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ABSTRACT
The Online Impossible Anagram Task: Development And Testing Of A Novel Online Cheating
Paradigm
by
Emily Joseph
Advisor: Maria Hartwig
For the past fifteen years, the Russano et al. (2005) cheating paradigm has dominated
research in the forensic psychological literature. While this paradigm successfully activates
theoretical mechanisms for ethical decision-making, applying the methods for online data
collection is cumbersome and retains a confound inherent in the design. Alternative cheating
paradigms from both the psychology and economics literatures were evaluated for their
suitability for an online cheating paradigm. The impossible anagram task was selected as most
likely to elicit the same internal and external cost-benefit analyses online as the Russano et al.
(2005) cheating paradigm does in-person: self-concept maintenance, ethical dissonance, and
moral disengagement. Three studies developed the online impossible anagram task and tested the
task as a guilt manipulation in a larger experimental design. First, Study 1 developed the stimuli
for the anagram task by evaluating the difficulty of 149 anagrams in the target population.
Second, Study 2 examined cheating behavior on different versions the task with the goal of
randomly assigning participants to guilt condition. I also hypothesized cheaters would experience
changes in self-concept, ethical dissonance, and moral disengagement. Finally, Study 3 provided
participants an opportunity to confess to cheating on the anagram task to examine the influence
of morality inductions on truthful disclosure. Study 1 successfully identified several
“impossible” anagrams participants in the target population were unable to correctly unscramble.
In Study 2, these “impossible” anagrams were used to classify cheating during the anagram task.
iv

Unfortunately, the rates of cheating among the different versions of the task did not meet a priori
thresholds for random assignment to guilt condition. However, in one version of the task,
participants cheated approximately 50% of the time, allowing comparisons between those who
self-selected their guilt status. Results from Studies 2 and 3 partially supported the hypotheses
regarding changes in ethical dissonance and moral disengagement as a result of cheating on the
anagram task but not self-concept. The morality inductions included in Study 3 moderated some
participants’ reports of ethical dissonance and moral disengagement, partially supporting the
hypotheses. Exploratory analyses suggest there may be fundamental personality differences
between participants who cheated to the fullest extent and those who abstained from cheating.
Implications of the results are discussed and recommendations made for further refinement of the
impossible anagram task for use as a guilt manipulation in online data collection.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Neither this dissertation nor the circumstances that led to its completion would have been
possible had Maria Hartwig not taken an interest in me as an undergraduate lab assistant, which
led to acceptance as a Homeland Security Scholar, which paved the road for application to John
Jay’s PhD program. Similarly, the defense of this dissertation would not have been possible if
not for the efforts of Charlie Stone, my sincerest gratitude.
I would also like to extend special thanks to my committee, both for their service as part
of this committee as well as support in my academic career. Nearly as much thanks is owed to
Timothy Luke for hearing me out during a Kentucky Derby party when I expressed my interest
in becoming involved with Maria’s lab. I surmise my life would be on a different path had ours
not crossed, but that is purely conjecture. What I can deduce is that you have been an invaluable
friend, colleague, and mentor for over a decade. Thank you to Mike Leippe for being my BASP
advisor, serving on multiple committees, and providing incredible insight into the psychosocial
mechanisms explored in this dissertation. Thank you to Mark Fondacaro for your instruction as
an undergraduate, participation in the faculty-student book club, and feedback and support
during my time in the program. Last, but certainly not least, thank you to Charlie Bond for
having the conversation with Maria that developed into my area of specialty and for your
collaboration in working towards publishing the results.
Completing a dissertation is difficult on in its own right, but doing so during a global
pandemic when social support systems are strained even more so. My undying gratitude to my
husband, František Čech, who kept me positive, focused, and fed. This dissertation would look
very different without your love, support, and patience. Thank you also to my parents and sister,
who were extremely supportive while (mostly) avoiding the dreaded “So, how’s your

vi

dissertation going?” question. Special thanks, to my mom, Karen, for being always being my
proof-reader from assignments where I was the QBS to this dissertation examining moral
decision-making. I love you all.

vii

CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES ………………………………………………………………………………..x
LIST OF FIGURES ...……………………………………………………………………………xi
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND ………………………………………………………………….1
Introduction ...………………………………………………………………………………….1
Why People Misbehave ...……………………………………………………………………...2
Dissonance ...…………………………………………………………………………………...4
Cheating Paradigms ...………………………………………………………………………….7
CHAPTER 2: PROJECT OVERVIEW .………………………………………………………...18
General Research Aims and Hypotheses ...…………………………………………………...19
CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1 ...………………………………………………………………………20
Participants .......……………………………………………………………………………....21
Materials ...……………………………………………………………………………………22
Procedures ...………………………………………………………………………………….23
Results ...……………………………………………………………………………………...24
Discussion ...………………………………………………………………………………….25
CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2 PILOT ...……………………………………………………………...27
Participants ...…………………………………………………………………………………29
Materials ...……………………………………………………………………………………29
Procedures ...………………………………………………………………………………….33
Results ...……………………………………………………………………………………...35
Discussion ...………………………………………………………………………………….37
CHAPTER 5: STUDY 2 ...………………………………………………………………………39
Participants ...…………………………………………………………………………………40
Materials ...……………………………………………………………………………………41
Procedures ...………………………………………………………………………………….41
Results ...……………………………………………………………………………………...42
Planned Analyses ...………………………………………………………………………..42
Exploratory Analyses ...……………………………………………………………………58
Discussion ...………………………………………………………………………………….62
CHAPTER 6: STUDY 3 ...………………………………………………………………………70
Participants……………………………………………………………………………………72
Materials ...……………………………………………………………………………………74
Procedures ...………………………………………………………………………………….74
Results ...……………………………………………………………………………………...76
Planned Analyses ………………………………………………………………………….76
Exploratory Analyses ...…………………………………………………………………..108
Discussion ...………………………………………………………………………………...114
CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION ...…………………………………………………...125
Theoretical Implications ...…………………………………………………………………..126
Future Directions…………………………………………………………………………….127
TABLES AND FIGURES ……………………………………………………………………..130
APPENDIX A………………………………………………………………………………......149
viii

APPENDIX B………………………………………………………………………………......151
APPENDIX C………………………………………………………………………………......152
APPENDIX D………………………………………………………………………………......154
APPENDIX E ...…………………………………………………………………………..........156
REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………………………...160

ix

TABLES
Page
Table 3.1 Proportions of anagrams correctly unscrambled in Study 1 ...………………………130
Table 5.1 Proportions of anagrams correctly unscrambled in Study 2 ...………………………137
Table 5.2 Confirmatory factor analysis fits Study 2 …………………………………………...139
Table 6.1 Proportions of anagrams correctly unscrambled in Study 3 ………………………...140
Table 6.2 Confirmatory factor analysis fits Study 3 …………………………………………...143
Table 6.3 Search engine check surrogate confession Study 3………………………………….147
Table 6.4 BFI subscales moral disengagement Study 3………………………………………..148

x

FIGURES
Fig. 1.
Fig. 2.
Fig. 3.
Fig. 4.

Page
Number of anagrams in each condition by confession position ……………………….142
Interaction between condition and cheating for anger Study 3………………………...144
Interaction between condition and cheating for shame Study 3………………………..145
Interaction between condition and cheating for fatigue Study 3……………………….146

xi

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND
Introduction
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) launched in November of 2005 and has since
become a staple for cheap, reliable data for psychological research (Litman et al., 2017). In fact,
in 2015, over one-third of studies published in top social psychology journals were conducted on
MTurk alone (Anderson et al., 2019). In general, online data collection accounted for just under
half of studies all published in those journals, over a 300% increase from five years prior
(Anderson et al., 2019). While mostly representative of the United States population (for full
review, see Sheehan, 2018), MTurk provides a cheap source of data validated across numerous
tasks and countries (e.g., Litman et al., 2015). Additionally, MTurk workers perform comparably
with undergraduate samples on attention and manipulation checks, with both MTurkers and
undergraduates performing more reliably than participants recruited from other online platforms
(i.e., Qualtrics and Lightspeed; Sheehan, 2018). However, MTurk workers are significantly more
demographically diverse than the average American college sample (e.g., Burhmester et al.,
2015).
In response to the trend of researchers moving their studies online, Litman and colleagues
(2017) aimed to increase the quality of MTurk data further by creating TurkPrime.com (now
CloudResearch). For instance, researchers can specify detailed inclusion and exclusion criteria to
exert more control over participant recruitment compared to standard MTurk. Additionally,
researchers can relaunch their study to increase visibility, thus increasing their total sample size,
or release their study in microbatches over pre-specified time periods to increase the sample’s
representativeness (Litman et al., 2017). Despite these advancements, some areas of research
have not been able to make the technological leap to online data collection, whether because of
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unfamiliarity and concerns with validity (Sheehan, 2018) or lack of development of paradigms
suitable for the online environment (Anderson et al., 2019).
This dissertation tackles the latter by developing and testing an online cheating paradigm
wherein participants were randomly assigned to a guilt or innocence condition. Cheating
paradigms have been used to examine ethical decision-making in the fields of economics (e.g.,
Shu et al., 2011) and psychology (e.g., Russano et al., 2005), but a literature search revealed that,
while there are some online cheating paradigms, none randomly assign participants to condition.
The literature reviewed below first explores leading theories regarding ethical decision-making,
arguing that these decisions have both internal and external drivers. As such, an online cheating
paradigm should influence participants to weigh both internal and external costs and benefits.
Next, prominent paradigms from both economics and psychology research are reviewed in terms
of the key drivers of (dis)honest behavior and evaluated for their compatibility with research in
an online environment. Finally, three studies are discussed regarding the development and testing
of an online cheating paradigm with random assignment to condition (Studies 1 and 2) and
demonstrating the paradigm’s use as the guilt manipulation to examine confession behavior
(Study 3).
Why People Misbehave
Researchers have examined both how and why people transgress, including Becker’s
(1968) examination of individuals’ choices to transgress from an economic, cost-benefit
perspective. Becker’s Rational Crime Theory posits that individuals are more likely to transgress
when the benefits of committing a crime outweigh the potential costs associated with the
commission of the crime, including probability of apprehension, probability of conviction, and
expected punishments if convicted (e.g., imprisonment, fiscal, social, etc.; Becker, 1968).
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Theoretically, according to Rational Crime Theory, crime would be eliminated if the costs for
transgressing always outweighed the benefits achieved via transgression, an admittedly
impossible feat.
While standard economic theories focus mainly on external incentives, psychological
theories frequently focus on internal incentives. However, humans are motivated by both internal
and external rewards (Mazar et al., 2008), so any rational choice theory attempting to explain the
cost-benefit analysis performed by potential transgressors must include both. Mazar and Ariely’s
(2006) General Model of Dishonest Behavior attempts to do so by identifying four general
drivers of dishonest behavior.
First, similar to Rational Crime Theory, the General Model of Dishonest Behavior
(Mazar & Ariely, 2006) proposes that dishonest behavior is likely to occur when the benefits of
dishonesty outweigh any external costs. Second, dishonest behavior is likely to occur due to an
underdevelopment of internal reward mechanisms stemming from a lack of internalized social
norms. In other words, if a person is unaware of, or uneducated in, expected, normative behavior,
their internal reward mechanisms are less likely to trigger for responding in a socially normative
fashion (i.e., behaving honestly). Third, dishonest behavior is likely to occur as a result of low
self-awareness, such that an individual’s internal reward mechanisms never get primed. That is,
when conducting a cost-benefit analysis for behaving (dis)honestly, the individual distances their
perception of themself from the unethical action, thereby bypassing the activation of potential
internal reward mechanisms. Fourth and finally, dishonest behavior is likely to occur as a result
of self-deception due to a self-serving bias. Similar to the distancing that occurs for dishonesty
resulting from low self-awareness, in this case, the distancing takes the form along the lines of “I
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may have over-reported how many answers I correctly answered (self-serving action), but I am
not a cheater” (Mazar & Ariely, 2006).
In testing the General Model of Dishonest Behavior, Mazar and Ariely (2006)
discovered, when given financial incentive, people cheat enough to benefit but not enough to
necessitate revision of their self-concept—how the individual perceives him or herself. In other
words, people weigh both the external and internal costs and benefits of dishonest behavior. This
may be due to an increased salience of a self-concept inconsistent with how the individuals
perceive themselves, thereby creating dissonance by highlighting discrepancies between current
actions (i.e., dishonesty) and how people prefer to view themselves (i.e., moral; Mazar & Ariely,
2006). Additional research suggests that people do not take full advantage of the opportunity to
increase their material gain from their dishonest behavior (Mazar et al., 2008). Instead, people
transgress just enough to benefit, but not so much that they have to revise their inherently moral
self-concept. Thus, self-concept maintenance theory posits the cost-benefit analysis when
deciding whether or not to engage in dishonest behavior includes the potential need for revision
of self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008).
Dissonance
Self-concept maintenance theory’s roots reach back to Festinger’s (1957) theory of
cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual has conflicting attitudes,
beliefs, or behaviors resulting in an uncomfortable psychological state. For instance, an
individual who cheats on an activity (behavior) but views themself as a morally respectable
member of society (belief) would experience cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, individuals in a
state of cognitive dissonance often attempt to reduce this discomfort by altering the out-ofbalance attitude, belief, or behavior.

4

When confronted with a situation where their dishonest actions threaten their self-concept
as an inherently good or moral person, an individual may experience the unpleasantness of
ethical dissonance (Barkan et al., 2012). Like cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), ethical
dissonance is an aversive psychological state occurring when there is a disagreement between an
individual’s cognitions, beliefs, attitudes, or actions. Likewise, ethical dissonance can be
triggered by simply imagining behaving unethically or remembering past unethical behaviors;
however, the effect is strongest when an individual’s behaviors directly contradict their moral
self-concept (Barkan et al., 2012). Despite these similarities, ethical dissonance differs from
cognitive dissonance in several ways.
First, the dissonant behavioral misconduct threatens self-perceived goodness. For
instance, cheating on a task, especially when instructed to behave honestly, challenges the
individual’s self-concept as a good person. Second, and similar to the General Model of
Dishonest Behavior, definitions of right and wrong are prescribed by society, thereby attributes
of goodness have both internal and external loci. In addition to the internal conflict of their
actions and self-concept, the individual’s cheating violates socially normative defined morality
(i.e., cheating is bad). Finally, the consequences of an ethical failure being exposed may be
linked to tangible losses as well as negative affect. If the individual were to get caught and
exposed as a cheater, they could experience the tangible loss of money (e.g., not getting paid)
and/or time (e.g., spent on the activity), plus negative feelings both from failing to get away with
their dishonesty and from the conflicting morality of dishonest behavior (i.e., cheating) and their
moral self-concept (Barkan et al., 2012).
The experience of ethical dissonance may be why Mazar and Ariely’s (2006) third and
fourth drivers of dishonest behavior—low self-awareness and self-deception, respectively—
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contain an aspect of distancing the individual’s self-concept from their dishonest behavior.
Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) is an aversive psychological state, and individuals
experiencing cognitive dissonance engage in the first method of dissonance reduction provided
(Gosling et al., 2006). However, research suggests that ethical dissonance threatens self-concept
beyond both ethically neutral cognitive dissonance and ethically neutral threats to self-concept
(Barkan et al., 2012, Exp. 5). As a result, the desire to reduce ethical dissonance should be even
stronger than Gosling et al. (2006) report, especially when the ethical dissonance results from
unambiguous unethical behaviors (Ayal & Gino, 2011).
Dissonance Reduction Strategies
One form this ethical dissonance reduction may take is impression management, whereby
individuals attempt to present themselves as ultra-honest to counteract negative affect (e.g., low
self-esteem) resulting from the dissonant state. Additionally, people experiencing ethical
dissonance provide harsher moral judgment of others, provide overly righteous advice, and are
more likely to fall victim to the fundamental attribution error than those not experiencing ethical
dissonance (Barkan et al., 2012).
Another form ethical dissonance reduction may take is moral disengagement from the
unethical action, whereby the individual distances themself from the action of cheating in an
attempt to rationalize their behavior (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura et al., 2001; Barkan et al.,
2012; Shu et al., 2011). Bandura and colleagues’ (1996, 2001) examinations of moral
disengagement focused on children and adolescents. Shu et al. (2011) created a shorter, more
generalized measure to study instances of moral disengagement in adults, who demonstrate
moral disengagement in scenarios ranging from reading descriptions of dishonest behavior to
cheating after reading and signing an honor code. Importantly, moral disengagement is especially
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high among cheaters when moral awareness has been heightened (i.e., reading an honor code;
Shu et al., 2011). Moral disengagement often takes the form of persuading oneself that the
unethical behavior is morally justifiable through rationalization.
When rationalization and moral disengagement are insufficient to reduce ethical
dissonance, individuals may resort to engaging in altruistic behaviors, making social
comparisons, or moral cleansing (Ayal & Gino, 2011). Receivers of ill-gotten gains are often
willing to split or donate their profits, but prior knowledge that others would benefit increases
occurrences of dishonest behavior (Gino et al., 2013; Wiltermuth, 2011). In other words, the
presence of co-beneficiaries provides an altruistic justification to engage in dishonest behaviors,
and splitting the spoils with others can serve as a method of ethical dissonance reduction.
Likewise, the presence of others often determines relative social norms for ethical
behavior (Ayal & Gino, 2011). If another individual initiates cheating (e.g., Russano et al., 2005)
or establishes that overt cheating goes unpunished (e.g., Gino et al., 2009), ethical dissonance
reduction can occur via direct comparisons of one’s own unethical behavior to other’s in the
same situation (e.g., “They started it; I just acquiesced”). Lastly, acts of moral cleansing (e.g.,
physical washing, pain, and confession) can reduce ethical dissonance and act as a deterrent for
future acts of dishonesty in the short-term (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Ayal et al., 2010; Peer et al.,
2014). While some effects of moral disengagement, ethical dissonance, and moral cleansing fail
to replicate (Kristal et al., 2020; Rotella & Barclay, 2020), this project used different operational
definitions, materials, and procedures to explore these phenomena than were used in the failed
replications.
Cheating Paradigms
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This dissertation investigated the mechanisms of self-concept maintenance, moral
disengagement, and ethical dissonance in an online setting. The examination of mechanisms
behind ethical decision-making spans multiple realms, with much of research above coming
from the economics literature. However, cheating has also been used as a manipulation of guilt
in the forensic psychology literature (e.g., Haney-Caron, 2018; Russano et al., 2005). The
following section reviews predominant paradigms in both literatures in terms of the concepts
described above as well as assesses their practicality for online data collection.
Russano et al. (2005) Cheating Paradigm
In 2005, Russano et al. introduced a novel experimental paradigm whereby participants
could be randomly assigned to be either morally culpable (guilty) or not culpable (innocent) of a
seemingly real transgression. All participants engaged in a problem-solving task where they were
instructed to work either alone or as a dyad, where the other participant was a confederate, on
solving the problems. The key critical rule of the experiment was to follow instructions for which
problems were to be solved individually versus as a team. In the guilty condition, the confederate
solicits help from the participant during the portion of the task when participants are instructed to
work alone, whereas in the innocent condition, the confederate follows the task instructions.
Overall, research using this paradigm achieves 94-96% adherence to the guilt manipulation (e.g.,
Guyll et al., 2013; Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Russano et al., 2005).
Although the Russano et al. (2005) cheating paradigm successfully manipulates whether
participants engage in dishonest behavior, the manipulation presents challenges for examining
psychological mechanisms behind participants’ decisions to behave (dis)honestly. When the
confederate induces the participant to cheat by breaking the rules of the experiment, the social
norms of the experiment change. As noted above, people are more likely to behave dishonestly
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when others also benefit, especially when someone else initiates the dishonest behavior (e.g.,
Wiltermuth, 2011). Unfortunately, the confederate’s presence also serves as a route of ethical
dissonance reduction via moral comparisons between the confederate’s behavior (i.e., instigating
cheating) and the participant’s behavior (i.e., acquiescing).
Additionally, in the Russano et al. (2005) paradigm, the confederate “asked for help” (p.
483), which provides another potential avenue for ethical dissonance reduction via moral
disengagement (e.g., Barkan et al., 2012). Instead of viewing breaking the experiment’s rule
against collaborating on the individual portions of the problem-solving task as “cheating”, guilty
participants can disengage from their dishonest behavior by reframing cheating on the task for
their own gain as “helping” their fellow participant.
Lastly, the Russano et al. (2005) paradigm was initially developed to investigate true and
false confessions. The act of confessing provides an avenue of ethical dissonance reduction
(Ayal & Gino, 2011). In other words, if neither the changed social norms nor moral
disengagement successfully relieve the psychological discomfort experienced from cheating on
the task, participants can absolve themselves of their actions via partial confessions (e.g., Peer et
al., 2014), full confessions (e.g., Russano et al., 2005), or even taking the blame for someone
else’s dishonest behavior (e.g., Pimentel et al., 2015).
In the past fifteen years, the paradigm has been used in several populations to investigate
different facets of the criminal justice system, including Miranda waivers (e.g., Scherr & Franks,
2015), interrogation techniques (e.g., Joseph et al., 2021), plea bargains (e.g., Cardenas et al.,
2020), and confessions (e.g., Russano et al., 2005). While the paradigm successfully manipulates
guilt and is useful for investigating the behavior of both guilty and falsely accused individuals
(e.g., Guyll et al., 2013; Pimentel et al., 2015), the presence of the confederate complicates
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investigating the mechanisms by which people decide to behave dishonestly both during the
initial (i.e., cheating) and subsequent (i.e., interrogation and confession) phases of an experiment.
Exline et al. Cheating Paradigm
Thirty years prior to Russano et al.’s (2005) cheating paradigm, Exline et al. (1970) also
examined cheating behavior using confederate-participant dyads. Instead of a problem-solving
task, the dyads were to estimate the number of dots present on a card and determine shapes of the
figures made by the dots; the group with the highest score after 12 cards would receive a bonus
prize of $10, worth approximately $66 today. About halfway through the 12 cards, the
experimenter was called out of the room, providing an opening for misbehavior.
Similar to the Russano et al. (2005) paradigm, the confederate instigated the cheating by
discovering and sharing answers with the participant. However, the bulk of the moral culpability
in Exline et al.’s (1970) paradigm shifted to the participant. While the confederate had the
answer key for their previously attempted guesses, the participant had the answer key for
upcoming, more difficult cards and were instructed by the confederate to write them down to use
as a reference when the experimenter returned. If the participant refused, the confederate then
read the correct answers aloud while writing them down in his/her own notepad to ensure the
participant at least had guilty knowledge. When the experimenter returned, the task continued,
followed by an increasingly accusatorial interrogation where, again, the bulk of the moral
culpability for reporting the misbehavior rested on the participant (e.g., the confederate deferred
or redirected to the participant).
Exline et al. (1970) successfully implicated 38 participants in either cheating or, at the
very least, acquiescing to the confederate’s cheating by not reporting the infraction to the
experimenter. One of the strengths of both Exline et al.’s (1970) and Russano et al.’s (2005)
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cheating paradigms is the motivation to not get caught for violating the rules of the experiment.
In both cases, student participants were threatened external costs relating to the institutions’
expectations for student behavior (e.g., Honor Council and an angry professor, respectively).
Additionally, Exline et al.’s (1970) participants faced an additional external cost if they did not
acquiesce with the confederate, the loss at a chance for the equivalent of $66 dollars today,
which was exacerbated by the experimenter disclosing that the dyad had surpassed all other
groups’ scores by a wide margin. Online samples cannot be threatened with violations of a
school’s honor code, but research successfully using the Russano paradigm in community
samples (Joseph et al., 2021) suggests the threat of both external (losing compensation for their
participation) and internal costs (e.g., self-concept maintenance, ethical dissonance) may be
sufficient motivation for online participants to continue behaving unethically when confronted
about their cheating, especially since online participants are willing to do so in activities with
much lower personal investment (see next section).
Unfortunately, because the confederate instigated the unethical behavior, Exline et al.’s
(1970) cheating paradigm falls prey to the same issues regarding ethical decision-making
(Wiltermuth, 2011) and possible avenues for ethical dissonance reduction via moral comparisons
and confession (Ayal & Gino, 2011) as the Russano et al. (2005) cheating paradigm.
Die Tosses and Coin Flips
To address the complications associated with a confederate’s presence, some researchers
have examined individual’s (mis)reporting of random outcomes like die tosses (e.g., Fischbacher
& Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi et al., 2011) and coin flips (e.g., Peer et al., 2014; Pittarello et al.,
2016). In both types of paradigms, participants’ winnings are dependent upon the outcome of
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either throwing a die or flipping a coin. Participants can behave dishonestly by misreporting the
outcome to increase their financial gain.
For example, participants are instructed to roll a six-sided die and have an opportunity to
receive a cash bonus depending on the outcome of the roll (Fishbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013;
Shalvi et al., 2011). In order to maximize the chances that participants will misreport the number
on the die, experimenters are either in a different room (Fishbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013) or the
die is rolled under a cup with a small viewing hole cut out of the top (Shalvi et al., 2011). Both of
these procedures make determining whether cheating occurred on the individual level impossible
because ground truth is not known. Instead, probabilities are used to gauge the likelihood of the
distribution of reported outcomes. In other words, cheating is assessed by evaluating the
probability of the distribution of the reported outcome for the sample as a whole, but it is
impossible to tell which individual participants are guilty or innocent of misreporting.
In order to address the issue of ground truth, researchers have used digital coin flip
programs where participants click to initiate the coin flip, then report the outcome (Peer et al.,
2014; Pittarello et al., 2016). Like with the die toss paradigms, the reported results of the coin
flip impact the participants’ financial gain. However, the use of software allows researchers to
track the outcome of each coin flip and link the outcome to individual participants, thereby
providing individual-level data regarding (dis)honest reporting. Additionally, because the coin
tosses are software-based, these methods are better suited for research using online samples (e.g.,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk) over the Russano et al. (2005) paradigm.
While both the individual-level data and flexibility of usage for in-person and online
samples are improvements over the die toss paradigm, neither method allows for random
assignment to cheating versus non-cheating conditions, one of the strengths of the Russano et al.
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(2005) paradigm. That said, the die toss and coin flip paradigms allow for a purer route for
investigating mechanisms involved in ethical decision-making because neither involve a
confederate to introduce possible avenues of ethical dissonance reduction. Though some research
uses multiple tosses and flips, both the die toss and coin flip paradigms are often “one shot”
tasks, where participants only have one, relatively low-stakes, opportunity to behave
(dis)honestly (Gerlach et al., 2019). As a result, applications to the forensic psychology realm,
where people are faced with multiple and compounding ethical decision-making opportunities
(e.g., commission, interrogation, plea bargain/confession, etc.), are limited.
Matrix Tasks
In addition to proposing a theoretical framework for dishonest behavior, Mazar et al.
(2008) also introduced a new matrix-solving paradigm to test and investigate their theoretical
framework. Several versions of the matrix task exist (see Gerlach et al., 2019, for a review), but
the fundamental activity is consistent. Participants are provided with several matrices containing
12 numbers and are instructed to solve as many matrices as possible in the provided time by
finding two numbers that sum to 10. Across the over 100 studies using the matrix task (Gerlach
et al., 2019), researchers have varied the difficulty of the matrices (e.g., 7 + 3 versus 7.44 + 2.56)
as well as the time allotted for solving the matrices.
Most versions of the matrix task include random assignment to an experimental group—
who self-score their results—or a control group—where the experimenter scores the responses
(Gerlach et al., 2019). The experimental group can cheat by inflating the number of matrices
reportedly solved, whereas the control group cannot. Cheating is evaluated at either the
aggregate level—using statistical probabilities between the number of correctly solved matrices
in each condition—or individual level—using ploys to track individual performance (e.g., carbon
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paper, identifiable collection slips, etc.). In some versions of the matrix task, researchers include
“impossible” matrices where there are no pairs that sum to 10.
Like die-roll and coin-flip tasks, the decision to behave dishonestly rests solely on the
participant. Additionally, similar to solving problems in the Russano et al. (2005) paradigm,
solving matrices involves more personal investment in the task than either rolling a die or
flipping a digital coin. Furthermore, the nature of matrix tasks is suitable for the online
environment using timed pages and hot spots on Qualtrics. Unfortunately, research by Heyman
et al. (2020) and Faravelli and colleagues (2015) suggests that some of the dishonest reporting in
matrix tasks are actually honest mistakes, with no way to distinguish between purposeful
overreporting and these honest mistakes. Moreover, these honest mistakes, likely due to poor
addition skills, also open an avenue for rationalizing the behavior via blaming poor performance
on poor mathematical ability (Heyman et al., 2020). As a result, the drivers of dishonest behavior
may not be activated to their fullest, which may explain why cheating rates are quite low even
when conditions are favorable for getting away with it (39%; Gerlach et al., 2019). Despite the
many strengths of Mazar et al.’s (2008) matrix task, the inability to distinguish honest mistakes
from dishonest overreporting and relatively low rates of cheating in the experimental group make
this paradigm unsuitable for the current project.
Anagram Tasks
Like the die toss, coin flip, and matrix paradigms, unscrambling anagrams does not
require a confederate to either induce or measure cheating. The carbonless anagram method
(CAM; Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2010) and impossible anagrams (Wiltermuth, 2011) provide two
possible avenues for investigating the mechanisms of ethical-decision making when both
financial and personal stakes are on the line, without the complications a confederate contributes.
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The CAM (Ruedy & Schwietzer, 2010) tasks participants with unscrambling anagrams in
a short amount of time with added financial incentive for each correct answer. After the allotted
time has elapsed, participants self-score the number of anagrams correctly unscrambled in
private. Unbeknownst to participants, carbonless copy paper containing the imprint of their
original answers can be compared to the self-scored sheet to establish individual-level cheating.
As a result, a scale measure of cheating—ranging from 0 over-reported answers to the maximum
number of anagrams—exists for the CAM.
While the CAM has been used to examine confession behavior (Haney-Caron, 2018),
there is no random assignment to condition. There may be fundamental differences between
those who decide to behave dishonestly versus those who honestly report their results, which
could affect future decision-making in follow-up tasks (i.e., interrogations and confessions; Ayal
& Gino, 2011). While the CAM is a promising avenue for forensic psychological research
involving ethical decision-making, the use of carbonless paper makes the CAM unsuitable for
online research.
An alternative for online research is the impossible anagram task (Cameron & Miller,
2009; Wiltermuth, 2011). While the CAM provides financial rewards for every correct answer,
the impossible anagram task only rewards successive correct answers. In order to receive
compensation for correctly unscrambling a word, participants must correctly unscramble all
preceding words as well. For instance, to get paid for correctly answering the fourth anagram,
participants must also correctly answer the first, second, and third anagrams.
While most of the anagrams are relatively simple (e.g., ELLOWY; Cameron & Miller,
2009), essentially unsolvable, obscure words (e.g, Taguan, Semovedly; Wiltermuth, 2011) are
placed strategically within the series of anagrams such that participants are incentivized to cheat
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to maximize their financial gains. For example, in a series of nine anagrams, Cameron and Miller
(2009) placed their impossible anagrams in the 2nd and 7th positions; 42% of their participants
reported solving the first impossible anagram (cheaters) and 22% reported solving the second
(super-cheaters). Also in a series of nine anagrams, Wiltermuth (2011) placed his impossible
anagrams in the 3rd and 9th positions; 29% of his participants reported solving the first impossible
anagram (cheaters) and approximately 7% reported solving the second (super-cheaters).
Because people self-select whether or not to cheat, neither the CAM nor the impossible
anagram task randomly assigns people to a cheat versus no-cheating condition. Despite this, the
impossible anagram task appears to be the most promising starting point for creating an online
cheating paradigm for use in social and forensic psychology research with random assignment to
cheating condition. In fact, versions of the impossible anagram task have been used to examine
ethical decision-making in online samples. Hoffman et al. (2015) successfully used a version of
the impossible anagram task in an online sample, but there was no random assignment to
condition and only 15.5% of their sample cheated on the task. Kristal et al. (2020) reported a
higher rate of cheating (55-59%), but there was no attempt to randomly assign participants to
guilt condition. Examination of the means and standard deviations for correctly reported answers
is in line with previous literature suggesting that people cheat a little when given the opportunity
(e.g., reporting an extra 1-2 correct answers), but not enough to require revision of their selfconcept (Mazar et al., 2008). One of the goals of this project was to design a cheating condition
where individuals are incentivized to cheat thereby significantly increasing the proportion of
people who cheat when provided the opportunity.
If constructing series of anagrams to encourage cheating is possible, constructing series
of anagrams that encourage honest reporting is plausible, thus addressing the lack of random
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assignment. The impossible anagram task also involves the same level of personal investment as
Russano et al.’s (2005) problem-solving task, without the confederate complications, thereby
providing a purer mechanism for examining the mechanisms of ethical decision-making in an
online environment. Furthermore, individual-level cheating can be assessed on a non-binary
level (i.e., non-cheaters, cheaters, super-cheaters) when using only a single set of anagrams.
Additionally, the rates of cheating are higher for the impossible anagram task (55-59%; Kristal et
al., 2020) compared to the matrix task (39%; Gerlach et al., 2019). Lastly, because the dishonest
behavior requires an attempt to deceive by violating the study’s rules for personal gain, the
impossible anagram task could be used as a guilt manipulation for online investigations of
interrogations, plea bargains, and confessions.
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CHAPTER TWO: PROJECT OVERVIEW
This dissertation examined psychological mechanisms of ethical decision-making using a
novel, online cheating paradigm. Previous research suggests that people engage in a cost-benefit
analysis when deciding whether to behave honestly or dishonestly, and this analysis involves
both internal and external considerations (e.g., Becker, 1968, Mazar & Ariely, 2006). Because of
ethical and practical constraints, for many laboratory studies, the dishonest behavior takes the
form of cheating—a behavior which breaks a rule with the intent to gain an unfair advantage
(e.g., Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Russano et al., 2005). When people decide to cheat, they may
experience ethical dissonance—an unpleasant psychological state resulting from their unethical
actions conflicting with their moral self-image and characterized by aversive arousal (Barkan et
al., 2012). Like individuals experiencing cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), individuals
experiencing ethical dissonance seek to reduce these unpleasant feelings (Gosling et al., 2006).
Much of the research in the past 15 years in the field of psychology has utilized the
Russano et al. (2005) cheating paradigm, which, due to the presence and influence of a
confederate, muddies examination of potential mechanisms for ethical decision-making like selfconcept maintenance, ethical dissonance, and moral disengagement. In the field of economics,
die toss and coin flip paradigms lack personal investment in the task, lack random assignment,
and show limited potential for use in social and forensic psychological research (e.g., Fishbacher
& Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Peer et al., 2014). Anagram tasks have been used by economics
researchers (e.g., Cameron & Miller, 2009) and psychology researchers (e.g., Haney-Caron,
2018), and show the most promise for developing an online cheating paradigm.
General Research Aims and Hypotheses
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The purposes of the proposed project are two-fold. Studies 1 and 2 focus on the
development and testing of an online cheating paradigm with random assignment to guilt
condition including measures of self-concept maintenance, ethical dissonance, and moral
disengagement as additional dependent variables. Study 3 is a replication-plus-extension
examining the opportunity to confess dishonest behavior as a possible method of ethical
dissonance reduction. In addition to measuring the rates at which people cheat, dependent
measures also include measures of self-concept maintenance, ethical dissonance, and moral
disengagement.
Regarding the difficulty of the anagrams, some anagrams will be more difficult to solve
than others. Regarding the testing of the impossible anagram task, I predicted that participants
would cheat more in the cheat condition compared to the no-cheat condition. Additionally,
because participants’ decisions to cheat would be in direct violation of the rules of the
experiment, thus threatening both internal and external costs, I predicted directional hypotheses
for all three dependent measures. First, participants who cheat will experience lower feelings of
self-concept (report more negative affect on the self-esteem scale) compared to participants who
do not cheat (Vaidis & Gosling, 2011). Second, cheaters will experience more ethical dissonance
(score lower on the emotional affect scale) than non-cheaters (Barkan et al., 2012). Third,
participants who cheat will experience more moral disengagement (score higher on the moral
disengagement about cheating scale) immediately after cheating than participants who do not
cheat (Shu et al., 2011).
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CHAPTER THREE: STUDY 1
Because this project developed and tested a novel online cheating paradigm, there were
many unknowns regarding the anagrams to be used and the construction of the task itself. The
first step and primary goal of Study 1 was to develop and test a list of anagrams for difficulty in
the target population. These anagrams would then be used as the stimuli for Studies 2 and 3,
where the testing of an online impossible anagram task with random assignment to condition
occurred (Cameron & Miller, 2009; Wiltermuth, 2011).
At a minimum, the construction of the stimulus materials for Studies 2 and 3 required at
least two impossible anagrams, p = .01, SE = .013, 95% CI [-.015, .035], and at least eight words
participants were easily able to solve, p = .90, SE = .039, 95% CI [.824, .976]. This would allow
for the construction of the impossible anagram tasks as described above with sufficient
sensitivity to detect differences at the quartile level. However, in the unlikely event that
participants were able to solve all of the anagrams within the allotted time, a more conservative
metric of success would be used for defining “impossible” anagrams, p = .10, SE = .039, 95% CI
[.024, .176]. Even with more conservative measures of 10% and 90%, there is still sufficient
sensitivity to detect differences at the tertile level.
Data collection took place in two phases. First, a small pilot test (N = 20) was used to
check words for multiple correct solutions that were not identified by the primary investigator.
Second, large scale distribution of the survey established the difficulty of the anagrams based on
the proportion of correct solutions participants entered.
Method
Participants
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Two hundred workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were recruited for the
main data collection (Litman et al., 2017). An additional 20 participants were recruited using the
same method for pilot testing. In total, fourteen participants were excluded from the study for
failing an instructional comprehension check regarding the rules for unscrambling the anagrams
(n = 10), self-reported lack of fluency in English (n = 3), and non-completion of the study (n =
1). Demographic questions occurred at the end of the study, so I could not test for demographic
differences between those who were rejected partway through the study and those who
completed the study.
Participants ranged in age from 20- to 67-years-old (M = 36.67, SD = 10.73). Most
participants identified as male (n = 183, 82.43%), and, with the exception of two participants
(0.9%), the rest identified as female. The vast majority of participants identified as White (n =
181, 81.53%), followed by Black/African American (n = 30, 13.51%), Other/Mixed (n = 6,
2.7%), American Indian/Alaskan Native (n = 2, 0.90%), and Asian (n = 2, 0.90%).
For the most part, participants were employed either full- or part-time (n = 183, 82.43%,
n = 20, 9.00%) with about half making less than $50,000 annually (n = 117, 52.94%), one-fifth
making between $50,000-100,000 (n = 42, 19.00%), and about one-third making more than
$100,000 annually (n = 62, 28.05%). Participants were also well-educated with all reporting
attending at least some college (n = 68, 30.77%) or completing a professional degree (n = 115,
52.04%). All participants responded that they were fluent English speakers and writers, and most
(n = 218, 98.20%) responded that English was their first language. Participants were
compensated $1.50 for their time (M = 15.13 minutes, SD = 6.07 minutes) with an additional
$0.01 bonus for each correctly answered anagram (possible total compensation of $2).
Materials
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A list of random words, 5-7 letters in length (see Cameron & Miller, 2009; Wiltermuth,
2011), were randomly generated using Random Lists’ Random Word Generator, which generates
random lists of words from more than 2500 of the most common English words (Random Lists,
n.d.; see Appendix A). Random Lists samples with replacement. Any exact duplicates (e.g.,
“Groan” appeared twice) were deleted, and, if the singular and plural both appeared (e.g.,
“Glove” and “Gloves”) a coin flip determined which remained in the list. Additionally, some
words exceeded the maximum word length due to conjugation (e.g., “Drinking”) or appeared
only in plural form (e.g., Sequoias) and were shortened to fit the a priori range for word length
(e.g., “Drink” and “Sequoia”, respectively). Lastly, some words (e.g., “Unite” and “Grate”) were
excluded because more than one correct word could be formed using the letters (e.g., “Untie”
and “Great”).
In case none of Random Lists’ words were difficult enough to stump participants, an
additional list of words, 5-7 letters in length, were retrieved from Vocabulary.com. The list is
described as “hard, random words pulled from the dictionary, meant for advanced
spellers/vocabulary learners” (Vocabulary.com, n.d.; see Appendix B). After the exclusions
above, the 156 remaining words were scrambled using Word Scramble Maker (Education.com,
n.d.). In case none of the words were easy enough for virtually all participants to solve, twenty
words, 5-7 letters in length, were retrieved from Word-Game-World.com (n.d.) from a variety of
worksheets described as “an easy word scramble that’s fun for kids” and manually scrambled
with the intention of keeping the number of letters needed to be unscrambled to a minimum (e.g.,
MONKEY à MONKYE). A pilot study (N = 20) was conducted to check for any anagrams with
multiple correct solutions (e.g., TONIP à PINTO, POINT, and PINOT). A single coder
examined the responses and identified words that had multiple correct solutions. These anagrams
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were eliminated from the list of anagrams for full data collection, resulting in a final list
containing 149 anagrams.
Procedure
Advertisements for the study were placed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk through
CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017). MTurk workers who accepted the human intelligence task
(HIT) for this study were directed to a survey hosted on Qualtrics. The informed consent
informed participants that they would be unscrambling 50 words presented one-at-a-time, with
each correctly answered anagram adding a one-cent bonus to their compensation. After agreeing
to the informed consent, participants advanced to a page containing a scrambled word (e.g.,
PPAER) and had 20 seconds to solve the anagram (e.g., PAPER) before the page automatically
advanced to the next anagram. If a participant completed the anagram before the allotted time
expired, they were able to click the “Next” button to advance to the following anagram. No
backtracking was allowed. After completing all 50 anagrams, participants were thanked for their
participation and given a completion code to enter into MTurk.
Coding
Two coders each coded half of the data with a 10% overlap. Overall, there was 98.11%
agreement regarding whether the anagrams had a single or multiple possible correct solutions,
Cohen’s κ = 0.88. In instances of disagreement, we erred on the side of caution and coded the
anagram as having multiple correct solutions. This resulted in identification of 17 additional
anagrams with more than one correct solution. Once the variations were identified, the data for
these 17 anagrams were recoded such that any possible solution was marked as correct resulting
in 100% agreement.
Results
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Pilot data were combined with the full dataset, with the exception of anagrams that were
excluded after pilot testing, for a final sample of 220 participants. With 220 participants, each
word was seen approximately 63 times (M = 63.34, SD = 3.08), which provides sufficient
sensitivity to detect differences between anagrams most participants were able to solve, p = .75,
SE = .054, 95% CI [.643, .857], half were able to solve, p = .50, SE = .063, 95% CI [.377, .623],
a quarter were able to solve, p = .25, SE = .055, 95% CI [.143, .357], and those which virtually
no one was able to solve, p = .01, SE = .013, 95% CI [-.015, .035]. On average, participants were
able to correctly unscramble 19.22 (SD = 12.34) anagrams of the 50 they were shown.
Because some anagrams included in the final data collection had multiple correct
solutions and all possible solutions were coded as correct, the proportion solved for these
anagrams are inflated. Excluding anagrams with multiple correct solutions, 16 anagrams were
solved at least 75% of the time, 31 anagrams were solved between 50-75% of the time, 40
anagrams were solved between 25-50% of the time, 38 anagrams were solved between 1-25% of
the time, and 17 anagrams were solved less than 10% of the time, including 3 which no one
correctly unscrambled. Unfortunately, no anagrams were solved at least 90% of the time. Table
3.1 contains the full list of anagrams ranked from easiest to hardest difficulty, determined by the
proportion correctly unscrambled.
On average, participants spent about 13 seconds on each anagram (M = 13.23, SD =
2.25). The difficulty of the anagrams was strongly negatively correlated with the average time
spent attempting to unscramble the anagram, r = -.904, p < .001, 95% CI [-.930, -.869]. For the
most part, participants were able to quickly unscramble the easier anagrams and devoted more
time attempting to unscramble the more difficult anagrams.
Discussion
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The purpose of this first study was to generate a list of anagrams with varying difficulties
for use in developing the online impossible anagram task, with a particular focus of finding
impossible anagrams. By this measure, the study was a success. Seventeen anagrams were
unscrambled less than 10% of the time, including 3 which were “impossible” that no participants
were able to correctly solve. Additionally, the negative correlation between proportion correctly
solved and time spent attempting to unscramble the anagram lends additional support for the
difficulty ranking of the anagrams in Table 3.1.
A second goal of this study was to find words that virtually all participants were able to
unscramble. Though statistically unlikely, ideally these words would have been correctly
unscrambled at least 99% of the time, p = .99, SE = .013, 95% CI [.965, 1.015]. Knowing the
odds were stacked against achieving that rate of accuracy, a more conservative proportion of
90% was proposed as an alternative, p = .90, SE = .038, 95% CI [.826, .974]. Unfortunately,
none of the anagrams were unscrambled at least 90% of the time, though 10 were unscrambled at
least 80% of the time. Even using this more conservative measure of success, there is still
sufficient sensitivity to detect differences between these 10 anagrams and those which no one
was able to solve. Therefore, the easiest eight words and two, randomly selected “impossible”
words were used for construction of the impossible anagram task for Studies 2 and 3.
Limitations
It is important to note that the proportions in Table 3.1 may be artificially reduced due to
fatigue. Participants randomly received 50 anagrams, given 20 seconds to solve each, and were
not given a break. Though the order of anagrams was randomized, the lack of a break may have
resulted in a decline of accuracy as the study progressed. As such, some of the easier words may
in fact be more solvable than the findings from this study suggest and even reaching the desired
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levels (See Studies 2 and 3). Additionally, some of the participants skipped difficult-looking
anagrams, possibly decreasing the average time spent unscrambling some anagrams. Despite
occurrences of this behavior, there was still strong negative correlation between anagram
difficulty and time spent on the anagram.
The most troubling limitation with this study was the format in which the anagrams were
presented on Qualtrics. Because the anagrams were included as part of the question text, some of
the less scrupulous participants were able to copy the anagrams into web-based anagram
unscramblers then paste the correct solution back into the Qualtrics survey. The average
participant was able to correctly unscramble about 19 anagrams, but some participants correctly
entered as many as 46 solutions. While this behavior would have inflated the proportion for all
difficulty ratings, it is especially concerning when attempting to identify impossible anagrams.
However, there were still 3 anagrams no participants correctly solved and a total of 17 less than
10% were able to correctly solve, which provided more than needed for constructing the online
impossible anagram task.
Conclusion
Overall, Study 1 of this dissertation accomplished the goal of developing a list of
anagrams with varying difficulty from which the impossible anagram task could be created. Even
though no anagrams met the 90% cutoff, there is enough sensitivity to detect differences between
the impossible anagrams and those that were solved at least 80% of the time. Additionally, the
limitations noted above provided valuable insight for the presentation format of the online
impossible anagram task. For instance, anagrams were presented as images in the following
studies, thereby preventing participants from easily copy-pasting into anagram unscramblers.
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CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY 2 PILOT
After collecting data regarding the difficulty of the anagrams in Study 1, the construction
of the online impossible anagram task could commence. The ideal outcome for testing the
paradigm would be to have two conditions: one where cheating occurred less than 25% of the
time and one where cheating occurred at least 50% of the time. Originally, the plan was to
compare a self-reported Cheating condition to a fill-in-the-blank Computer-Scored condition.
However, that design introduces format confounds that may influence some of the key affect
measures used for hypothesis testing. To this end, pilot testing of potential alternatives examined
different instructions, phrasing, and tweaks to the self-report condition for development of a
version where participants would not cheat.
The impossible anagram task for the no-cheating condition posed an interesting
quandary. This pilot study explored two alternatives that kept the presentation format between
the Cheating and No Cheating condition constant and reduce cheating to the a priori 25%
threshold detailed in the dissertation proposal. To reiterate, if cheating rates were near or below
25%, further testing of that condition would be warranted in an attempt to retain random
assignment to condition without significant data loss. The first potential alternative manipulated
the motivation to misreport the number of correctly unscrambled anagrams; the second
manipulated the difficulty of the anagrams.
The driving force behind how the impossible anagram task functions is that people are
willing to compromise their moral integrity a little when the benefits outweigh the costs (i.e.,
reporting correctly solving anagram 3 to get credit for anagrams 4-8; Wiltermuth 2011).
Manipulating the motivation to misreport by adjusting the way the bonus is calculated may alter
this cost-benefit analysis and reduce cheating when the bonus is for all correctly unscrambled
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anagrams as opposed to sequentially solved anagrams (Hypothesis 1). Because the “impossible”
anagrams are positioned in slots 3 and 8, participants who only get a 25% increase in their bonus
by misreporting may be less likely to do so than those who face a 400% increase.
Alternatively only 1% of Wiltermuth’s (2011) participants cheated to the fullest extent
(i.e., reporting correctly solving anagram 9 to get credit for anagram 10). Using this logic, along
with the theories of ethical decision-making and dissonance discussed above, participants may be
less likely to falsely report correctly unscrambling multiple “impossible” words in the Impossible
No Cheating condition compared to either the Cheating or No Cheating conditions (Hypothesis
2). Plus, if they did report successfully unscrambling them, we would know that they
purposefully cheated to increase their own financial gain because less than 10% of participants
were able to correctly unscramble these anagrams in Study 1. In the improbable chance that
participants were able to unscramble the “impossible” words, because participants are randomly
assigned to condition, these wordsmiths had an equally likely chance of being distributed among
the groups.
If neither of these options reduced cheating to a maximum of 25%, a minimum of 50% in
the Cheating condition would be acceptable to run the Studies 2 and 3 without random
assignment to condition. As stated in the Cheating Paradigms portion of the literature review,
both in-person and online cheating paradigms have examined ethical decision-making when
participants are not randomly assigned to guilt-conditions. Some have done so with a 50% ratio
of cheaters to non-cheaters by utilizing subtle priming in the task instructions for in-person
laboratory studies using the Russano et al. (2005) cheating paradigm (e.g., Joseph et al., 2021).
Others using a version of the impossible anagram task reported cheating rates between 55%-59%
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in online samples without the use of such primes to strategically lower this proportion closer to
50-50 (Kristal et al., 2020).
Participants and Design
Sixty-six workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were recruited using
CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017) and randomly assigned to Cheating condition, No Cheating
condition, or an Impossible No Cheating condition. Participants were compensated $2.50 for
their time (M = 12.65 minutes, SD = 5.15 minutes). Fourteen participants (21.21%) were
excluded from the study for failing an instructional comprehension check regarding the rules for
unscrambling the anagrams (n = 11) and failing instructional manipulation checks (n = 3).
Though fewer participants were excluded from the Cheat condition (n = 3, 21.43%) than the No
Cheating condition (n = 6, 42.86%), and the Impossible No Cheating condition (n = 5, 35.71%),
this difference was not significant, χ2 (2, 66) = 0.11, p = .945, V = .04. An error in the survey
flow prevented collection of demographic data.
Materials
Impossible Anagram Task
For the Cheating condition, a modified version of Cameron and Miller’s (2009) and
Wiltermuth’s (2011) impossible anagram task was used. Whereas previous impossible anagram
tasks used nine scrambled words, the online impossible anagram task used ten. Participants were
tasked with unscrambling the anagrams and received financial compensation based on the
number of correct successive solutions. “Impossible” anagrams from Study 1 (e.g., AERXMO à
XEROMA and IHLGENR à GHRELIN) were placed in slots 3 and 9, and the rest of the slots
were filled with anagrams more than 80% of participants were able to solve (e.g., PPAER à
PAPER). In order to receive compensation for the easily solvable anagrams in slots 4-8,
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participants needed to cheat by reporting they solved the impossible anagram in slot 3. Likewise,
in order to receive compensation for all ten anagrams, participants needed to cheat twice by
reporting they solved the impossible anagrams in both slots 3 and 9. Participants then selfreported which anagrams they were able to correctly unscramble, with instructions that read,
“Please indicate below whether you were able to correctly or incorrectly unscramble each
anagram. Remember, your bonus is dependent upon sequential correctly solved anagrams”
(Emphasis added).
For the No Cheating condition, the anagrams and order in which they were presented
were identical to the Cheating condition. The key difference was an attempt to decrease the
motivation to cheat by changing the way bonuses were allotted. Instead of receiving a bonus for
each sequentially solved anagram, instructions in the No Cheating condition read, “Please
indicate below whether you were able to correctly or incorrectly unscramble each anagram.
Remember: Your bonus is determined by the total number of anagrams you unscramble. On
average, people unscramble about 40%” (Emphasis added). The addition of the bogus 40%
statistic was meant to further decrease motivation to misreport because most participants should
be able to solve 80% of the anagrams.
For the Impossible No Cheating condition, the impossible anagram task for the nocheating condition was impossibly difficult. Instead of filling slots with the easiest words, the
first two slots, similar to the other two conditions, were easy words. However, all subsequent
slots were filled with “impossible” words that less than 10% of participants were able to
unscramble in Study 1. See Appendix C for construction of the different anagram tasks.
Emotional Affect Scale
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The emotional affect scale is a measure of ethical dissonance, where respondents
experiencing increased ethical dissonance report increased negative affect (α =. 80) and
decreased positive affect (α =. 74) compared with participants in the control condition (Vaidis &
Gosling, 2011). The emotional affect scale (Norton et al., 2003, Exp. 3) is a six-item self-report
affect scale where participants indicate how happy, bothered, good, uneasy, optimistic, and
uncomfortable they feel on a 15-point scale (1: not at all, 15: very much). For these studies, the
scale was shortened to a 7-point scale (1: not at all, 7: very much), so responses would be
comparable to Elliot and Devine’s (1994) dissonance thermometer. Additional measures of
disappointment, frustrated, like a failure, fatigued, and tired were added to the emotional affect
scale to address potential differences among the conditions, particularly between the Impossible
No Cheating condition and the other two conditions.
Dissonance Thermometer
Elliot and Devine’s (1994) dissonance thermometer is a 24-item self-report scale where
participants indicate how uncomfortable, guilty, happy, disappointed with myself, annoyed with
myself, guilty, self-critical, good, optimistic, friendly, angry toward myself, dissatisfied with
myself, disgusted with myself, energetic, embarrassed, shame, bothered, uneasy, distressed,
tense, hesitant, cheerful, satisfied, and irritated they feel “right now” on a seven-point scale (1:
does not apply at all; 7: applies very much). Most measures are highly reliable (Cronbach’s
alphas exceeding .80; Elliot & Devine, 1994), though, in a series of dissonance induction
experiments, Gettings and Luke (2017) report somewhat lower levels of reliability for negative
affect in their first study (.65 ≤ α ≤ .88).
Self-Esteem Scale
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The self-esteem scale is a measure of self-concept. The self-esteem scale measures
participants responses to three statements: (a) “Right now, I feel good about myself”; (b) “Right
now, I like the way I look”; and (c) “Right now, I feel I am a person of worth” (1: strongly
disagree, 7: strongly agree; (.80 ≤ α ≥.91); Barkan et al., 2012; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).
Moral Disengagement about Cheating Scale
The moral disengagement about cheating scale (α =. 90, Shu et al., 2011) measures the
degree to which participants morally disengage from cheating. Participants respond to six items
assessing feelings about cheating (e.g., “Sometimes getting ahead of the curve is more important
than adhering to the rules”; -3: strongly disagree, 3: strongly agree).
Additional Measures
In order to obscure the main measures of the experiment, as well as provide measures to
provide discriminant validity, items from Goldberg’s (1993) Big-Five personality assessment
were included. Forty-four questions assessed participants’ Openness, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism on a five-point scale (1: Strongly disagree; 5:
Strongly agree; see Appendix D).
To further obscure key measures as well as examine potential character traits that may be
relevant in forensic settings, additional questions were added from the Hare Self-Report
Psychopathy scale (SRP-III; Paulhus et al., 2009), a 64-item self-report measure of psychopathy
where participants respond to statements on a five-point scale (1: Disagree strongly; 5: Agree
strongly; see Appendix E). Total psychopathy scores range from 64 to 320 after items from the
four subscales are summed.
Attention and Suspicion Checks
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To ensure the online participants’ attention was focused on the task at hand, two
instructional manipulation checks (IMCs, see Oppenheimer, 2009) were inserted among the
other questions: once before the impossible anagram task and once after. IMCs effectively weed
out satisficing participants when deployed properly (Abbey & Malloy, 2007; Ejelōv & Luke,
2020), thus participants who failed these attention checks were excluded from analyses. At the
end of the survey, participants were probed for suspicion regarding the true nature of the study.
Procedure
MTurk workers who accepted the human intelligence task (HIT) for this study were
directed to a survey hosted on Qualtrics. The informed consent informed participants that they
would be answering a series of personality measures for $1.50 with an anagram task at the
midway point where they could earn up to a $1 bonus for successfully unscrambling the words.
The emotional affect scale and self-esteem scale were embedded among other, filler personality
questions (see Additional Measures, above) in order to reduce recognition when similar items
appeared after the anagram task. Halfway through the pre-anagram task measures, participants
encountered an instructional manipulation check.
The online impossible anagram task marked the midpoint of the survey. First, participants
were provided instructions regarding the rules for unscrambling anagrams and practiced using a
sample anagram (EEEHSSCàCHEESES). Participants answered a multiple-choice question
with potential solutions for the anagram they saw (e.g., SHE, CHESS, CHEESE) but only one
answer met the criteria for being correct. CHEESES was the only solution that used all of the
letters and each letter in the scrambled word appeared the same number of times in the
unscrambled solution. If participants answered incorrectly, they were provided a reminder of
these rules and asked to choose again. Participants who answered either question correctly
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advanced to a review of the rules with a detailed explanation of why the other choices were
incorrect and asked to confirm they understood the rules. Participants who answered incorrectly
a second time or responded they did not understand the rules were directed to the end of the
survey.
After participants confirmed their understanding of the anagram task, they received
instructions on how their bonus was determined. In the Cheating and Impossible No Cheating
conditions, participants read, “You will get a $0.10 bonus for each correctly solved anagram, but
the catch is that you have to solve them in order. In other words, to get credit for correctly
unscrambling the 5th word, you need to correctly solve numbers 1-4.” In the No Cheating
condition, participants read, “You will get a $0.10 bonus for each correctly solved anagram.”
They were then provided with a sample answer sheet containing five anagrams, the answers
provided, and the correct solutions and asked to calculate the bonus that should be provided.
Similar to the practice anagram, participants were given two opportunities to demonstrate they
understood how bonuses were calculated and asked to confirm their understanding of the rules.
Participants who answered incorrectly a second time or responded they did not understand the
rules were directed to the end of the survey.
After demonstrating comprehension of both how to unscramble the anagrams and how
bonuses are calculated, participants were asked whether they had scrap paper and a writing
utensil before proceeding to the impossible anagram task. The task itself was presented as a list
of 10 scrambled words, and participants were instructed to use their scrap paper to solve the
problems. The list was visible for 220 seconds (approximately 3.67 minutes; or 20 seconds per
anagram), providing participants the same amount of time allotted per anagram in Study 1. Once
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the time expired the survey automatically advanced to show the solutions for each anagram with
check boxes for participants to indicate which words they successfully unscrambled.
After completing the anagram task, participants answered the moral disengagement about
cheating scale, Elliot and Devine’s (1994) dissonance thermometer, a reverse-worded version of
the self-esteem scale, and a second instructional manipulation check embedded among other
questions (see Other Measures, above). Original and reverse-worded versions of the self-esteem
scale were counterbalanced to account for order effects, as were the emotional affect scale
(Norton et al., 2003) and dissonance thermometer (Elliot & Devine, 1994). Next, participants
answered demographic questions and were debriefed regarding the true nature of the study,
including that their performance on the anagram task would not influence their payment. All
participants who correctly entered the completion code at the end of the study received the full
$2.50.
Results
The primary purpose of this pilot study was to explore viable alternatives for the No
Cheating condition which kept the format of the anagram task more constant with the Cheat
condition than the fill-in-the-blank alternative. Overall, there was a significant difference in the
number of anagrams people reported correctly solving among the three conditions, F (2, 49) =
30.93, p < .001, η2 = .56. Tukey post-hoc comparisons showed participants reported fewer
anagrams solved in the Impossible No Cheating condition (M = 2.95, SD = 3.36) than either the
Cheating condition (M = 8.15, SD = 2.15, 95% CI [3.14, 7.28]; t (49) = 6.08, p < .001) or No
Cheating condition (M = 8.45, SD = 1.00, , 95% CI [3.66, 7.35]; t (49) = 7.23, p < .001). The
difference between the Cheating and No Cheating conditions was not significant, t (49) = -0.35,
p = .94).
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While these results may appear to suggest that making the impossible anagram task
impossibly difficult for the No Cheating condition may be a viable solution, it is important to
remember that there were more opportunities to cheat in the Impossible No Cheating condition.
Therefore, analyses should focus on the cheating rates where the conditions overlapped. A 2
(Cheated: Yes, No) x 4 (Condition: Cheating, No Cheating, Impossible No Cheating) chi-square
test suggested that number of cheaters was not significantly different than expected among the
Cheating (n = 7, 53.85%), No Cheating (n = 6, 30%), and Impossible No Cheating (n = 5,
26.32%) conditions, χ2 (2, 52) = 2.89, p = .236, V = .24.
Because the Cheating and No Cheating condition only had two impossible anagrams
(XEROMA and GHRELIN), I ran the same 2x3 chi-square on these individual anagrams.
Because XEROMA was the first impossible anagram in all conditions, the chi-square statistics
exactly match those reported for overall cheating above. The chi-square test for GHRELIN also
suggested that number of cheaters was not significantly different than expected among the
Cheating (n = 3, 23.08%), No Cheating (n = 5, 25%), and Impossible No Cheating (n = 5,
26.32%) conditions, χ2 (2, 52) = .043, p = .979, V = .029.
Furthermore, because participants in the Cheating and No Cheating conditions could
cheat only twice, whereas participants in the Impossible No Cheating condition could cheat up to
8 times, I conducted a one-way ANOVA of the total number of anagrams misreported. Though
the mean number of anagrams cheated on was higher in the Impossible No Cheating condition
(M = 1.47, SD = 2.97) than the Cheating (M = .77, SD = .83) and No Cheating conditions (M =
.55, SD = .89), this difference was not significant, F (2, 49) = 1.19, p = .313, η2 = .05. Contrary
to the hypotheses, the results from these analyses suggest that neither the No Cheating condition
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nor the Impossible No Cheating condition were well-suited comparisons for the Cheating
condition.
There was, however, a noticeable drop in cheating from the first impossible anagram
(54%) to the second impossible anagram (23%) in the Cheating condition. A 3 (Type of Cheater:
Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) x 4 (Condition: Cheating, No Cheating, Impossible No
Cheating) chi-square was marginally significant, χ2 (4, 52) = 9.35, p = .053, V = .30. Whereas
people in the No Cheating and Impossible No Cheating conditions either did not cheat at all
(70% and 73.68%, respectively) or cheated more than once (25% and 26.32%, respectively),
there was more variety in the Cheating condition: 46.15% of participants did not cheat at all,
30.77% cheated on the first impossible anagram, and 23.08% cheated on both the first and
second impossible anagram. These results demonstrate that the Cheating condition elicited rates
of cheating close to the 50% ad hoc determination for acceptability to use for studies without
random assignment to guilt condition.
Discussion
The primary purpose of this pilot study was to investigate potential alternatives to a fillin-the-blank No Cheating condition. To this effect, the study was unsuccessful. Neither
manipulating the motivation to cheat nor increasing the impossibility of the task reduced
cheating to the 25% a priori threshold. In fact, neither manipulation significantly decreased
cheating below that of the Cheating condition. On a more positive note, the Cheating condition
functioned precisely as predicted—about half of participants cheated a little and about onequarter cheated to the maximum. This 54% cheating rate is within an acceptable margin of the
50% a priori threshold for self-selection to guilt condition for a study without random assignment
to condition. Additionally, the variety of types of cheaters (non-cheaters, cheaters, and super
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cheaters) was only observed in the Cheating condition, allows finer-tuned analysis of differences
on the personality and affect measures.
While losing the benefit of random assignment to guilt condition, a 50-50 ratio of
cheaters to non-cheaters in the self-reported Cheating condition still provides adequate
information to test all the major and exploratory hypotheses. Additionally, the inclusion of the
Big Five Inventory measures allows for exploration of personality differences between cheaters
and non-cheaters who are given identical stimuli. A brief review of the psychology and law
literature failed to unearth any investigation into personality differences between those who cheat
when provided the opportunity versus those who abstain in cheating paradigms used in the
forensic psychology literature. One study investigating relational cheaters suggests that
unfaithful partners score higher on Extroversion and Openness while faithful partners score
higher on Conscientiousness (Orzeck & Lung, 2005), but the generalizability to these types of
tasks is limited.
The secondary purpose of this pilot study was to identify and address any issues with the
survey prior to large-scale deployment. To this effect, the study was successful. Unfortunately,
there was a catastrophic error with the survey flow logic that prevented all but one participant
from proceeding beyond the anagram task. As such, within- and between-subject analyses of the
differences among the conditions on the personality and affect measures post-task were
impossible to conduct. Fortunately, this error was caught during pilot testing and easily tweaked
prior to deploying the full study.
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CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY 2
The pilot study provided important information for the construction of the online
impossible anagram task: a Cheating condition where participants self-select whether or not to
cheat. However, the prospect of developing a paradigm with random assignment to condition
was too alluring to abandon altogether. Unfortunately, the pilot study failed to find a suitable No
Cheating condition that kept the presentation format of the anagram task constant with the
Cheating condition. Instead, a fill-in-the-blank Computer-Scored condition, where participants
typed in the solution, retained random assignment to condition and provided an opportunity to
re-evaluate the solvability of the easier anagrams in the task. In other words, the ComputerScored condition was retained primarily in an attempt to achieve an online cheating paradigm
with random assignment to guilt condition. To this end, I predicted that cheating rates would be
lower in the fill-in-the-blank Computer-Scored condition compared to the self-report Cheating
condition (Hypothesis 1). Despite the inclusion of this condition, the remainder of the predictions
and analyses focused on differences between cheaters and non-cheaters, regardless of condition.
Cheating, by reporting correctly solving the impossible anagrams, is a direct violation of
the rules of the experiment, thus threatening both internal and external costs. As such, directional
hypotheses were predicted for the other dependent measures. First, participants who cheat will
experience lower feelings of self-concept (report more negative affect) compared to participants
who do not cheat (Hypothesis 2; Vaidis & Gosling, 2011). Second, cheaters will experience
more ethical dissonance than non-cheaters (Hypothesis 3; Barkan et al., 2012). Lastly,
participants who cheat will morally disengage from their transgressive behavior compared to
participants who do not cheat (Hypothesis 4; Shu et al., 2011).
Participants and Design
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Three hundred fifty workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were recruited
using CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017) and randomly assigned to either a Cheating condition
or a Computer-Scored condition. Because the cheating rate in the pilot study met the 50%
threshold for a paradigm without random assignment to condition, assignment to condition was
weighted to assign approximately two-thirds of participants into the Cheating condition and the
other third into the Computer-Scored condition.
The a priori smallest effect of interest between the conditions was 50%, or OR = 5, so
100 participants would be sufficient to test for differences between the cheaters and non-cheaters
with 95% confidence. However, for comparisons among all three potential anagram task
classifications (non-cheaters, cheaters, and super cheaters), an a priori power analysis suggested
a minimum of 220 participants to detect a medium effect (w = 0.3) with 95% power (Faul et al.,
2007). The minimum sample size was increased to 350 in anticipation of participants not
following instructions or failing to complete all portions of the study. Participants were
compensated $2.50 for their time (M = 19.99 minutes, SD = 6.77 minutes).
One hundred forty-one participants (40.29%) were excluded from the study for failing an
instructional comprehension check regarding the rules for unscrambling the anagrams (n = 119),
failing instructional manipulation checks (n = 23), self-reported lack of fluency in English (n =
4), and non-completion of the study (n = 3). Some excluded participants returned the HIT,
allowing CloudResearch to recruit replacements resulting in a final sample of 229. Though more
participants were excluded from the Cheat condition (n = 77, 54.61%) than the Computer Scored
condition (n = 64, 45.39%), this difference was not significant, χ2 (1, 370) = 0.17, p = .685, V =
.02. Demographic questions occurred at the end of the study, so it was not possible to test for
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demographic differences between those who were rejected partway through the study and those
who completed the study.
The remaining 229 participants ranged in age from 18- to 72-years-old (M = 38.11, SD =
11.70). Most participants identified as male (n = 135, 58.95%), and, with the exception of two
participants (0.87%), the rest identified as female. The vast majority of participants identified as
White (n = 178, 77.73%), followed by Black/African American (n = 30, 13.10%), Asian (n = 25,
10.90%), Other/Mixed (n = 4, 1.75%), Hispanic/Latinx (n = 3, 1.31%), American Indian/Alaskan
Native (n = 1, 0.44%), and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (n = 1, 0.44%).
For the most part, participants were employed either full- or part-time (n = 154, 67.25%,
n = 33, 14.41%) with about 60% making less than $50,000 annually (n = 141, 61.57%), one-third
making between $50,000-100,000 (n = 76, 33.19%), and about 5% making more than $100,000
annually (n = 12, 5.24%). Participants were also well-educated with most reporting attending at
least some college (n = 172, 75.11%) or completing a professional degree (n = 30, 13.10%). All
included participants responded that they were fluent English speakers and writers, and most (n =
224, 97.82%) responded that English was their first language.
Materials
The materials for the large-scale deployment of Study 2 were identical to the pilot study,
with the exception of the Computer-Scored condition of the anagram task (see below).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the procedure for the pilot study, with the exception of the
comparison group for the anagram task. Due to a lack of differences in cheating rates among the
alternative formats tested in the Pilot Study, a Computer-Scored condition was used as the
comparison group for the Cheating condition. Participants in the Computer-Scored condition
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received the same anagrams in the same order with the same instructions and time constraints as
the Cheating condition. However, instead of self-reporting which anagrams they correctly
unscrambled, participants in the Computer-Scored condition were required to type their solutions
to the anagrams within the allotted time. The Computer-Scored condition provided ground truth
of whether participants were able to correctly unscramble the anagrams, since their responses
were physically typed into the survey and recorded by Qualtrics. These responses were then
coded for accuracy by a single coder based on the solutions from Study 1.
Results: Planned Analyses
Hypothesis 1: Random Assignment to Guilt Condition
The ideal goal of Study 2 was to develop an online cheating paradigm with random
assignment to condition. As such, the primary analyses investigate the extent to which people
cheated in the Cheating versus Computer-Scored condition.. Cheating was evaluated by
reporting correct solutions of the “impossible” anagrams, which no participants in Study 1 were
able to correctly unscramble. Unfortunately, ground truth was only known in the ComputerScored condition, where participants actually entered their responses, and cheating was assumed
in the Cheating condition based on the improbable likelihood that Study 2 participants differed in
their anagram unscrambling ability from a sample drawn from the same population as Study 1.
Overall, 62.45% of participants did not cheat (n = 143) and 37.55% cheated (n = 86).
Comparing occurrences of cheating between the conditions, though there were more cheaters in
the Cheating condition (n = 53; 41%) compared to the Computer-Scored condition (n = 33;
33%), a 2 (Condition: Cheating, Computer-Scored) x 2 (Cheating: Present, Absent) chi-square
analysis suggests that this difference is not significantly different than expected, χ2 (1, 229) =
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1.325, p = .25, V = .08. While these results may appear to suggest the random assignment to
condition did not succeed, a closer examination of the data suggests otherwise.
Because participants had multiple opportunities to cheat, it was prudent to examine this
degree to which participants cheated between the conditions. The results of an independent
samples t-test suggest that more severe cheating occurred in the Cheating condition (M = .61, SD
= .07) than the Computer-Scored condition (M = .34, SD = .50, 95% CI [-0.434, -0.094]; t (227)
= 2.88, p = .004, d = .38). A follow-up 2 (Condition: Cheating, Computer-Scored) x 2 (Type of
Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) chi-square analysis revealed that the distribution
of cheating significantly differed from expected, χ2 (2, 229) = 20.60, p < .001, γ = -.26 [-0.48, 0.03]. Within the Cheating condition, about 59% of participants abstained from cheating (n =
77), 21% cheated on only the first impossible anagram (n = 27), and 20% cheated on both
impossible anagrams (n = 26). Within the Computer-Scored condition, about 67% of participants
abstained from cheating (n = 66), 32% cheated on the first impossible anagram (n = 32), and
only a single participant cheated on both impossible anagrams (1%).
These results partially support Hypothesis 1. Though binary classification of cheating did
not significantly differ between the conditions, participants in the Cheating condition were more
likely to cheat to a greater extent compared to the Computer-Scored condition. According to the
a priori parameters for a successful online cheating paradigm to which participants could be
randomly assigned, we would see a minimum rate of cheating of 50% in the Cheating condition
(Kristal et al., 2020) and a maximum rate of cheating of 25% in the Computer-Scored condition
(Hoffman et al., 2015). In this study, we found a 41% rate of cheating in the Cheating condition
and a 33% rate of cheating in the Computer-Scored condition. Since the remainder of the
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hypotheses focused on between- and within-subjects comparisons of cheaters and non-cheaters,
the rest of the analyses are collapsed across anagram condition, except when otherwise specified.
An additional goal of the study was to re-evaluate the accuracy with which people were
able to unscramble the easier anagrams in the Computer-Scored condition. In general,
participants were able to solve these anagrams at a higher rate in Study 2 than in Study 1 (See
Table 5.1). However, the proportion solved in the Computer-Scored condition sharply declines
after each impossible word, because several participants (7%) stopped responding after
encountering the first impossible word, and additional participants (11%) stopped responding
after the second impossible word. On one hand, the drop-off demonstrates that participants
clearly understood how the bonus was calculated (i.e., sequential correct solutions). On the other
hand, the drop-off inhibits reassessment of the anagrams’ difficulty beyond the first two.
However, these two were solved at a greater rate (99% and 97%) in Study 2 than in Study 1
(88% and 87%).
Hypothesis 2: Changes in Self-Concept
The second hypothesis focused on changes in state self-concept as measured by the selfesteem scale (Vaidis & Gosling, 2011). Both the original and reverse-worded measures of selfconcept showed high internal consistency, α = 0.90 [0.87, 0.93]; α = 0.89 [0.86, 0.92],
respectively. Overall, there were no significant changes on pre-task (M = 3.72, SD = 1.96) and
post-task measures of self-esteem (M = 3.68, SD = 1.99, t (228) = 0.167, p = .868, [-0.443,
0.525]). A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super
Cheater) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and type of cheater as a
between-subjects factor examined whether self-concept differed based on the extent to which
participants cheated on the task. Neither the main effect for time, F (1, 226) = 0.278, p = .60, η2
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= .001, nor type of cheater, F (2, 226) = 1.146, p = .276, η2 = .001, were significant. Similarly,
the interaction effect failed to reach a level of statistical significance, F (2, 226) = .910, p = .404,
η2 = .007. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, participants did not suffer from a change in self-concept as a
result of cheating on the anagram task.
A second 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Condition: Cheating, Computer-Scored)
mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and condition as a between-subjects
factor examined whether self-concept differed based on the anagram task completed. Neither the
main effect for time, F (1, 227) = 0.186, p = .667, η2 < .001, nor condition, F (1, 227) = 0.174, p
= .677, η2 < .001, were significant. The interaction effect achieved a marginal level of statistical
significance, F (1, 227) = 3.835, p = .051, η2 = .015. Examination of the group means suggested
that participants in the Computer-Scored condition experienced a decrease in self-concept from
pre-task measurement (M = 4.01, SD = 1.89) to post-task measurement (M = 3.43, SD = 1.93),
whereas participants in the Cheating condition experienced an increase in self-concept from pretask measurement (M = 3.50, SD = 1.98) to post-task measurement (M = 3.87, SD = 2.02).
However, none of the post-hoc comparisons reached statistical significance (all p > .05).
Hypothesis 3: Changes in Ethical Dissonance
The third hypothesis predicted that participants would experience ethical dissonance if
they cheated on the anagram task as measured by increased negative affect and decreased
positive affect, compared to pre-task measures. The 24-item emotional affect scale and 11-item
dissonance thermometer were used to measure affect on a 7-point Likert-type scale with the
intent of comparing pre-and post-task scores between the counterbalanced measures. First,
Pearson’s correlations were used to check the factorability of the items from both measures.
Thirty-three of the 35 items significantly positively correlated with at least one other item (r >
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0.3; Watkins, 2018). Second, the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was
greater than the recommended value of 0.6 (MSA = .943), and the individual MSAs were all
greater than 0.85. Finally, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was statistically significant, χ2 (595) =
9487.91, p < .001, so a factor analysis was deemed suitable for the combined measures.
However, because the emotional affect scale and dissonance thermometer were
counterbalanced to control for order effects, I initially conducted separate confirmatory factor
analyses (CFA) for these measures before examining the CFA for the combined model for two
reasons. First, additional items were added to the emotional affect scale that had not previously
been examined as part of the scale. Second, the measures contained different items, and previous
research using the dissonance thermometer found a three-factor model better fit the data (e.g.,
Gettings & Luke, 2017).
For a model to have good fit, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)
values should exceed 0.90, and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) should be
less than 0.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). MacCallum et al. (1996) suggest classifying models with
RMSEAs of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.08 as having excellent, good, and mediocre fit, respectively. The
CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR for each CFA are reported in the text below, but full fit measures,
including TLI, AIC, and BIC, are available in Table 5.2.
Emotional affect scale CFA. Additional items measuring disappointment, frustrated,
like a failure, fatigued, and tired were added to the emotional affect scale that had not previously
been examined as part of the scale. While disappointment, frustrated, and like a failure share
commonalities with other items in both the emotional affect scale and dissonance thermometer,
the two items measuring Fatigue (fatigued, tired) were specifically added to measure differences
between the conditions and may result in poor fit of a two-factor model
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A confirmatory factor analysis examined the fit of the two-factor model with 8 items
classified as negative affect (bothered, disappointed, fatigued, frustrated, like a failure, tired
uncomfortable, uneasy) as the first factor and 3 items classified as positive affect (good, happy,
optimistic) as the second factor. Though the two-factor model was statistically significant from
the baseline model, the model showed poor fit, χ2 (43) = 425.44, p < .001, CFI = 0.847, RMSEA
= 0.197 [0.180, 0.214], SRMR = 0.075. The RMSEA exceeded MacCallum et al.’s (1996)
cutoffs for mediocre fit, and other indices of model fit, like CFI and TLI, did not meet criteria for
good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The only index indicating good fit was the SRMR.
Because the emotional affect scale included two additional items measuring Fatigue,
fatigued and tired were removed from the negative affect factor and added as a third factor. This
three-factor model showed better model fit compared to the two-factor model, χ2 (2) = 177.99, p
< .001, and, though both the CFI and SRMR both met criteria indicating good fit, the TLI and
RMSEA did not, χ2 (41) = 247.45, p < .001, CFI = 0.918, RMSEA = 0.148 [0.131, 0.166],
SRMR = 0.054. Examination of the factor loadings did not reveal any obvious adjustments to
increase model fit, so composite variables were created for positive affect, α = 0.93 [0.92, 0.95],
negative affect, α = 0.94 [0.93, 0.95], and fatigue, α = 0.91 [0.89, 0.93].
Dissonance thermometer CFA. Unlike the emotional affect scale, the dissonance
thermometer contained several items that, while typically viewed as negative, could potentially
be measuring a separate factor (e.g., angry, annoyed, irritated). Gettings and Luke (2017) found
a three-factor model with items measuring Anger separated as a third factor had better fit than
when these items were combined with the other measures of negative affect. Therefore, it was
pertinent to examine both a two-factor and three-factor model.
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A confirmatory factor analysis examined the fit of the two-factor model with 16 items
classified as negative affect (angry, annoyed, bothered, disappointed, disgusted, dissatisfied,
distressed, embarrassed, guilty, hesitant, irritated, self-critical, shame, tense, uncomfortable,
uneasy) as the first factor and 8 items classified as positive affect (cheerful, energetic, friendly,
good, happy, optimistic, relaxed, satisfied) as the second factor. Again, the two-factor model was
statistically significant from the baseline model, but the model showed poor fit, χ2 (251) =
1317.72, p < .001, CFI = 0.819, RMSEA = 0.137 [0.130, 0.145], SRMR = 0.098. None of the fit
measures indicated good fit, but examination of the factor loadings suggested creating a third
factor may increase model fit.
To test the three-factor model, five items which do not appear in the emotional affect
scale (angry, annoyed, disgusted, irritated, tense) were removed from the negative affect factor
to create a third factor measuring anger (Gettings & Luke, 2017). The three-factor model showed
better model fit compared to the two-factor model, χ2 (2) = 293.25, p < .001, but the three-factor
model still had poor fit, χ2 (249) = 1208.18, p < .001, CFI = 0.837, RMSEA = 0.131 [0.124,
0.138], SRMR = 0.097. Examination of the factor loadings for the three-factor model suggested
that some items measuring Shame may fit better as a fourth factor.
The four-factor model contained eight items measuring positive affect (cheerful,
energetic, friendly, good, happy, optimistic, relaxed, satisfied), eight items measuring negative
affect (bothered, disappointed, dissatisfied, distressed, hesitant, self-critical, uncomfortable,
uneasy), five items measuring anger (angry, annoyed, disgusted, irritated, tense), and three items
measuring shame (embarrassed, guilty, shame). Overall, the four-factor model still had poor fit,
χ2 (246) = 1034.09, p < .001, CFI = 0.886, RMSEA = 0.119 [0.112, 0.166], SRMR = 0.088, but
fit the data significantly better than either the two-factor model, χ2 (5) = 283.64, p < .001, or the
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three-factor model, χ2 (3) = 174.09, p < .001. Examination of the factor loadings did not reveal
any obvious adjustments to increase model fit, so composite variables were created for positive
affect, α = 0.95 [0.93, 0.96], negative affect, α = 0.94 [0.93, 0.95], anger, α = 0.93 [0.91, 0.94],
and shame, α = 0.92 [0.91, 0.94].
Combined Measures CFA. Hypothesis 3 predicted that cheaters would experience more
ethical dissonance than non-cheaters as measured by a post-task decrease in positive affect and
increase in negative affect. The emotional affect scale and dissonance thermometer were
counterbalanced with the intent of combining the two for pre-task and post-task within-subjects
comparisons. Therefore, it was pertinent to conduct CFAs with the combined measures to
discover whether a two-factor model with positive and negative affect was adequate or whether,
taking into consideration the CFAs from the individual measures, a different model better fit the
data.
First, a two-factor model was tested with negative affect comprised of eight items from
the emotional affect scale (bothered, tired, uneasy, like a failure, uncomfortable, disappointed,
frustrated, fatigued) and 16 items from the dissonance thermometer (angry, annoyed, disgusted,
irritated, tense, bothered, disappointed, dissatisfied, distressed, embarrassed, guilty, hesitant,
self-critical, shame, uncomfortable, uneasy) and positive affect comprised of three items from
the emotional affect scale (happy, optimistic, good) and eight items from the dissonance
thermometer (cheerful, energetic, friendly, good, happy, optimistic, relaxed, satisfied). Similar to
the two-factor models from the individual scales, the two-factor model for the combined
measures showed poor model fit, χ2 (559) = 2730. 74, p < .001, CFI = 0.768, RMSEA = 0.131
[0.126, 0.136], SRMR = 0.090.
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The best fit for both the emotional affect scale and dissonance thermometer occurred
when there were at least three factors in the model. The ten items that composed these additional
factors (tired, fatigued, angry, annoyed, disgusted, irritated, tense, embarrassed, guilty, shame)
were removed from the negative affect factor to create a third factor, which significantly
improved model fit, χ2 (2) = 191.25, p < .001. The model fit for the three-factor model was still
poor, χ2 (557) = 2668.73, p < .001, CFI = 0.774, RMSEA = 0.130 [0.126, 0.136], SRMR =
0.089, which is understandable because these items measured multiple concepts.
To address these different concepts, the ten items from the third factor were broken into
the three separate factors they represented from the individual measure CFAs. This resulted in a
five-factor model with 14 items measuring negative affect, 11 items measuring positive affect,
five items measuring anger, three items measuring shame, and two items measuring fatigue. The
five-factor model had better model fit than either the two-factor model, χ2 (9) = 648.62, p < .001,
or the three-factor model, χ2 (7) = 457.37, p < .001. The five-factor model fit was still generally
poor, χ2 (550) = 2193.37, p < .001, CFI = 0.824, RMSEA = 0.115 [0.110, 0.120], SRMR =
0.089, but the SRMR met the criteria for good fit, the RMSEA was the lowest of all models
tested, and the CFI and TLI were approaching target values. Examination of the factor loadings
did not reveal any apparent adjustments to improve model fit, and additional attempts to modify
the model failed to improve model fit. Therefore, composite variables were created for positive
affect, α = 0.96 [0.95, 0.97] and negative affect, α = 0.96 [0.96, 0.97], for within-subjects
comparisons of the combined measures. The previously created composite variables for anger, α
= 0.93 [0.91, 0.94], shame, α = 0.92 [0.91, 0.94], and fatigue, α = 0.91 [0.89, 0.93] were used for
between-subjects comparisons.

50

Changes in Positive Affect. The third hypothesis predicted cheaters would experience a
decrease in positive affect after morally transgressing during the anagram task. Overall, there
was a statistically significant decrease in positive affect from pre-task measures (M = 4.44, SD =
1.50) to post-task measures (M = 4.22, SD = 1.67; t (228) = 4.23, p < .001 [0.12, 0.32], d = 0.28).
A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater)
mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and type of cheater as a betweensubjects factor examined whether positive affect differed based on whether or not the participant
cheated on the anagram task. Neither the main effect for type of cheater, F (1, 226) = 0.243, p =
.784, η2 = .002, nor time was statistically significant, F (1, 226) = 3.38, p = .07, η2 < .001, though
the main effect for time reached marginal significance. The interaction effect, however, was
statistically significant, F (1, 226) = 3.69, p = .03, η2 = .002.
Tukey post hoc comparisons suggest the driving influence for the interaction originates
with non-cheaters who experienced a greater decrease in positive affect post-task (M = 4.13, SD
= 1.64) compared to pre-task measures (M = 4.44, SD = 1.40, t = 4.88, p < .001, [0.12, 0.51])
than either cheaters (Mdiff = 0.13 [-0.03, 0.28], p = .10) or super cheaters (Mdiff = -0.09 [-0.29,
0.11], p = .36). These results directly contradict Hypothesis 3. While both cheaters and super
cheaters reported experiencing slightly less positive affect after cheating on the task, noncheaters were the only ones experiencing significantly less positive affect post-task. This may be
because they were under the impression that they missed out on more than tripling their bonus
had they reported correctly solving the third anagram.
Out of an abundance of caution, a second 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Condition:
Cheating, Computer-Scored) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and
condition as a between-subjects factor examined whether positive affect differed based on the
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anagram task completed. Only the main effect of time was significant, F (1, 227) = 17.96, p <
.001, η2 = .005. Participants in the Cheating condition reported significantly lower ratings of
positive affect post-task (M = 4.33, SD = 1.68) compared to pre-task measures (M = 4.53, SD =
1.51, 95% CI [0.07, 0.33]; t (130) = 2.98, p = .003). Participants in the Computer-Scored
condition also reported significantly lower ratings of positive affect post-task (M = 4.31, SD =
1.48) compared to pre-task measures (M = 4.07, SD = 1.48, 95% CI [0.08, 0.41]; t (98) = 2.99, p
= .004).
Lastly, only the main effect of condition was significant from a 2 (Time: Pre-task, Posttask) x 2 (Condition: Cheating, Computer-Scored) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater,
Super Cheater) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and condition and
type of cheater as between-subjects factors, F (1, 223) = 5.81, p = .017, η2 = .008. Participants in
the Computer-Scored condition reported lower positive affect on both pre- and post-task
measures compared to the Cheating condition (Mdiff = 1.315 [0.24, 2.39], t (227) = 2.41, p = .017,
d = 0.16).
Changes in Negative Affect. The third hypothesis predicted cheaters would experience
an increase in negative affect after morally transgressing during the anagram task. Overall, there
was a statistically significant increase in negative affect from pre-task measures (M = 2.01, SD =
1.32) to post-task measures (M = 2.15, SD = 1.37, 95% CI [-0.22, -0.04]; t (227) = -2.82, p =
.005, d = -0.19). A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater,
Super Cheater) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and type of cheater
as a between-subjects factor examined whether negative affect differed based on whether or not
the participant cheated on the anagram task. Neither the main effect for type of cheater, F (2,
225) = 1.20, p = .302, η2 = .010, nor time was statistically significant, F (1, 225) = 1.96, p = .163,
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η2 < .001. Likewise, the interaction effect failed to reach statistical significance, F (1, 225) =
2.17, p = .117, η2 = .001.
However, follow-up paired t-tests suggest this effect seems to be driven by non-cheaters
experiencing a significant increase in negative affect from pre-task measures (M = 2.05, SD =
1.27) to post-task measures (M = 2.25, SD = 1.35, 95% CI [-0.33, -0.07]; t (227) = -3.09, p =
.002, d = -0.26). Neither cheaters nor super cheaters experienced this same change in negative
affect (Mdiff = 0.01[-0.12, 0.14], p = .87; Mdiff = -0.05, [-0.27, 0.17] p = .66, respectively). These
results fail to support the hypothesis that cheaters would experience greater post-test negative
affect compared to non-cheaters.
Further exploring the significant increase in negative affect post-task, a 2 (Time: Pretask, Post-task) x 2 (Condition: Cheating, Computer-Scored) mixed model ANOVA with time as
a within-subjects factor and condition as a between-subjects factor examined whether negative
affect differed based on the anagram task completed. There was a significant main effect for
time, F (1, 226) = 10.26, p = .002, η2 = .003, and a significant interaction effect for the combined
effect of time and condition, F (1, 226) = 6.97, p = .009, η2 = .002. However, there was not a
significant main effect for condition, F (1, 226) = 1.11, p = .292, η2 = .005. Tukey post hoc
comparisons suggest the driving influence for the significant interaction comes from the
Computer-Scored condition, where participants experienced a greater increase in negative affect
post-task (M = 2.32, SD = 1.43) compared to pre-task measures (M = 2.05, SD = 1.33, 95% CI [0.454, -0.084]; t (227) = -3.87, p < .001) than participants in the Cheating condition (Mdiff = -0.03
[-0.186, 0.135], SD = 1.31; t (227) = -0.43, p = .973).
The effect of condition does not appear to interact with the other variables, as the only
notable effect in a follow-up 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Condition: Cheating, Computer-
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Scored) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) was the interaction of time
and type of cheater, which was only marginally significant, F (1, 222) = 2.92, p = .056, η2 =
.002. Tukey post hoc comparisons revealed this marginally significant interaction effect was
driven by within-subjects increases in negative affect of non-cheaters, 95% CI [-0.39, -0.05], t
(142) = -3.80, p = .003.
Changes in Anger. Because there were no comparable measures for anger in the
emotional affect scale, all five items for the anger composite variable came from the dissonance
thermometer (angry, annoyed, disgusted, irritated, tense). The order of the emotional affect scale
and dissonance thermometer were counterbalanced, so only between-subjects comparisons were
possible. On average, participants reported feeling more angry after the anagram task (M = 2.23,
SD = 1.73) compared to beforehand (M = 1.59, SD = 1.16, 95% CI [0.31, 0.97]; t (225) = 3.82, p
< .001, d = 0.51). The model for a 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Condition: Cheating,
Computer-Scored) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) betweensubjects ANOVA was statistically significant, F (7, 219) = 2.43, p = .02, but the only significant
effect was the main effect of time.
Examination of the open-ended question at the end of the survey suggests this anger may
be due to participants viewing the task as “rigged”, which would explain the difference in anger
levels pre- and post-anagram task. Likewise, because the positioning of the impossible anagrams
within the task itself was held constant, there should not be differences in anger between the two
conditions. Given that non-cheaters experienced the greatest changes in both positive and
negative affect, it is somewhat surprising that those trends did not appear for anger. On the other
hand, the lack of the trend replicating for anger supports the five-factor model for the combined
measures.
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Changes in Shame. Similar to the items for the anger composite, all three items for the
shame composite came from the dissonance thermometer (embarrassed, guilty, shame), and
analyses were limited to between-subjects comparisons. On average, participants reported feeling
slightly more shame after the anagram task (M = 1.70, SD = 1.30) compared to beforehand (M =
1.42, SD = 1.04, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.58]), but this difference was only marginally significant, t
(226) = 1.92, p = .056, d = 0.26). A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Condition: Cheating,
Computer-Scored) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) betweensubjects ANOVA was not statistically significant, F (7, 220) = 0.77, p = .61.
Instead, this effect seemed to originate within the Cheating condition where the main
effects from a 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super
Cheater) between-subjects ANOVA approached significance for both time, F (1, 123) = 3.61, p
= .06, η2 = .03, and type of cheater, F (2, 123) = 2.81, p = .06, η2 = .04. Specifically, super
cheaters reported significantly experiencing higher shame (M = 1.87, SD = 1.57) than cheaters
(M = 1.23, SD = 0.42; t (123) = 1.91, p = .05, d = -0.65); non-cheaters did not report significantly
different levels of shame compared to either cheaters or super cheaters (M = 1.55, SD = 1.06; p =
.45 and 0.23, respectively). The lack of a significant interaction effect between time and type of
cheater, in particular, is somewhat surprising because these traits are expected to change as a
result of moral transgression. The data trended in the expected direction for an interaction, so,
hopefully, the non-significant effect was because analysis was limited to between-subjects
comparisons, whereas within-subject comparisons would examine individual-level changes and
increase the statistical power of the analysis.
Changes in Fatigue. Two items measuring fatigue (tired, fatigued) were added to the
emotional affect scale. Generally speaking, participants did not report feeling less fatigued after
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the anagram task (M = 2.45, SD = 1.66) compared to before the anagram task (M = 2.77, SD =
1.67, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.76]; t (227) = 1.46, p = .145, d = 0.19). This effect did not appear to be
due to differences between the types of cheaters as the model for a 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task)
x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) ANOVA was not significant, F (5,
223) = 0.57, p = .73, nor were either of the main effects or the interaction effect (all p > .05).
A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Condition: Cheating, Computer-Scored) betweensubjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for condition, F (1, 225) = 4.03, p = .05, η2 =
.02. Tukey post hoc comparisons showed participants in the Computer-Scored condition felt
more fatigued (M = 2.86, SD = 1.76) than participants in the Cheating condition (M = 2.44, SD =
1.58; t (225) = 2.01, p = .05). Though the interaction effect was not significant, F (1, 225) =
1.02, p = .314, η2 = .004, independent t-tests revealed that participants in the Computer-Scored
condition reported feeling about the same levels of fatigue before the anagram task (M = 2.91,
SD = 2.77; 96% CI [-0.61, 0.80]) and after (M = 2.81, SD = 1.90; t (97) = 0.26, p = .796). In
contrast, individuals in the Cheating condition reported less post-task fatigue (M = 2.15, SD =
1.37) compared to pre-task measures (M = 2.68, SD = 1.94, 95% CI [-0.01, 1.08]; t (128) = 1.95,
p = .053, d = 0.34). In other words, participants in the Cheating condition felt a bit more
invigorated after the anagram task, on which they were more likely to have cheated than in the
Computer-Scored condition. However, the model for a 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2
(Condition: Cheating, Computer-Scored) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super
Cheater) between-subjects ANOVA was not statistically significant, F (10, 218) = 0.98, p = .46,
nor were any of the main effects or interactions (all p > .05).
Changes in Ethical Dissonance Summary. Hypothesis 3 predicted that cheaters would
experience a decrease in positive affect and an increase in negative affect after cheating on the
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anagram task. The analyses above suggest that was not the case. To the contrary, while there
were significant changes of these variables in the expected directions, individuals who resisted
the temptation to cheat reported decreased positive affect and increased negative affect after the
anagram task. Participants in all conditions reported higher anger after the task versus before.
Super cheaters reported feeling more shame on post-task measures compared to cheaters, but not
non-cheaters. Participants in the cheating condition reported feeling less fatigued after the
anagram task compared to before.
Hypothesis 4. Changes in Moral Disengagement
The fourth hypothesis predicted that participants who cheated on the anagram task would
morally disengage from their actions more than people who refrained from cheating on the task.
Responses to the six items from the moral disengagement scale were averaged to create a
composite score after showing good internal consistency, α = 0.83 [0.79, 0.86], with higher
scores indicating higher endorsement for moral distancing from morally questionable behavior
(e.g., “Cheating is appropriate behavior because no one gets hurt”). While the results trended in
the expected direction, when comparing non-cheaters (M = 2.99, SD = 1.15) to those who
cheated (M = 3.16, SD = 1.29, 95% CI [-0.49, 0.16]) the difference was not statistically
significant, t (227) = -1.00, p = .32, d = -0.14. However, when examining differences in moral
disengagement among non-cheaters (M = 2.99, SD = 1.15), cheaters (M = 2.85, SD = 1.11), and
super cheaters (M = 3.82, SD = 1.41), the results of a one-way ANOVA were statistically
significant, F (2, 226) = 6.79, p = .001, η2 = .06. Tukey post hoc comparisons showed that super
cheaters morally disengaged significantly more than both non-cheaters (t (200)= -3.35, p = .003,
d = -0.69, 95% CI [-0.83, -1.41]) and cheaters (t (84) = -3.54, p = .001, d = -0.80, 95% CI [-1.61,
-0.32]).
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These results partially support Hypothesis 4 insofar as people who cheated to the
maximum they could morally disengaged more than people who abstained from cheating.
However, participants who only cheated once did not significantly differ from non-cheaters, t =
0.77, p = .725, d = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.57]).
Results: Exploratory Analyses
The Hare Self-Report Psychopathy scale (SRP-III; Paulhus et al., 2009) and Goldberg’s
(1993) Big-Five personality assessment were included to obscure the measures of the key
dependent variables above. Since participants self-selected whether or not to cheat, these filler
questions also provided an opportunity to examine potential personality differences between
those who resisted and those who succumbed to the temptation to cheat. The relationships
between these two measures and the dependent variables were examined. Notable findings are
reported below.
Hare Self-Report Psychopathy (SRP-III)
The 64-item SRP-III (Paulhus et al., 2009) is composed of four, 16-item subscales
measuring interpersonal manipulation (IPM, α = 0.89 [0.84, 0.90]), callous affect (CA, α = 0.83
[0.79, 0.86]), erratic lifestyle (ELS, α = 0.83 [0.79, 0.87]), and criminal tendencies (CT, α = 0.85
[0.82, 0.88]). Total psychopathy scores for participants in this study ranged from 73 to 250 (M =
135.24, SD = 33.53). The sample as a whole tended to respond below the midpoint of the
maximum possible score of 80 for each of the four SRP-III subscales: IPM (M = 37.31, SD =
10.37), CA (M = 35.55, SD = 9.67), ELS (M = 36.52, SD = 10.14), and CT (M = 25.39, SD =
8.97). These results are comparable with previous examinations of community samples (e.g.,
Gordts et al., 2017; Watt & Brooks, 2011).
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In some analyses below, SRP-III total scores were broken into tertiles to examine
differences between people with low, medium, and high psychopathy scores relative to the
sample. Tertiles were used because there were not enough people who scored two or more
standard deviations on either side of the mean to have sufficient statistical power for any of the
analyses. Using this coding, the three classifications of psychopathy were not distributed
differently than expected between the two anagram conditions, χ2 (2, 229) = 3.31 p = .19, V =
.12.
Though super cheaters scored higher on the SRP-III (M = 146.04, SD = 42.04) than both
cheaters (M = 134.64, SD = 33.88) and non-cheaters (M = 134.08, SD = 32.01), the difference
was not statistically significant, F (2, 226) = 1.46, p = .24, η2 = .013. Psychopathy scores also did
not influence self-esteem scores in a 2 (Self-Esteem: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Psychopathy: Low,
Medium, High) mixed model ANOVA, all p > .05. There was a marginally significant main
effect for psychopathy in a 2 (Positive Affect: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Psychopathy: Low,
Medium, High) mixed model ANOVA, F (2, 226) = 2.71, p = .07, η2 = .022, such that
individuals with low psychopathy scores reported significantly higher positive affect (M = 4.65,
SD = 1.57) than those with high psychopathy scores (M = 4.05, SD = 1.56). Similarly, there was
a significant main effect for psychopathy in a 2 (Negative Affect: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3
(Psychopathy: Low, Medium, High) mixed model ANOVA, F (2, 225) = 19.01, p < .001, η2 =
.134, such that participants with high psychopathy scores reported significantly higher negative
affect (M = 2.77, SD = 1.66) than those with low psychopathy scores (M = 1.66, SD = 0.81).
Two-way ANOVAs examined the effect of psychopathy (low, medium, high) and timing
(pre-task, post-task) for the between-subjects affect measures. The main effects for the affect
measures mentioned here mirrored those reported above, namely experiencing more anger,
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fatigue, and shame post-task compared to pre-task measures. Additionally, several main effects
of psychopathy emerged. Those with high psychopathy scores reported experiencing
significantly more anger (M = 2.73, SD = 1.71) than those with both medium (M = 1.64, SD =
0.91, 95% CI [0.58, 1.45]; t (152) = 5.50, p < .001, d = 0.74) and low psychopathy scores (M =
1.37, SD = 0.50, 95% CI [0.84, 1.71]; t (151) = 7.17, p < .001, d = 1.00). Likewise, participants
high in psychopathy reported higher levels of fatigue (M = 3.16, SD = 1.82) than those with both
medium (M = 2.34, SD = 1.45, 95% CI [0.15, 1.40]; t = 2.93, p = .01, d = 0.47) and low
psychopathy scores (M = 2.33, SD = 1.60, 95% CI [0.78, 0.15]; t = 2.94, p = .01, d = 0.46). The
trend continued for reports of shame with those scoring high in psychopathy reporting
significantly higher levels (M = 2.14, SD = 1.54) than those with both medium (M = 1.34, SD =
0.87, 95% CI [0.38, 1.19]; t (152) = 4.59, p < .001, d = 0.63) and low psychopathy scores (M =
1.19, SD = 0.41, 95% CI [0.53, 1.34]; t (151) = 5.63, p < .001, d = 0.83). None of the interaction
effects between psychopathy and timing were statistically significant.
Psychopathy scores were significantly positively correlated with moral disengagement, r
= 0.55 [0.45, 0.63], p < .001. There was a significant difference among low, medium, and high
SRP-III scores and the degree to which participants morally disengaged, F (2, 226) = 30.76, p <
.001, η2 = .21. Participants who scored lowest on psychopathy (M = 2.37, SD = 0.95) morally
disengaged significantly less than those in the center of the distribution (M = 3.03, SD = 0.99,
95% CI [0.25, 1.07]; t (149) = 3.79, p < .001, d = .68), who, in turn, morally disengaged
significantly less than participants who scored highest on psychopathy (M = 3.73, SD = 1.24,
95% CI [0.29, 1.10]; t (152) = 3.78, p < .001, d = 0.62). Despite psychopathy not statistically
significantly influencing the decision to cheat, cheaters with higher psychopathy scores morally
disengaged from their actions more than cheaters with lower psychopathy scores, F (4, 220) =
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2.34, p = .057, η2 = .033. Specifically, low-psychopathy cheaters morally disengaged
significantly less than high-psychopathy cheaters, Mdiff = 0.97 [0.01, 1.94], SE = 0.31; t (151) =
3.16, p = .047, d = 0.94. Likewise, low-psychopathy super cheaters morally disengaged
significantly less than both medium-psychopathy super cheaters (Mdiff = -1.65 [-2.62, -0.59], SE
= 0.52; t (149) = 3.16, p = .046, d = -1.60) and high-psychopathy super cheaters, Mdiff = 2.10
[1.00, 3.08], SE = 0.53; t (151)= 3.95, p = .003, d = 2.04. These results suggest psychopathy may
play a role in moral decision-making tasks and warrants further investigation. However, as the
SRP-III was included as filler to prevent hypothesis guessing, more detailed examination is
beyond the scope of this project.
Big Five Inventory
Goldberg’s (1993) Big-Five personality assessment was included. Forty-four questions
assessed participants’ Openness (α = 0.87 [0.85, 0.90]), Conscientiousness (α = 0.90 [0.88,
0.92]), Extraversion (α = 0.88 [0.85, 0.90]), Agreeableness (α = 0.87 [0.85, 0.90]), and
Neuroticism (α = 0.92 [0.91, 0.94]) on a five-point scale (1: Strongly disagree; 5: Strongly
agree). None of the five personality subscales significantly differed between cheaters and noncheaters nor did they differ among non-cheaters, cheaters, and super cheaters (all p > .05).
Likewise, when entered into linear regressions as covariates for changes in self-esteem and affect
measures, the only significant effect was that of agreeableness on moral disengagement
indicating that agreeableness was inversely related to moral disengagement, β = -0.28, t = -3.45,
p < .001, 95% CI [-0.63, -0.17]. The model as a whole was significant, F (5, 223) = 6.10, p <
.001, but only accounted for 10% of the variance. Unlike psychopathy, it appears personality
traits had little effect on any of the key dependent variables.
Self-Admission
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At the beginning of the survey, participants were asked a standard battery of questions
asking if they would comply with certain requirements to minimize distractions during the
course of the study. At the end of the survey, participants were asked to confirm whether they
had complied with these requirements. Two of these questions may have served as a surrogate
for admitting to external help on the anagram task. The first question asked, “Did you complete
the study without anyone helping you?” with closed-ended Yes/No response options. The second
question asked, “Please tell us whether you used a search engine at any point during the study to
look anything up,” with closed-ended “Yes, I used a search engine during the study” and “No, I
did not use a search engine during the study” response options. Overall, very few people
admitted to external help (1.31%) or using a search engine (5.26%), and these rates did not
significantly differ between cheaters and non-cheaters, all p > .30.
Discussion
The main goal of Study 2 was to test the design of the impossible anagram task as a
suitable method for examining ethical decision-making in an online environment with random
assignment to guilt condition. The paradigm did elicit cheating, but the random assignment to
condition did not work out as well as hoped. There were higher cheating rates in the Cheating
condition (41%) compared to the Computer-Scored condition (33%), but this difference only
reached statistical significance when comparing among the three different outcomes: noncheaters, people who cheated once (cheaters), and people who cheated twice (super cheaters).
Dichotomous rates of cheating, collapsed across type of cheating (non-cheater vs. cheater), did
not reach the a priori thresholds for further adjustment to either reduce or increase cheating rates
in either condition (25% and 75%, respectively). However, the rates of cheating in the Cheating
condition approached the 50% a priori threshold for a satisfactory cheating paradigm without
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random assignment to condition (Pilot: 46%; Full: 41%). These rates are at the upper end of the
range previously reported for both laboratory anagram tasks (29-42%; Cameron & Miller, 2009;
Wiltermuth, 2011) and online anagram tasks (16-59%; Hoffman et al., 2015; Kristal et al., 2020)
without random assignment to condition.
As part of testing the design of the impossible anagram task, several measures were
included to examine external and internal drivers of dishonest behavior previous laboratory
studies found, including self-concept maintenance (Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al., 2008),
ethical dissonance (Barkan et al., 2012), and moral disengagement (Shu et al., 2011). Mazar and
Ariely’s (2006) General Model of Dishonest Behavior posits cheating will occur when the
benefits outweigh the costs. In this paradigm, the impossible anagrams were positioned in the
third and eighth slots to increase the cash benefits from reporting more correctly solved
anagrams thereby incentivizing cheating. With this positioning, participants were able to increase
their cash bonus by 250% by cheating on the first anagram and 400% by cheating on both the
first and second. The predicted costs associated with cheating would be revision of self-concept
and experiences of ethical dissonance.
Additional research suggests that people do not take full advantage of the opportunity to
increase their material gain from their dishonest behavior (Mazar et al., 2008). Instead, people
transgress just enough to benefit, but not so much that they have to revise their inherently moral
self-concept. In this study, self-concept was measured using the self-esteem scale (Vaidis &
Gosling, 2011), but there were no significant effects for pre- versus post-task measures overall or
when examined in combination with condition or type of cheater. These results failed to support
the hypothesis that the paradigm would activate revision of self-concept in cheaters. Per selfconcept maintenance theory, people should not experience significant changes in self-concept if
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they only cheat once compared to non-cheaters (Mazar et al., 2008), but there were also no
significant effects for those who cheated twice.
The attempt to incentivize cheating by placing the first impossible anagram in the third
slot may have undermined examination of changes in self-concept. The increase in external
benefits was exponential for cheating on the first anagram versus abstaining from cheating
altogether (250%), but the additional increase for cheating on the second anagram task to get the
full bonus was only 70% more than stopping upon encountering the second impossible word.
The lack of proportional, or even comparable, increases in benefit from the first to the second
impossible anagram may have obfuscated true differences among non-cheaters, cheaters, and
super-cheaters.
According to the theory of ethical dissonance (Hypothesis 3; Barkan et al., 2012),
participants who cheated on the anagram task should experience more negative affect and less
positive affect for both between-subjects measures (compared with non-cheaters) and withinsubjects measures (their own pre-task reports). Overall, positive affect decreased and negative
affect increased as a result of the anagram task. However, these within-subject changes in affect
were driven not by cheaters, as hypothesized, but by non-cheaters. Cheaters were able to more
than double their bonus by misreporting how many anagrams they correctly solved, and noncheaters may have felt disappointed for missing out on an easy opportunity to increase their
monetary compensation. Indeed, between-subjects comparisons demonstrated that post-task
measures of anger were significantly higher than pre-task measures, and participants mentioned
the “rigged” and “unfair” design of the anagram task at the end of the survey. Perhaps, some of
these individuals who abstained from cheating during the first opportunity may choose to
increase their bonus if provided an opportunity to amend their report (See Study 3).
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Some of the significant differences detected in affect were between the Cheating and
Computer-Scored conditions, most notably for reports of fatigue. The two conditions were
confounded by the presentation of the impossible anagram task. Participants in the ComputerScored condition were required to physically solve the anagram by typing the correct solution
into the box. Participants in the Cheating condition simply needed to check a box next to which
anagrams they supposedly correctly unscrambled. Participants in the Computer-Scored condition
reported feeling more fatigued than participants in the Cheating condition. It would be
reasonable to assume that the difference in fatigue due to condition took the form of participants
in the Computer-Scored condition reporting greater post-task measures of fatigue compared to
the Cheating condition. This was not the case. While participants in the Computer-Scored
condition did report higher levels of fatigue on average, pre- and post-task measures did not
significantly differ. Instead, the significant change in fatigue was from the Cheating condition,
where participants reported experiencing less fatigue on post-task measures compared to pre-task
measures. Since cheating was easier in the Cheating condition, it may be the case that these
cheaters experienced a form of duping delight (Ekman, 1985), whereby they felt invigorated by
getting away with increasing their bonus. Though there was not a significant interaction between
type of cheater and fatigue, these analyses are limited to between-subjects comparisons, resulting
in lower power and a lack of individual-level change measures.
One affect measure that did trend in the expected direction was shame, with super
cheaters reporting experiencing the most shame. However, this difference was only significant
compared to regular cheaters but not when compared to non-cheaters, who also reported posttask increases in shame. In other words, participants who cheated once—thereby more than
doubling their bonus—felt the least shame, followed by non-cheaters, and super cheaters.
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Cheaters may have been able to rationalize their misbehavior (e.g., “I only cheated a little but got
a much larger bonus”), resulting in negligible pre- to post-task affect differences (Ayal & Gino,
2011). Perhaps the questions regarding cheaters’ emotional states could, in and of themselves,
have provided a method of dissonance reduction instead of measuring the occurrence of any
experienced dissonance (Gosling et al., 2006). Theoretically, this route of dissonance reduction
would be strongest for cheaters, who could rationalize cheating enough to benefit without
necessitating the need for revision of self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008). While the affect measures
may have served as a route of dissonance reduction for cheaters, these same questions would
have made non-cheaters’ and super cheaters’ choices more salient. Non-cheaters missed out on
exponentially increasing their bonus; super cheaters knowingly misreported to the fullest extent
for a proportionately smaller increase in their bonus compared to cheaters.
This rationalization could also take the form of moral disengagement from the amoral
behavior. The moral disengagement scale (Shu et al., 2011) included scale responses to
statements about cheating, with higher scores indicating more moral distancing from cheating
behavior. The fourth hypothesis predicting participants’ moral disengagement would increase
with the degree to which they cheated was partially supported. Super cheaters morally
disengaged significantly more than either cheaters and non-cheaters. Cheaters also morally
disengaged more than non-cheaters, but this difference was not significant. Despite a lack of
support for some of the hypotheses, this pattern of significant differences occurring only between
super cheaters and the other two classifications reinforces the self-concept maintenance literature
(e.g., Mazar et al., 2008). Participants who cheated on the first impossible anagram did not
significantly differ from non-cheaters on the vast majority of the measures, but this should be
expected because cheaters could have cheated more. However, because they did not cheat to the
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fullest extent possible, they were largely able to rationalize their behaviors and forego any
revision to self-concept.
Be that as it may, there may be fundamental differences between people who cheated in
any form and those who withstood the temptation to cheat. These interpersonal differences have
gone largely unaddressed in cheating paradigm studies in both the economic and psychology
literatures. Measures of Big Five personality traits and psychopathy were included both as filler
questions but also to provide insight into differences between those who commit and those who
abstain from cheating when the benefits clearly outweigh the costs (i.e., more than doubling the
cash bonus). In general, Big Five traits did not significantly predict the key DVs, but
psychopathy scores did. Super cheaters scored higher on psychopathy than cheaters and noncheaters, but this difference was not statistically significant. Participants with higher
psychopathy scores reported significantly lower levels of positive affect and significantly higher
levels of negative affect, anger, fatigue, and shame. Psychopathy scores also positively correlated
with moral disengagement, with statistically significant differences between each tertile of the
distribution of psychopathy scores. Though psychopathy did not influence the decision to cheat
in this paradigm, the results suggest reactions to moral decision-making tasks may differ
depending on an individual’s psychopathy score, but more research is needed.
Limitations
Despite increasing the sample size to account for exclusion of participants for failed
manipulation checks, the final sample consisted of only 229 participants. An a priori power
analysis suggested a minimum of 220 participants to compare among the three outcomes of the
anagram task (non-cheaters, cheaters, and super cheaters), so there was sufficient power to detect
medium effects (w = 0.3) with 95% power (Faul et al., 2007). However, many of the significant

67

effects above were much smaller and some of the analyses (e.g., CFAs) were underpowered, so
the results should be viewed with a cautious eye.
Similarly, even though some of the analyses were sufficiently powered, the distribution
of cheating in the conditions may have influenced the results. The random assignment to
anagram condition merely increased the chances of people cheating, but the decision of whether
or not to cheat on the anagram task ultimately rested upon the participants. Most participants in
both conditions refrained from cheating. There were higher rates of cheating in the Cheating
condition compared to the Computer-Scored condition, but this difference was driven by a
difference in super cheaters: 20% in the Cheating condition; 1% in the Computer-Scored
condition. As a result, some of the factorial comparisons are underpowered because of low cell
counts.
The low rates of cheating overall may be due to participants fearing the HIT would be
rejected, which would result in lack of payment for the study and could jeopardize future tasks
on MTurk. The former was hypothesized to influence participants’ cost-benefit calculations, but
the latter was not considered until after data collection concluded for this dissertation. People
may have turned to alternative sources of income during the COVID-19 pandemic, so the risk of
potentially decreasing or losing a low-COVID-risk income stream could have factored into
participants’ decisions to cheat.
Conclusion
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to test the functionality of the online impossible
anagram task. Despite the numerous limitations and lack of or partial support for hypotheses,
Study 2 was a success as a first step toward testing the functionality of the task for use within the
psychology literature. The online impossible anagram task elicited cheating close to the a priori
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threshold of 50% for a cheating paradigm without random assignment to condition. In the
process, theoretical drivers of moral decision-making were tested with some expected and some
unexpected results. Because this study was the first of its kind, these results need replicated for
the anagram task itself as well as tested for suitability for use in forensic psychological research,
particularly in the case of serial ethical decision-making.
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CHAPTER SIX: STUDY 3
While Studies 1 and 2 focused on development and testing of the online impossible
anagram task, Study 3 examined the task’s functionality as part of a larger protocol. Specifically,
the online impossible anagram task was used as a guilt manipulation to examine the influence of
morality reminders on truthful disclosure of dishonest behavior. Research suggests that making
morality salient decreases dishonest behavior in both children (Lyon & Dorado, 2008) and adults
(Bing et al., 2012). However, this effect can be fickle depending on the framing of the
(dis)honest behavior (Lee et al., 2014), and is not as effective as when an individual makes an
explicit commitment to behave honestly (Evans & Lee, 2010). For instance, swearing to tell the
truth increases truthful disclosure in children (Evans & Lee, 2010) and adults (Joseph et al.,
2021) alike.
Several studies suggest commitment to engage in a behavior increases adult adherence to
that behavior. This trend replicates in myriad settings including increasing recycling (Wang &
Katzev, 2006), safety belt use (Geller & Lehman, 1991), and medication compliance (Kulik &
Carlino, 1987). Importantly, commitment to a behavior increases adherence above and beyond
monetary incentives so long as the commitment is made in the presence of another (Efran et al.,
1979). Perhaps, the driving influence comes not from morality salience but from making an
explicit commitment to be honest.
The literature on ethical dissonance suggests that people engage in the first method of
dissonance reduction made available to them (e.g., Ayal & Gino, 2011; Barkan et al., 2012). In
light of research suggesting both morality salience and making an explicit commitment to be
honest increase truthful disclosure, Study 3 examined confession of cheating during the
experiment as a method of ethical dissonance reduction. The primary dependent measure was the
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rate of truthful disclosure—measured by whether or not the participant confessed when provided
an opportunity to amend their false reports. Ethical dissonance and self-concept were
investigated as potential mediators for confessing after cheating. Also of interest were the
changes in reports of self-concept and moral disengagement both after having the opportunity to
cheat and confess. Because Study 3 is a replication-plus-extension of Study 2, the same
hypotheses apply. First, cheating rates will be higher in the Cheating condition compared to the
Computer-Scored Condition (Hypothesis 1). Second, measures of self-concept (Hypothesis 2)
and ethical dissonance (Hypothesis 3) will change as a result of unethical behavior (i.e., cheating
and/or lying). Lastly, cheaters, regardless of condition, will morally disengage from their actions
more than non-cheaters (Hypothesis 4).
Adding to the hypotheses from Study 2, I expected participants who received a morality
reminder (i.e., reminder or commitment) will confess to their cheating at a higher rate than
participants who did not receive a morality reminder (Joseph et al., 2021) and that confession
rates will be highest when the morality induction takes the form of an active commitment versus
a passive reminder (Evans & Lee, 2010; Hypothesis 5). Similarly, participants in both the
Passive Reminder and Active Commitment conditions were expected to experience greater
changes in ethical dissonance than participants who did not receive a morality reminder
(Hypothesis 6). Since ethical dissonance is an aversive psychological state, I also predicted
participants experiencing ethical dissonance would seek to relieve that dissonance by confessing
to cheating instead of adding to the ethical dissonance by engaging in further dishonest behavior
(i.e., continuing to lie; Gosling et al., 2006). As a result, participants who confess their cheating
will experience ethical dissonance reduction compared to those who do not confess (Ayal &
Gino, 2011; Barkan et al., 2012; Hypothesis 7). Likewise, people who confess will have better
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self-concept than they did prior to confessing and when compared to those who do not confess
(Hypothesis 8). Lastly, participants who lie during the confession opportunity will morally
disengage from their behavior more than participants who tell the truth (Hypothesis 9).
Due to time and budget restrictions, the limitations mentioned with the design in Study 2
were not corrected. Despite being unable to improve upon the paradigm, keeping the design
constant between the two studies provides an opportunity for direct replication for testing the
online impossible anagram task. Additionally, even though the rates of cheating in Study 2’s
Cheating condition were close to the 50% a priori threshold for self-selection to guilt condition,
the Computer-Scored condition was retained for Study 3 for the purposes of direct replication to
further explore its viability as a non-cheating condition.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four anagram conditions (ComputerScored, Cheating, Passive Reminder, Active Commitment). An a priori power analysis suggested
a minimum of 340 participants to detect a small-to-medium effect (f = 0.17) for a repeated
measures, between factors ANOVA with 95% power (Faul et al., 2007). The minimum sample
size was increased to 450 in anticipation of participants not following instructions or failing to
complete all portions of the study. Participants were compensated $2.50 for their time (M =
19.72 minutes, SD = 13.25 minutes).
Prior to full-scale distribution of the survey, a small pilot study (N = 100) tested the
survey flow and found an error with the with the survey flow and confession manipulation.
Unfortunately, this error rendered all data from the pilot study unusable. Upon correcting the
error, 450 MTurk workers were recruited using CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017).
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Unfortunately, a survey logic error introduced when correcting the faults found in the pilot study
resulted in no usable data from the Cheating condition. To remedy the lack of data for this
condition, an additional 100 participants were recruited specifically for the Cheating condition,
and the data were combined with the other conditions.
Of the participants recruited for the final study, 447 (81%) were excluded for the
following reasons. Five participants (1%) left required fluency checks blank, 40 (7%) failed
attention checks, 14 (2.5%) did not complete the survey, and 35 participants (6%) were from the
flawed Cheating condition. The remainder of excluded participants (n = 353, 79%) failed
essential instructional comprehension checks related to the impossible anagram task at a much
higher rate than in any of the previous studies. Thankfully, these exclusions did not differ among
the four conditions, χ2 (3, 518) = 2.56, p = .313, V = .08, and some of the participants returned
the HIT allowing MTurk to release more HITs. Demographic questions occurred at the end of
the study, so it was not possible to test for demographic differences between those who were
rejected partway through the study and those who completed the study.
The remaining 177 participants ranged in age from 21- to 66-years-old (M = 37.51, SD =
9.67). Most participants identified as male (n = 125, 70.62%), and, with the exception of two
participants who identified as non-binary (1.13%), the rest identified as female. The vast
majority of participants identified as White (n = 130, 73.45%), followed by Black/African
American (n = 21, 11.86%), Asian (n = 18, 10.17%), Other/Mixed (n = 6, 3.39%), and American
Indian/Alaskan Native (n = 1, 0.57%).
For the most part, participants were employed either full- or part-time (n = 144, 81.35%,
n = 24, 13.56%) with about 40% making less than $50,000 annually (n = 75, 42.61%), half
making between $50,000-100,000 (n = 92, 52.00%), and about 5% making more than $100,000
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annually (n = 9, 5.08%). Participants were also well-educated with most reporting attending at
least some college (n = 142, 80.23%) or completing a professional degree (n = 23, 12.99%). All
included participants responded that they were fluent English speakers and writers, and most (n =
175, 98.87%) responded that English was their first language.
Materials
The materials for Study 3 were identical to Study 2 with two additions: the moral
disengagement about lying scale, and a second opportunity to report the number of anagrams
unscrambled. First, the language of Shu et al.’s (2011) six-item moral disengagement about
cheating scale was modified so the statements asked about lying instead of cheating. The
resulting seven-point scale assessed participants’ self-reported ratings about lying (e.g., “Lying is
appropriate behavior because no one gets hurt”; -3: strongly disagree, 3: strongly agree).
Second, all participants were provided an opportunity to re-report the number of anagrams
correctly unscrambled in the same, self-report format as the original report in the Cheating
condition from Study 2.
Procedure
The procedure for Study 3 was largely the same as the procedure in Study 2. After
consenting to participate in the study and confirming fluency in written and spoken English,
participants first encountered a series of personality questions. The measures for the key
dependent variables (e.g., ethical dissonance, self-concept, etc.) were embedded among measures
from the SRP-III and the BFI. Participants were randomly assigned to two, separate orders of
presentation of these measures. The first randomization determined which versions of the
dependent measures they would see before and after the anagram task for within-subjects
comparisons (identical to Study 2). The second randomization determined when the post-task
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measures would be placed in the survey flow: immediately after the anagram task or after an
opportunity to amend their reports of correctly solved anagrams (See below).
After completing the first batch of personality and affect measures, participants
encountered the impossible anagram task, at which point they randomly completed one of the
four versions of the task. The Computer-Scored and Cheating conditions were identical to those
in Study 2. The Cheating plus Passive Reminder (Passive Reminder) and Cheating plus Active
Commitment (Active Commitment) conditions were identical to the Cheating condition but had
an extra step before participants continued with the survey.
In the Passive Reminder condition, participants read the following statement before
continuing: “By clicking the Next button and proceeding with the study, I affirm the answers
submitted on the previous page were completed during the time allotted for the anagram task and
are a true reflection of my honest efforts. I understand that submitting false information or
including answers taken from the answer key constitutes cheating and violates the rules
regarding bonus compensation I agreed to earlier.” Participants in the Active Commitment
condition read the same statement but were required to type the text into the survey in order to
continue. Although the text was identical, prior research demonstrates that behavior is more
likely to change after an active commitment as opposed to a passive reminder (Evans & Lee,
2010). The anagrams, presentation order, and time allotted for completion of the task were held
constant between the conditions.
After the anagram task, the second randomization of measures determined when
participants would encounter an opportunity to confess to any wrongdoing by amending the
number of anagrams reported. All participants encountered a question with instructions that read,
“Sometimes users experience connectivity issues during surveys. To ensure you receive the

75

correct bonus amount, please check your scrap paper and report the number of anagrams you
correctly unscrambled below.” This provided a first opportunity for participants in the
Computer-Scored condition to self-report their performances and a second opportunity for
participants in the three cheating conditions by selecting which anagrams they correctly
unscrambled.
The order of the confession opportunity was counterbalanced to appear either
immediately after the anagram task or at the end of the second block of personality and affect
measures. Participants then responded to the moral disengagement about lying scale before
moving on to complete demographic questions and a distraction removal check. Once
participants completed these questions, they were fully debriefed of the nature of the study,
informed they would receive the full bonus, and provided a completion code to enter into
MTurk.
Results: Planned Analyses
Random Assignment to Guilt Condition
As stated above, although the results from the pilot and full distribution of Study 2 met
the a priori 50% threshold for a paradigm without random assignment to condition, I decided to
retain the Computer-Scored condition in Study 3 for two reasons. The first was for direct
replication purposes; the second was to further explore whether an online cheating paradigm
with random assignment to guilt condition was feasible. The guilt manipulation took the form of
different presentation formats for the anagram task: the fill-in-the-blank Computer-Scored
condition and the self-report Cheating condition. Because the differences in the three Cheating
conditions of Study 3 occurred after the anagram task, these analyses are collapsed across the
Cheating, Passive Reminder, and Active Commitment conditions and compared to the cheating
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rates in the Computer-Scored condition. As was the case in Study 2, the classification of cheating
or not is mainly based on probabilities.
Overall, there was a relatively even distribution of cheaters (n = 83; 47.23%) and noncheaters (n = 92; 52.57%). The self-reported Cheating format resulted in significantly higher rate
of cheating (53.54%) than the Computer-Scored condition (31.25%), χ2 (1, 175) = 6.94, p = .008,
V = .20. This difference became even more pronounced when examining the distribution of noncheaters, cheaters, and super cheaters between the Cheating and Computer-Scored condition, χ2
(2, 175) = 14.38, p < .001, V = .29. Similar to the trends from Study 2, most people in the
Computer-Scored condition did not cheat (n = 33; 68.75%), some cheated once (n = 12; 25%),
and a few cheated twice (n = 3; 6.25%). In the Cheating conditions, less than half of the sample
abstained from cheating (n = 59; 46.46%), some cheated once (n = 24; 18.90%), and one-third
cheated twice (n = 44; 34.65%).
These results support Hypothesis 1. Whereas the observed rates of dichotomous cheating
(non-cheater vs. cheater) between anagram presentation formats did not significantly differ from
expected rates in Study 2, they did here. Furthermore, the rates of cheating in both the Cheating
conditions (53.55%) and Computer-Scored condition (31.25%) warrant further investigation.
Within the Computer-Scored condition, cheating rates approached the a priori threshold for
further refinement attempts to reduce cheating to a negligible loss of data (25%; see General
Discussion).
An additional goal of the study was to re-evaluate the accuracy with which people were
able to unscramble the easier anagrams in the Computer-Scored condition. Unfortunately, as was
the case in Study 2, the rates reported in Table 6.1 are likely underestimations for words
following the impossible anagrams in slots three and eight. Because participants needed to pass

77

instructional comprehension checks regarding their bonus calculation, several participants
(12.5%) stopped responding after encountering the first impossible word, and additional
participants (8.33%) stopped responding after the second impossible word.
Morality Reminders and Confessions
The original purpose of this dissertation was to further examine the influence of morality
reminders on truthful disclosure. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, data collection
needed to occur online. The first two studies developed and tested the online impossible anagram
task as a guilt manipulation to determine whether morality reminders in an online setting would
increase truthful disclosure of cheating as similar reminders did during a laboratory paradigm
(Hypothesis 5; Joseph et al., 2021). Because the position of the confession opportunity differed
based on random assignment, the confession opportunity itself may have interacted with some of
the key personality and affect measures, namely serving as a form of dissonance reduction.
General trends of the influence of morality reminders on confessions of wrongdoing are
discussed here, and the potential interaction effects with the personality and affect measures are
explored under the appropriate subheadings.
Lying was classified as reporting correctly unscrambling “impossible” anagrams and/or
by increasing the number of correctly unscrambled anagrams from the initial report to the
confession opportunity. Similar to what was stated above regarding the ground truth for cheating
on the anagram task, ground truth for the confession opportunity was only known in the
Computer-Scored condition and to a limited extent. For those participants who did not type the
correctly unscrambled anagrams into the survey, ground truth was known by comparing their
actual incorrect solutions to their self-reported solutions during the confession opportunity. Some
Computer-Scored participants entered correct solutions to the “impossible” anagrams and
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reported that they had correctly solved the anagrams during the confession opportunity. These
participants were classified as both cheaters and liars despite correctly solving the anagrams. As
mentioned above, no participants in Study 1 were able to correctly unscramble the “impossible”
anagrams, hence their classification as “impossible”. However, several participants who were
classified as cheaters (and liars) reported using external online resources during the course of the
study (see below), which directly violates the rules of the anagram task. As such, the
classification of these individuals as cheaters (and liars) is warranted, despite a lack of ground
truth that could only be established using a laboratory version of this paradigm or software that
was unavailable due to budgetary restrictions (See Limitations).
Overall, about half of participants lied during the second opportunity to report the number
of anagrams correctly unscrambled (n = 90, 50.85%). Of these liars, 38% reported solving one
impossible anagram (n = 34), and 62% reported solving both impossible anagrams (n = 56). A
marginally significant, dependent samples t-test demonstrated that participants tended to increase
the number of anagrams supposedly solved from their first report (M = 8.06, SD = 1.93) to their
second report (M = 8.30, SD = 1.82, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.00]; t (174) = -1.93, p = .055, d = -0.15).
The within-subjects main effect of timing of the report dropped to non-significant in a 2 (Time:
Initial, Confession) by 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive Reminder, Active
Commitment) mixed models ANOVA, F (1, 171) = 3.38, p = .07, η2 = .004. However, a
significant main effect for condition and a significant interaction effect emerged.
First, there was a significant main effect for condition, F (3, 171) = 9.50, p < .001, η2 =
.114. Examination of Tukey post hoc comparisons revealed that participants in the ComputerScored condition reported solving significantly fewer anagrams than participants in the Cheating
condition (Mdiff = -1.58, SE = 0.35, [-2.52, -0.65]; t (176) = -4.52, p < .001, d = -0.34), the
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Passive Reminder condition (Mdiff = 1.36, SE = 0.32, 95% CI [0.52, 2.21]; t (176) = 4.29, p <
.001, d = 0.33), and the Active Commitment condition (Mdiff = 1.29, SE = 0.33, 95% CI [0.42,
2.16]; t (176) = 3.95, p < .001, d = 0.30). This may likely be due to the difference in format of
the anagram task between the fill-in-the-blank Computer-Scored condition and the three selfreport Cheating conditions. Participants’ initial responses to the anagrams in the ComputerScored condition were coded as either correct or incorrect by the principal investigator, and
ground truth was known.
This format difference may also explain the significant interaction effect between the
repeated measure of time and condition, F (3, 171) = 3.75, p = .012, η2 = .012. While participants
in all three Cheating conditions self-reported the number of anagrams correctly unscrambled
both during the task and during the confession opportunity, participants in the Computer-Scored
condition only had one opportunity to self-report: the confession. As such, Computer-Scored
participants were the only ones to significantly increase the number of anagrams correctly
unscrambled from their actual, typed responses (M = 6.71, SD = 2.68) to the confession
opportunity (M = 7.63, SD = 2.52; t (176) = 2.73, p = .003). However, generally speaking,
participants tended not to change their scores, r = 0.85 [.49, .69], p < .001.
Despite the morality reminders not appearing to influence confession behavior, it is
important to note that the confession position occurred in two different places: either
immediately after the morality induction or after a delay during which participants completed the
second batch of personality and affect measures. When confession position (Position: Immediate,
Delayed) was added to the model as an additional between-subjects factor, the interaction
between condition and confession position approached significance with results trending in the
expected direction, F (3, 167) = 2.14, p = .097, η2 = .025.
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Specifically, when the confession opportunity occurred immediately after the anagram
task, participants who did not receive a morality reminder reported correctly solving the most
anagrams (M = 9.15, SD = 0.90), followed by those who read a passive morality reminder (M =
8.54, SD = 1.18), and those who typed in an active commitment to be honest reported solving the
fewest anagrams (M = 8.21, SD = 1.44). The effects of the morality induction appeared to wear
off when the confession opportunity occurred at the end of the survey, where the means in all of
the cheating conditions centered around 8.5 anagrams reported solved (See Figure 1). On the
other hand, participants in the Computer-Scored condition demonstrated the opposite pattern,
reporting more correctly solved anagrams immediately after the task (M = 8.25, SD = 1.29) than
after a delay (M = 7.18, SD = 3.07, 95% CI [-1.78, -0.05]; t (47) = -2.13, p = .039, d = -0.31).
Despite trending in the expected direction, post hoc comparisons for the morality induction
manipulation failed to reach statistical significance. As such, the results fail to support the
hypothesis that the morality inductions alone influenced decisions to confess to cheating on the
anagram task (Hypothesis 5). The influence of these morality reminders on key affect measures
is further explored below.
Changes in Self-Concept
Applying the tenets of self-concept maintenance theory to these studies, participants’
ratings of self-concept, as measured through the self-esteem scale, would decrease as a result of
cheating on the anagram task (Hypothesis 2) and possibly as a result of lying when provided an
opportunity to amend their reports (Hypothesis 8). In Study 2, within-subjects comparisons of
self-concept from pre-task to post-task measures did not significantly differ. In Study 3,
measures of self-concept were taken at three time points. All participants responded to the selfesteem scale both prior to and after completing the impossible anagram task. However, the
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timing of the post-task measure of self-concept occurred either before or after an opportunity to
confess to cheating on the anagram task. Therefore, the analyses below include both withinsubjects comparisons (pre-task, post-task) as well as between-subjects comparisons (preconfession, post-confession). Both the original and reverse-worded measures of self-concept
(Vaidis & Gosling, 2011) showed high internal consistency, α = 0.91 [0.88, 0.93]; α = 0.94 [0.92,
0.96], respectively.
Beginning with the within-subjects comparisons, there was not a significant change in
self-concept from pre-task measures (M = 4.82, SD = 1.82) to post-task measures (M = 4.74, SD
= 1.72; t (176) = 0.44, p = .950, d = .03. A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater:
Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects
factor and type of cheater as a between-subjects factor examined whether self-concept differed
based on the extent to which participants cheated on the task. Neither the main effect for time, F
(1, 172) = 0.00, p = .995, η2 = .000, nor the interaction effect of time and type of cheater, F (2,
172) = 0.62, p = .276, η2 = .003, were significant. However, there was a statistically significant
main effect of type of cheater, F (2, 172) = 3.59, p = .03, η2 = .025. On average, cheaters
reported higher self-esteem than super cheaters (Mdiff = 0.82, SE = 0.31, t (176) = 2.67, p = .03)
but did not significantly differ from non-cheaters. A second 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4
(Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive Reminder, Active Commitment) mixed model
ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and condition as a between-subjects factor
examined whether self-concept differed as a result of the morality induction manipulation.
Neither the main effect for time, F (1, 173) = 0.62, p = .43, η2 = .001, nor condition, F (3, 173) =
1.34, p = .26, η2 = .014, were significant. Likewise, the interaction effect failed to reach a level of
statistical significance, F (3, 173) = 1.84, p = .14, η2 = .011. The analyses above focus
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specifically on pre-task measures of self-esteem compared to post-task measures collapsed
across the timing of the post-task measures in relation to the confession opportunity. In general,
there did not appear to be within-subject changes in self-concept.
The following analyses examine between-subject changes in self-concept as a result of
the decision to cheat on the anagram task and the decision to lie when provided an opportunity to
confess. Overall, post-task measures of self-esteem did not differ whether measured immediately
after the anagram task (M = 4.58, SD = 1.79) or after the opportunity to confess (M = 4.95, SD =
1.61, 95% CI [-0.88, 0.14]; t (175) = -1.42, p = .16, d = -0.22). When self-esteem was measured
immediately after the anagram task, cheaters (M = 4.92, SD = 1.59) and non-cheaters (M = 4.98,
SD = 1.67, 95% CI [-0.69, 0.80]) reported feeling essentially the same, t (176) = 0.14, p = .89, d
= 0.03. Likewise, participants who lied about their performance on the anagram task did not
experience less self-concept (M = 4.70, SD = 1.75) compared to those who told the truth (M =
4.49, SD = 1.85, 95% CI [-0.93, 0.50]; t (176) = -0.59, p = .55, d = -0.12). Unsurprisingly, a 2
(Timing: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Confession Position: Immediate, Delayed) x 2 (Cheated: Yes,
No) x 3 (Times Lied: None, Once, Twice) mixed model ANOVA with timing as the withinsubjects factor did not return any significant main or interaction effects, all p > .05.
As was the case in Study 2, neither cheating on the anagram task (Hypothesis 2) nor later
lying about performance on the task (Hypothesis 8) induced changes in self-concept.
Changes in Ethical Dissonance
Two hypotheses predicted changes in affect as a result of the decision to cheat on the
anagram task (Hypothesis 3) or lie during the second opportunity to report performance on the
anagram task (Hypothesis 6). Ethical dissonance was measured with the same emotional affect
scale and dissonance thermometer used previously. Therefore, the same procedures were used
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for investigating the factor structure of the individual measures as well as the combined measure.
As was the case in Study 2, the three-factor model of positive affect, negative affect, and fatigue
had the best fit for the emotional affect scale, χ2 (41) = 157.75, p < .001, CFI = 0.954, RMSEA =
0.128 [0.107, 0.149], SRMR = 0.046. Similarly, the four-factor model of positive affect, negative
affect, anger, and shame had the best fit for the dissonance thermometer, χ2 (246) = 942.20, p <
.001, CFI = 0.896, RMSEA = 0.129 [0.120, 0.137], SRMR = 0.077. Finally, the five-factor
model of positive affect, negative affect, anger, shame, and fatigue best fit the data for
combining the measures, χ2 (550) = 1864.35, p < .001, CFI = 0.870, RMSEA = 0.119 [0.113,
0.125], SRMR = 0.067. The composite variables created for positive affect, α = 0.97 [0.96, 0.98],
negative affect, α = 0.98 [0.98, 0.99], anger, α = 0.97 [0.96, 0.98], shame, α = 0.97 [0.96, 0.97],
and fatigue, α = 0.94 [0.92, 0.96], all showed excellent internal consistency. See Table 6.2 for
full model comparisons.
In the analyses below, general pre-post within-subjects changes in affect are investigated
first, collapsed across positioning of second set of affect measures (i.e., post-task or postconfession). Second, separate within-subjects comparisons examine changes in affect as a
function of the anagram task and the confession opportunity. Lastly, between-subjects
comparisons of post-task measures investigate changes in the affect measures as a result of the
positioning of the confession opportunity.
Positive Affect. The third hypothesis predicted participants who cheated on the anagram
task would experience a decrease in positive affect compared to participants who did not cheat.
Overall, participants reported feeling less positive affect after the anagram task (M = 4.72, SD =
1.66) than before the task (M = 4.89, SD = 1.52, 95% CI [-0.28, -0.06]; t (176) = -3.06, p = .003,
d = -0.23). A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super
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Cheater) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and type of cheater as a
between-subjects factor examined whether positive affect differed based on whether or not the
participant cheated on the anagram task. There was a significant main effect of time, F (1, 172) =
3.86, p = .05, η2 = .001, but not for type of cheater, F (2, 172) =0.47, p = .63, η2 = .005. The
interaction effect approached significance, F (2, 172) = 2.67, p = .07, η2 = .002. As was the case
in Study 2, non-cheaters experienced a greater decrease in positive affect post-task (M = 4.59, SD
= 1.77) compared to pre-task measures (M = 4.88, SD = 1.61,95% CI [0.06, 0.52]; t (142) = 3.73,
p < .003) than either cheaters (Mdiff = -0.03 [-0.40, 0.35], t (126) = -0.20, p = -0.20) or super
cheaters (Mdiff = 0.09 [-0.23, 0.48], t (137) = 0.86, p = .96).
A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive,
Reminder, Active Commitment) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and
condition as a between-subjects factor examined whether morality reminders influenced posttask reports of positive affect. Only the main effect of time was significant, F (1, 172) = 10.31, p
= .002, η2 = .003, suggesting that, generally speaking, morality reminders did not significantly
influence changes in positive affect. When both condition and type of cheater were entered as
between-subjects factors, the interaction effect between time and type of cheater described above
did achieve statistical significance, F (2, 163) = 3.22, p = .04, η2 = .003.
Specifically looking at within-subjects changes in positive affect recorded after the
anagram task, the interaction of condition and timing approached significance in the expected
direction, F (3, 73) = 2.36, p = .078, η2 = .004. While participants in the Computer-Scored and
Cheating condition did not report changes in positive affect, participants in both the Passive
Reminder and Active Commitment conditions both reported a decrease in positive affect.
However, only the difference in the Active Commitment condition was statistically significant,
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Mdiff = 0.50 [0.01, 0.99], SE = 0.15; t (43) = 3.29, p = .03. This effect does not appear to have
been due to cheating on the anagram task or the interaction between cheating and condition as
those effects did not reach statistical significance in a 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4
(Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder, Active Commitment) x 2 (Cheated:
Yes, No) mixed-model ANOVA. In other words, the morality inductions appear to have
influenced positive affect measures immediately after cheating, partially supporting, albeit
weakly, Hypothesis 6.
Turning to within-subjects changes in positive affect after the confession opportunity,
neither condition, F (3, 91) = 1.01, p = .36, η2 = .030, nor decision to lie, F (1, 91) = 1.29, p =
.26, η2 = .012, significantly influenced within-subjects measures of positive affect in a 2 (Time:
Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder, Active
Commitment) x 2 (Lied: Yes, No) mixed model ANOVA. However, the interaction between
condition and lying approached significant levels, F (3, 91) = 2.46, p = .068, η2 = .004.
Specifically, while liars in the Computer-Scored, Passive Reminder, and Active Commitment
conditions reported higher levels of positive affect compared to truth-tellers, liars in the Cheating
condition reported lower levels of positive affect compared to truth-tellers. While these results
partially support Hypothesis 3, it is interesting that this effect only occurred in the Cheating
condition without any morality reminders. Unfortunately, due to a lack of significance of the
influence of lying on reports of positive affect, these results fail to support Hypothesis 6.
In general, reports of positive affect did not differ when recorded after the anagram task
(M = 4.72, SD = 1.74) or after the confession opportunity (M = 4.71, SD = 1.56, 95% CI [-0.49,
0.51]; t (175) = 0.04, p = .97, d = .01). Beyond the effects reported in the simpler models,
comparisons of positive affect based on the position of the confession opportunity did not elicit
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any significant main or interaction effects when entered as an additional factor into any of the
analyses above, all p > .05.
To summarize, positive affect decreased from pre-task to post-task measures. Contrary to
Hypothesis 3, this appears to have mainly been driven by non-cheaters’ disappointment in
missing out on more than doubling their bonus as opposed to cheaters experiencing a decrement
in positive affect. Instead, cheaters appeared to have either experienced a form of duper’s delight
or overcompensated on their reports of positive affect as a form of moral distancing from their
less-than-moral decisions (explored further below). Regarding the influence of morality
inductions as catalysts for exacerbating ethical dissonance, there was partial support for
Hypothesis 6. Participants in both the Passive Reminder and Active Commitment conditions
reported a decrease in positive affect compared to participants in the Computer-Scored and
Cheating conditions, but the effect only reached statistical significance in the Active
Commitment condition.
Negative Affect. The third hypothesis also predicted participants who cheated on the
anagram task would experience an increase in negative affect compared to participants who did
not cheat. On average, participants reported feeling more negative affect after the anagram task
(M = 3.05, SD = 1.87) than before the task (M = 2.92, SD = 1.90, 95% CI [-0.24, -0.04]; t (176) =
-2.79, p = .006, d = -0.21). A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater,
Cheater, Super Cheater) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and type of
cheater as a between-subjects factor examined whether negative affect differed based on whether
or not the participant cheated on the anagram task. The main effect of time trended in the
expected direction, but dropped to non-significance, F (1, 172) = 2.65, p = .11, η2 < .001.
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However, both the main effect of type of cheater, F (2, 172) = 2.79, p = .06, η2 = .030, and
interaction effect were statistically significant, F (2, 172) = 3.66, p = .03, η2 = .001.
Beginning with the main effect of type of cheater, cheaters started (M = 2.42, SD = 1.73)
and ended (M = 2.41, SD = 2.82), with the lowest levels of negative affect, followed by noncheaters (M = 2.82, SD = 1.91; M = 3.08, SD = 1.85), and super cheaters (M = 3.37, SD = 1.90;
M = 3.37, SD = 1.88), but only the difference between cheaters and super cheaters was
statistically significant, 95% CI [-1.93, 0.02]; t (81) = -2.36, p = .05, d = 0.18. Moving to the
interaction effect, as was the case in Study 2, non-cheaters experienced a greater increase in
negative affect post-task compared to pre-task measures, t (91) = -3.90, p = .002, than either
cheaters (Mdiff = 0.01 [-0.31, 0.34], t (35) = 0.11, p = 1.00) or super cheaters (Mdiff = -0.01 [-0.29,
0.28], t (46) = -0.06, p = 1.00). Although negative affect did not significantly differ from pre-task
to post-task measures for cheaters and super cheaters, their base negative affect levels may have
influenced their decision to cheat on the anagram task.
A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive,
Reminder, Active Commitment) mixed model ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and
condition as a between-subjects factor examined whether morality reminders influenced posttask reports of negative affect. Only the main effect of time was significant, F (1, 173) = 6.82, p
= .010, η2 = .001, suggesting that, generally speaking, morality reminders did not significantly
influence changes in negative affect. When both condition and type of cheater were entered as
between-subjects factors, only the interaction effect of time and type of cheater trended toward
significance in the pattern described above, F (1, 163) = 2.58, p = .08, η2 < .001.
Specifically looking at within-subjects changes in negative affect after the anagram task,
neither of the main effects nor the interaction effect reached significance in a 2 (Time: Pre-task,

88

Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder, Active Commitment)
mixed model ANOVA, all p > .05. These findings suggest that morality inductions did not
significantly influence reports of negative affect immediately after the impossible anagram task.
Likewise, cheating on the anagram task did not appear to influence reports of negative affect
immediately after the anagram task as none of the effects reached significance in a 2 (Time: Pretask, Post-task) x 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) mixed-model
ANOVA.
When both condition and type of cheater were entered as factors in a 2 (Time: Pre-task,
Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder, Active Commitment)
x 2 (Cheated: Yes, No) mixed-model ANOVA, the main effect of time, F (1, 68) = 2.90, p = .09,
η2 = .001, and the interaction of time and cheating on the task trended in the expected directions,
F (1, 68) = 3.34, p = .07, η2 = .001. As was the case when post-task measures were collapsed
across the positioning of the measures (after the anagram task and after the confession
opportunity), non-cheaters’ reports of increased negative affect post-anagram task appear to be
driving both the main and interaction effect. In other words, neither the morality inductions nor
cheating on the anagram task resulted in increased negative affect, failing to support Hypothesis
3. In fact, the opposite was true; the only ones who reported an increase in negative affect were
non-cheaters who missed out on an opportunity to increase their bonus.
Turning to within-subjects changes in negative affect after the confession opportunity,
neither condition, F (3, 91) = 1.82, p = .149, η2 = .054, nor decision to lie, F (1, 91) = 0.02, p =
.88, η2 < .001, significantly influenced within-subjects measures of negative affect in a 2 (Time:
Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder, Active
Commitment) x 2 (Lied: Yes, No) mixed model ANOVA. Likewise, none of the interaction
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effects were statistically significant, all p > .05. The only significant effect was the main effect of
time, F (1, 91) = 5.19, p = .025, η2 = .002, with participants reporting higher levels of negative
affect after the confession opportunity (M = 3,04, SD = 1.88) than before the anagram task (M = 2.92, SD = 1.9, 95% CI [-0.29, -0.02]; t (99) = -2.29, p = .024, d = -0.23).
In general, reports of negative affect did not differ when recorded after the anagram task
(M = 3.04, SD = 1.88) or after the confession opportunity (M = 3.08, SD = 1.87, 95% CI [-0.61,
0.52]; t (175) = -0.15, p = .88, d = -0.02). However, three significant interactions emerged in 2
(Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder,
Active Commitment) x 2 (Cheated: Yes, No) x 2 (Order: Post-task, Post-confession) mixed model
ANOVA with time as the within-subjects factor. First, the interaction between time and cheating
on the anagram task mentioned above, with non-cheaters reporting a significant increase in
negative affect compared to cheaters, remained significant, F (1, 159) = 6.25, p = .013, η2 = .001.
The second interaction, though only achieving marginal statistical significance, occurred
between condition and cheating on the anagram task, F (3, 159) = 2.61, p = .054, η2 = .042.
While cheaters within the Computer-Scored, Cheating, and Active Commitment conditions
reported experiencing slightly less negative affect than non-cheaters, within the Passive
Reminder condition, cheaters reported experiencing more negative affect compared to noncheaters (Mdiff = -1.20, SE = 0.38, 95% CI [-2.87, 0,48]; t (47) = -1.73, p = .312). In fact, cheaters
within the Passive Reminder condition reported more negative affect than participants within the
Computer-Scored condition (Mdiff = 1.55, SE = 0.58, 95% CI [-0.20, 3.39]; t = 2.66, p = .142),
the Cheating condition (Mdiff = 1.29, SE = 0.55, 95% CI [-0.45, 3.03]; t = 2.35, p = .275), and the
Active Commitment condition (Mdiff = -1.08, SE = 0.53, 95% CI [-2.76, 0.60]; t = -2.04, p =
.457). Despite not reaching statistical significance, these results appear to suggest some support

90

for Hypothesis 6 regarding the influence of morality reminders on ethical dissonance. As seen
above, participants in the Active Commitment condition reported a decrease in positive affect,
and cheaters in the Passive Reminder condition reported an increase in negative affect.
Third, there was a significant interaction between positioning of the confession
opportunity and cheating on the anagram task, F (3, 159) = 5.84, p = .017, η2 = .032.
Specifically, cheaters reported more negative affect when the confession opportunity occurred
after the anagram task compared to at the end of the survey (Mdiff = -0.75, SE = 0.44, 95% CI [1.92, 0.43]; t = -1.70, p = .327). Non-cheaters, on the other hand, reported more negative affect
when the confession opportunity occurred at the end of the survey compared to after the anagram
task (Mdiff = 0.66, SE = 0.38, 95% CI [-0.36, 1.69]; t = -1.73, p = .312). Recall, there was a large,
positive correlation between cheating on the task and lying during the confession opportunity.
Perhaps cheaters felt bad about their actions immediately after cheating on the task and then
lying about their behavior, but that feeling dissipated either as time went on or as a result of
moral disengagement from their actions. On the other hand, non-cheaters may have reinforced
their positive self-concept by abstaining from both cheating and lying about their performance
when the confession opportunity occurred immediately after the anagram task, but that effect
wore off by the end of the survey at which point they felt doubly disenfranchised.
Unfortunately, because of the small sample size and correlation between cheating on the
task and lying during the confession opportunity, the model for a 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x
4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder, Active Commitment) x 2
(Cheated: Yes, No) x 2 (Lied: Yes, No) x 2 (Order: Post-task, Post-confession) mixed model
ANOVA was not estimable. As such, a separate 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition:
Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive, Reminder, Active Commitment) x 2 (Lied: Yes, No) x 2
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(Order: Post-task, Post-confession) mixed model ANOVA was conducted instead. Here, both the
within-subjects main effect of time, F (1, 159) = 7.50, p = .007, η2 = .001, as well as the
interaction of time and lying during the confession opportunity were significant, F (1, 159) =
4.37, p = .038, η2 < .001. Participants who told the truth about their performance on the anagram
task during the second report experienced a significant increase in negative affect on post-task
measures (Mdiff = -0.26, SE = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.05]; t (173) = -3.29, p = .007), whereas
participants who lied did not (Mdiff = -0.04, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.16]; t (173) = -0.48, p =
.964).
Although the interaction between confession position and lying did not reach significance
in this model, the results trended in the same direction as the interaction between confession
position and cheating in the previous model, F (3, 159) = 2.41, p = .122, η2 = .013. Liars reported
experiencing more negative affect than truth-tellers when the confession opportunity occurred
shortly after the anagram task (Mdiff = -0.86, SE = 0.45, 95% CI [-2.06, 0.35]; t = -1.90, p =
.233), but reports of negative affect were virtually identical at the end of the study (Mdiff = -0.06,
SE = 0.38, 95% CI [-1.07, 0.95]; t = -0.15, p = .999). Though part of a separate analysis, these
results appear to reinforce the conclusions drawn about the previous model with cheating on the
task (versus lying during the confession opportunity), such that cheaters (and liars) experienced
an increase in negative affect when they made serial unethical decisions (i.e., cheating then lying
shortly after) that dissipated over time. On the other hand, non-cheaters (and truth-tellers)
reported less negative affect when they made back-to-back ethical decisions (i.e., abstaining
from both cheating and lying), but this difference disappeared when there was a delay.
In summary, both cheaters and liars reported experiencing more negative affect than noncheaters and truth-tellers, suggesting support for Hypothesis 3. However, this effect only
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emerged when the choice to cheat (versus not) and lie (versus tell the truth) occurred in short
order. When there was a delay between the ethical decision-making opportunities, cheaters (and
liars) were able to reconcile some of their negative emotions, whereas non-cheaters (and truthtellers) gradually felt worse about their decisions. In partial support of Hypothesis 6, participants
in the Passive Reminder condition reported an increase in negative affect compared to
participants in the other conditions, suggesting morality inductions did influence ethical
dissonance. However, the trend was not present for those in the Active Commitment condition,
which is where the effect was expected to be strongest.
Anger. Unlike measures for positive and negative affect, which occurred in both the
emotional affect scale and dissonance thermometer, the measures for anger were only present in
the dissonance thermometer. As such, all analyses regarding anger are restricted to betweensubjects comparisons because of the counterbalancing of the measures. Though participants’
ratings of anger were higher when measured after the anagram task (M = 3.08, SD = 1.92)
compared to pre-task measures (M = 2.80, SD = 1.93), the difference was not significant when
collapsed across post-task timing, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.86], t (175) = 0.97, p = .332, d = 0.15. Posttask anger measures did not significantly differ when recorded after the anagram task (M = 3.05,
SD = 1.86) or after the confession opportunity (M = 3.12, SD = 2.02, 95% CI [-0.91, 0.77]; t (82)
= -0.16, p = .871, d = -0.04). A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Confession Position:
Immediate, Delayed) between-subjects ANOVA suggested that anger scores did not differ based
on whether they were collected before or after either the anagram task or the confession
opportunity, all p >.05.
When Type of Cheater (Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) was entered as a third
between-subjects factor, a main effect for type of cheater, F (2, 163) = 3.26, p = .04, η2 = .037,
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and an interaction effect between confession position and type of cheater emerged, F (2, 163) =
3.26, p = .04, η2 = .036. Beginning with the main effect, super cheaters reported experiencing
significantly more anger than participants who only cheated once (Mdiff = -1.05, SE = 0.43, 95%
CI [-2.07, -0.04]; t (81) = -2.45, p = .041, d = -0.57), but non-cheaters did not significantly differ
from cheaters (Mdiff = 0.39, SE = 0.38, 95% CI [-0.52, 1.30]; t (126) = 1.02, p = .568, d = 0.21)
or super cheaters (Mdiff = -0.66, SE = 0.35, 95% CI [-1.48, 0.16]; t (137) = -1.91, p = .138, d = 0.34). Similar to Study 2, many participants described the anagram task as “rigged” or “bogus”
in the free response at the end of the survey. As a result, these measures of anger may not be an
effect of cheating on the task, but the opposite: participants who were infuriated by the nature of
the task cheated as a result of their anger.
Examining the significant interaction between type of cheater and confession position,
super cheaters reported more anger than cheaters (Mdiff = -1.55, SE = 0.64, 95% CI [-3.40, 0.30];
t (81) = -2.42, p = .157) and significantly more anger than non-cheaters (Mdiff = -1.55, SE = 0.52,
95% CI [-3.03, -0.06]; t (137) = -3.00, p = .037) when the confession opportunity immediately
followed the anagram task. However, when the confession opportunity occurred at the end of the
study, there were no significant differences among the groups, all p > .05. These findings mirror
those for negative affect, where super cheaters experienced an immediate increase in anger after
the anagram task but cooled down by the end of the study.
Recalling the significant correlation between cheating on the task then lying during the
confession opportunity, the same model was examined with Times Lied (None, Once, Twice)
replacing Type of Cheater. There was a significant main effect of type of liar, F (2, 163) = 4.97,
p = .008, η2 = .056. People who lied twice during the confession opportunity reported being
significantly more angry (M = 3.54, SD = 1.92) than both those who lied once (M = 2.50, SD =
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2.00, 95% CI [-2.09, -0.08]; t (88) = -2.56, p = .030, d = -0.56) and those who told the truth (M =
2.65, SD = 1.81, 95% CI [-1.72, -0.16]; t (139) = -2.83, p = .014, d = -0.51). None of the other
main or interaction effects were significant, so it appears the act of cheating on the task exerted
more influence on participants’ anger than lying about their performance. Unfortunately, because
of the small sample size and correlation between cheating on the task and lying during the
confession opportunity, a model with both cheating and lying entered as predictors was not
estimable.
A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive,
Reminder, Active Commitment) x 2 (Cheated: Yes, No) between-subjects ANOVA investigated
the influence of morality inductions on anger. The interaction between condition and cheating on
the anagram task was significant, F (3, 159) = 2.76, p = .04, η2 = .046. None of the Tukey post
hoc comparisons reached statistical significance, but the significant interaction appears to have
been driven by the Passive Reminder condition. Cheaters in the Passive Reminder condition
experienced more anger than non-cheaters within the same condition (Mdiff = -1.24, SE = 0.56,
95% CI [-2.95, 0.48]; t (47) = -2.21, p = .353), whereas cheaters in the other conditions reported
less anger than non-cheaters (See Figure 2). This difference was more apparent in pre-task
measures of anger (Mdiff = -2.09, SE = 0.72, 95% CI [-4.60, 0.42]; t = -2.90, p = .227) than posttask measures of anger (Mdiff = -0.38, SE = 0.86, 95% CI [-3.36, 2.60]; t = -0.45, p = 1.00), but
the three-way interaction was not significant, F (3, 159) = 1.28, p = .28, η2 = .021. When Lying
(Yes, No) replaced Cheating in the model, none of the main effects or interaction effects were
statistically significant, all p > .05.
With the exception of super cheaters, there was not much movement of anger within the
sample. Participants who cheated as much as possible, and thus were likely to lie to that same
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extent, reported significantly higher rates of anger than participants who only cheated (and lied)
once and those who did not cheat (or lie). This effect was strongest when the anagram task and
confession opportunity occurred back-to-back versus after a cooling-off period between the two.
In other words, participants who cheated then lied before responding to affect measures reported
being more angry than people who cheated, answered affect questions, then lied. Part of this may
have been due to the nature of the anagram task itself, but pre-task and post-task betweensubjects measures of anger did not significantly differ.
Shame. Like the items measuring anger, the three items measuring shame came from the
dissonance thermometer and are thus restricted to between-subjects comparisons. On average,
reports of shame were approximately equivalent for pre-task (M = 2.72, SD = 1.96) and post-task
measures (M = 2.83, SD = 2.07, 95% CI [-0.49, 0.71]; t (174) = 0.37, p = .712, d = 0.06).
Likewise, measures of post-task shame did not significantly differ when recorded after the
anagram task (M = 2.63, SD = 1.93) or after the confession opportunity (M = 3.07, SD = 2.22,
95% CI [-1.34, 0.48]; t (81) = -0.95, p = .246, d = -0.21). A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2
(Confession Position: Immediate, Delayed) between-subjects ANOVA suggested that reports of
shame did not differ based on whether they were collected before or after either the anagram task
or the confession opportunity, all p >.05.
When Type of Cheater (Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) was entered as a third
between-subjects factor, the main effect for type of cheater, F (2, 123) = 2.44, p = .091, η2 =
.028, and interaction effect between confession position and type of cheater trended in the same
direction as anger, F (2, 162) = 2.84, p = .062, η2 = .032. As was the case with anger, super
cheaters reported experiencing more shame than participants who only cheated once (Mdiff = 0.94, SE = 0.45, 95% CI [-2.00, 0.13]; t (81) = -2.09, p = .096, d = -0.48), but non-cheaters did
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not differ from cheaters (Mdiff = 0.31, SE = 0.40, 95% CI [-0.64, 1.26]; t (126) = 0.78, p = .718, d
= 0.16) or super cheaters (Mdiff = -0.63, SE = 0.36, 95% CI [-1.49, 0.23]; t (137) = -1.73, p =
.198, d = -0.31).
Examining the significant interaction between type of cheater and confession position,
super cheaters reported more shame than cheaters (Mdiff = -1.46, SE = 0.67, 95% CI [-3.39, 0.47];
t = -2.19, p = .249) and marginally significantly more shame than non-cheaters (Mdiff = -1.49, SE
= 0.54, 95% CI [-3.04, 0.06]; t = -2.78, p = .066) when the confession opportunity immediately
followed the anagram task. However, when the confession opportunity occurred at the end of the
study, there were no significant differences among the groups, all p > .90. These findings mirror
those for negative affect and anger, where super cheaters experienced an immediate increase in
shame after the anagram task that dissipated by the end of the study.
Replacing Type of Cheater in the model with Times Lied (None, Once, Twice) yielded a
significant main effect of type of liar, F (2, 162) = 3.50, p = .022, η2 = .040. People who lied
twice during the confession opportunity reported experiencing significantly more shame than
those who told the truth (Mdiff = -0.86, SE = 0.35 95% CI [-1.69, -0.04]; t (139) = -2.47, p = .038,
d = -0.45) but not significantly more than those who lied once (Mdiff = -0.90, SE = 0.45, 95% CI
[-1.95, 0.16]; t (88)= -2.01, p = .114, d = -0.44). None of the other main or interaction effects
were significant, so it appears the act of cheating on the task exerted more influence on
participants’ anger than lying about their performance.
A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive,
Reminder, Active Commitment) x 2 (Cheated: Yes, No) between-subjects ANOVA investigated
the influence of morality inductions on shame, and two interaction effects emerged. First, the
interaction between condition and cheating on the anagram task was significant, F (3, 158) =
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2.91, p = .037, η2 = .048. None of the Tukey post hoc comparisons reached statistical
significance, but the significant interaction appears to have been driven once again by the
Passive Reminder condition. Cheaters in the Passive Reminder condition experienced more
shame than non-cheaters within the same condition (Mdiff = -1.27, SE = 0.58, 95% CI [-3.05,
0.51]; t (47) = -2.19, p = .362), whereas cheaters in the other conditions typically reported less
shame than non-cheaters (See Figure 3).
The second interaction between time and condition was marginally significant, F (3, 158)
= 2.63, p = .052, η2 = .043. Though none of the Tukey post hoc comparisons reached statistical
significance, the morality inductions may have influenced the level of shame participants felt.
Reports of shame on pre- and post-task measures remained fairly consistent for participants in
the Computer-Scored (Mdiff = 0.004, SE = 0.61, 95% CI [-1.86, 1.87]; t (47) = 0.01, p = 1.00) and
Active Commitment conditions (Mdiff = 0.09, SE = 0.59, 95% CI [-1.71, 1.89]; t (43) = 0.16, p =
1.00). However, participants in the Passive Reminder and Cheating conditions did report
different pre- and post-task measures of shame. Participants who received a passive morality
reminder reported increased levels of shame compared to pre-task—and pre-morality
induction—measures (Mdiff = 1.22, SE = 0.58, 95% CI [-0.56, 2.99]; t (48) = 2.10, p = .417).
Participants who received identical stimuli in the Cheating condition with the exception of the
morality induction reported less post-task shame compared to pre-task measures (Mdiff = -1.27,
SE = 0.67, 95% CI [-3.34, 0.80]; t (33) = -1.88, p = .565). Unfortunately, the interpretation of
these interaction effects is limited because the measures of shame are between-subjects, and the
three-way interaction among time, condition, and cheating was not significant, F (3, 158) = 1.39,
p = .249, η2 = .023. When Lying (Yes, No) replaced Cheating in the model, the interaction
between time and condition did reach significance in the exact pattern described for the model
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with cheating, F (3, 158) = 2.83, p = .040, η2 = .047, but none of the main effects or other
interaction effects were statistically significant, all p > .05.
Like anger, the only significant differences in ratings of shame came from the super
cheaters. Participants who cheated twice and/or lied twice reported higher ratings of shame
compared to those who cheated and/or lied once or not at all, lending support to Hypothesis 3.
However, this effect only occurred when the confession opportunity immediately followed the
anagram task, suggesting serial (un)ethical decisions influenced affect measures in the short-term
but not the long-term. Likewise, morality inductions appeared to increase feelings of shame,
lending support to Hypothesis 6, but only in the Passive Reminder condition.
Fatigue. Two items measuring fatigue (tired, fatigued) were added to the emotional
affect scale, so, like the items measuring anger and shame, analyses are limited to betweensubjects comparisons. On average, reports of fatigue were approximately equivalent for pre-task
(M = 3.28, SD = 1.91) and post-task measures (M = 2.09, SD = 1.89, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.76]; t
(175) = 0.69, p = .489, d = 0.10). Likewise, measures of post-task shame did not significantly
differ when recorded after the anagram task (M = 3.23, SD = 1.98) or after the confession
opportunity (M = 2.88, SD = 1.77, 95% CI [-0.44, 1.14]; t (91) = 0.88, p = .381, d = 0.19). A 2
(Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 2 (Confession Position: Immediate, Delayed) between-subjects
ANOVA suggested that reports of shame did not differ based on whether they were collected
before or after either the anagram task or the confession opportunity, all p >.05.
When Type of Cheater (Non-cheater, Cheater, Super Cheater) was entered as a third
between-subjects factor, the main effect for type of cheater, F (2, 163) = 4.58, p = .012, η2 =
.050, and interaction effect between confession position and type of cheater were both
significant, F (2, 163) = 4.08, p = .019, η2 = .045. As was the case with anger and shame, super
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cheaters reported experiencing more fatigue than participants who only cheated once (Mdiff = 1.35, SE = 0.42, 95% CI [-2.23, -0.26]; t (81) = -2.98, p = .009, d = -0.73), but non-cheaters did
not differ from cheaters (Mdiff = 0.57, SE = 0.37, 95% CI [-0.32, 1.45]; t (126) = 1.52, p = .284, d
= 0.30) or super cheaters (Mdiff = -0.68, SE = 0.34, 95% CI [-1.48, 0.12]; t (137) = -2.02, p =
.111, d = -0.36).
Examining the significant interaction between type of cheater and confession position,
super cheaters reported significantly more fatigue than non-cheaters (Mdiff = -1.67, SE = 0.50,
95% CI [-3.05, -0.16]; t = -3.21, p = .019) but not significantly more shame than cheaters (Mdiff =
-1.59, SE = 0.62, 95% CI [-3.38, 0.21]; t = -2.55, p = .117) when the confession opportunity
immediately followed the anagram task. However, when the confession opportunity occurred at
the end of the study, there were no significant differences among the groups, all p > .05. These
findings mirror those for negative affect, anger, and shame, where super cheaters experienced an
immediate increase in fatigue after the anagram task that dissipated by the end of the study. On
the other hand, non-cheaters reported slightly lower levels of fatigue when the confession
opportunity immediately followed the anagram task compared to when the confession
opportunity occurred later in the study (Mdiff = 0.81, SE = 0.39, 95% CI [-0.33, 1.94]; t = 2.05, p
= .320).
Replacing Type of Cheater in the model with Times Lied (None, Once, Twice) only
yielded a significant main effect of type of liar, F (2, 163) = 6.42, p = .002, η2 = .071. People
who lied twice during the confession opportunity reported experiencing significantly more
fatigue than those who told the truth (Mdiff = -0.96, SE = 0.33, 95% CI [-1.73, -0.19]; t (139) = 2.94, p = .010, d = -0.53) and significantly more than those who only lied once (Mdiff = -1.33, SE
= 0.42, 95% CI [-2.32, -0.35]; t (117) = -3.20, p = .005, d = -0.73). The results thus far lend
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support to Hypothesis 3 insofar as those who cheated to the fullest extent possible experienced
more negative affect, shame, anger, and fatigue than non-cheaters and those who only cheated a
little.
A 2 (Time: Pre-task, Post-task) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive,
Reminder, Active Commitment) x 2 (Cheated: Yes, No) between-subjects ANOVA investigated
the influence of morality inductions on shame, and two marginally significant interaction effects
emerged. First, the interaction between condition and cheating on the anagram task trended in the
same direction as shame and anger, F (3, 159) = 2.26, p = .084, η2 = .036. Cheaters in the Passive
Reminder condition reported more fatigue than non-cheaters (Mdiff = -0.66, SE = 0.55, 95% CI [2.34, 1.03]; t (47) = -1.20, p = .932), and cheaters in the Computer-Scored condition reported
less fatigue than non-cheaters (Mdiff = 1.28, SE = 0.58, 95% CI [-0.51, 3.06]; t (46) = 2.20, p =
.358). Participants in the regular Cheating condition (Mdiff = -0.18, SE = 0.64, 95% CI [-2.15,
1.80]; t (32) = -0.28, p = 1.00) and Active Commitment condition (Mdiff = -0.37, SE = 0.56, 95%
CI [-2.80, 0.42]; t (42) = -0.66, p = .998) did not report differences in fatigue regardless of
whether or not they cheated on the anagram task.
The second interaction was a marginally significant three-way interaction among time,
condition, and cheating, F (3, 159) = 2.58, p = .055, η2 = .042. Visual inspection of the
interaction shows a stark difference in the reports of fatigue from pre-task measures to post-task
measures (See Figure 4). Among the pre-task measures, there were no significant differences in
fatigue either among the conditions or between cheaters and non-cheaters. For post-task
measures, cheaters generally reported slightly lower levels of fatigue compared to non-cheaters
within the Computer-Scored condition (Mdiff = 1.52, SE = 0.86, 95% CI [-1.49, 4.53]; t (46) =
1.76, p = .926), Active Commitment condition (Mdiff = 0.42, SE = 0.77, 95% CI [-2.27, 3.11]; t
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(42) = 0.55, p = 1.00), and Cheating condition (Mdiff = 1.09, SE = 0.87, 95% CI [-1.95, 4.12]; t
(32) = 1.24, p = .997). However, cheaters in the Passive Reminder condition reported more
fatigue than non-cheaters (Mdiff = -1.55, SE = 0.71, 95% CI [-4.01, 0.91]; t (47) = -2.19, p = .70).
These results suggest participants in the Passive Reminder condition were differentially affected
by the morality reminder, lending support to Hypothesis 6. When Lying (Yes, No) replaced
Cheating in the model, the interaction between time and condition nudged closer to the threshold
for statistical significance, F (3, 159) = 2.31, p = .079, η2 = .038, and the three-way interaction
crossed the threshold, F (3, 158) = 2.68, p = .049, η2 = .044. The pattern of results for both
interactions with lying in the model exactly mirrored those when cheating was in the model.
As was the case with all other non-positive affect measures, ratings of fatigue were most
affected by cheating on the anagram task and subsequently lying during the confession
opportunity. In particular, the differences emerged among super cheaters in general and cheaters
(collapsed across those who cheated once and twice) in the Passive Reminder condition, partially
supporting both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 6.
Changes in Ethical Dissonance Summary. The third hypothesis predicted that
participants would experience a decrease in positive affect and an increase in negative affect as a
result of cheating on the anagram task. While significant effects were found in the expected
directions, the results only partially support Hypothesis 3. Some participants did experience a
decrease in positive affect from pre-task to post-task measures; however, it was the non-cheaters,
not the cheaters, who did. This may have been because non-cheaters missed out on more than
doubling their bonus, while cheaters and super cheaters may have experienced a form of duper’s
delight, reporting higher post-task levels of positive affect. With regard to the experience of
negative affect, the results trended in the expected direction. Participants who cheated on the
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anagram task, and were thus more likely to lie to the same extent during the confession
opportunity, reported experiencing more negative affect, anger, shame, and fatigue compared to
non-cheaters. This effect was strongest among super cheaters and when the confession
opportunity immediately followed the anagram task.
The sixth hypothesis predicted exposure to the morality inductions in the Passive
Reminder and Active Commitment conditions would heighten experiences of ethical dissonance
in cheaters compared to non-cheaters. Participants in both morality induction conditions reported
less positive affect than participants in the conditions without a morality induction, but the effect
was stronger for the Active Commitment condition. For experiences of negative affect, anger,
shame, and fatigue, participants in the Active Commitment condition behaved largely like those
in the conditions without morality reminders. On the other hand, the Passive Reminder seemed to
exert a stronger influence on non-positive emotions as cheaters in this condition reported more
negative affect, anger, shame, and fatigue than non-cheaters within the Passive Reminder
condition as well as cheaters within the other conditions. As a result, there was only partial
support for Hypothesis 6.
Moral Disengagement
Two hypotheses predicted participants would morally disengage from the unethical
behaviors of cheating (Hypothesis 4) and lying (Hypothesis 9). Because participants had two
opportunities to misbehave, there were two measures of moral disengagement: one after the
anagram task, and another after the confession opportunity. A 3 (Type of Cheater: Non-cheater,
Cheater, Super Cheater) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive Reminder, Active
Commitment) between-subjects ANOVA investigated moral disengagement after the opportunity
to cheat on the anagram task, α = 0.92 [0.90, 0.94]. The main effects for both type of cheater, F
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(2, 162) = 3.33, p = .026, η2 = .040, and condition were statistically significant, F (3, 162) =
2.49, p = .017, η2 = .056, but the interaction was not, F (6, 162) = 1.24, p = .288, η2 = .040.
Looking first at the main effect of type of cheater, super cheaters morally disengaged
significantly more than both cheaters (Mdiff = -0.92, SE = 0.39, 95% CI [-1.84, -0.00]; t (81) = 2.37, p = .050, d = -0.62) and non-cheaters (Mdiff = -0.84, SE = 0.33, 95% CI [-1.62, -0.06]; t
(137) = -2.55, p = .031, d = -0.52). Similar to Study 2, participants who only cheated once did
not morally disengage significantly more than non-cheaters (Mdiff = 0.08, SE = 0.31, 95% CI [0.66, 0.82]; t (81) = 0.26, p = .965, d = 0.05), so Hypothesis 4 was only partially supported.
Turning to the main effect of condition, participants in the Active Commitment condition
morally disengaged less than participants in any of the other conditions (M = 3.14, SD = 1.64),
but only significantly less than participants in the Passive Reminder condition (M = 4.16, SD =
1.53, 95% CI [-1.95, -0.16]; t (92) = -3.07, p = .013, d = -0.67). These findings suggest there is a
difference between making an active commitment to be honest and simply reading the same
language on participants’ ability to morally distance themselves from dishonest behavior.
The second measure of moral disengagement asked specifically about lying and occurred
after the confession opportunity, α = 0.94 [0.93, 0.95]. In a similar 3 (Times Lied: None, Once,
Twice) x 4 (Condition: Computer-Scored, Cheating, Passive Reminder, Active Commitment)
between-subjects ANOVA, only the main effect of times lied was significant, F (2, 162) = 5.33,
p = .006, η2 = .058. As was the case with cheating, those who lied twice (M = 4.39, SD = 1.52)
morally disengaged significantly more than those who told the truth (M = 3.42, SD = 1.65, 95%
CI [-1.69, -0.24]; t (139) = -3.21, p = .005, d = -0.58) but not significantly more than those who
lied once (M = 3.60, SD = 1.69, 95% CI [-1.61, 0.11]; t (88) = -2.06, p = .102, d = -0.47). Truthtellers and participants who lied a single time did not significantly differ in their levels of moral
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disengagement about lying, 95% CI [-0.97, 0.64]; t (117) = -0.50, p = .872, d = -0.10. As such,
Hypothesis 9 was also only partially supported.
In support of Hypotheses 4 and 9, participants who cheated on the impossible anagram
task and those who lied during the confession opportunity morally disengaged from both acts of
transgression. However, this was only the case for those who misbehaved to the greatest possible
extent (twice), but not for those who only cheated or lied once.
Confession as Ethical Dissonance Reduction
The seventh hypothesis predicted that participants who admitted to cheating during the
confession opportunity would experience ethical dissonance reduction compared to participants
who maintained they had solved the impossible anagrams. As such, two mediation models
explored the relationship between within-subjects ratings of positive and negative affect with the
change in reported score as a mediator. The mediator was calculated by subtracting the number
of anagrams reported solved during the confession opportunity from the number initially
reported during the anagram task. Scores could range from -10 to 10 with negative numbers
representing lying during the confession and positive scores representing admissions of
misconduct. Most participants remained consistent from the first to second report (M = 0.25, SD
= 1.68) but ranged from -8 to 10.
Starting with positive affect, pre-task measures were entered as a predictor for post-task
measures in a linear regression. Positive affect prior to the anagram task significantly predicted
post-task measures, β = 0.89, t = 26.09, 95% CI [0.90, 1.05], p < .001. However, when pre-task
measures of positive affect were entered as a predictor for change in score, the relationship was
not significant, β = 0.05, t = 0.596, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.22], p = .552. Entering both pre-task
positive affect and change in score as predictors for post-task measures resulted in a significant
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model, F (2, 174) = 339.46, p < .001. However, change in score did not significantly predict
post-task positive affect, β = -0.05, t = -1.38, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.02], p = .170, and the relationship
between pre-task and post-task measures remained significant, β = 0.89, t = 26.06, 95% CI [0.91,
1.06], p < .001. These results suggest that behavior during the confession opportunity did not
mediate the relationship between pre-task and post-task reports of positive affect, thereby failing
to support Hypothesis 7.
Repeating the same process with within-subjects measures of negative affect, pre-task
measures of negative affect significantly predicted post-task measures, β = 0.93, t = 35.93, 95%
CI [0.87, 0.96], p < .001. As was the case with positive affect, pre-task measures of negative
affect did not significantly predict confession decisions, β = 0.10, t = 1.31, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.22],
p < .193. When both pre-task measures and change in score were entered as predictors for posttask measures, the same pattern emerged for negative affect as for positive affect. Change in
score did not significantly predict post-task negative affect, β = 0.03, t = 1.08, 95% CI [-0.03,
0.09], p = .279, and the relationship between pre-task and post-task measures remained
significant, β = 0.93, t = 33.01, 95% CI [0.87, 0.97], p < .001.
Research suggests people engage in the first avenue of dissonance reduction available
(Gosling et al., 2006), but that was not the case with participants in this study. Instead, there
appears to be no support for Hypothesis 7 regarding participants using the confession
opportunity within the study as a form of ethical dissonance reduction.
Search Engine as Surrogate Confession, Dissonance Reduction
From the results above, we know that super cheaters and those who lied twice did
experience an increase in ethical dissonance during the course of the study. Despite being an
uncomfortable experience, participants did not avail themselves the opportunity to reduce this

106

dissonance by amending their reports during the confession. However, when checking for
compliance with requested study procedures, I noticed that four times the number of participants
admitted to using a search engine during Study 3 (22%) than during Study 2 (5%). The two
studies were nearly identical with two major changes in Study 3: the inclusion of the morality
inductions and the confession opportunity within the study. As demonstrated above, there was a
significant positive correlation between cheating on the anagram task and lying during the
confession opportunity. Generally speaking, participants in Study 3 experienced greater levels of
ethical dissonance when the anagram task was immediately followed by the confession
opportunity, essentially reinforcing and reminding them of their dishonesty.
Examination of self-reported search engine use observed between cheaters and noncheaters showed a significantly different distribution than expected, χ2 (1, 172) = 4.62, p = .032
V = .16. This seems to be driven by high proportion of cheaters (n = 30; 36.15%) and lower
proportion of non-cheaters (n = 19; 21.35%) admitting to using a search engine during the course
of the experiment. A 2 (Confession: Lied, Told Truth) x 2 (Search Engine Use: Yes, No) chisquare analysis suggests perhaps participants used this final opportunity as a surrogate
confession to external help on the task, χ2 (1, 172) = 14.77, p < .001 V = .29. In particular,
participants who lied during the confession opportunity admitted to using a search engine at a
higher rate than expected (n = 37; 41.11%). In other words, when provided an opportunity to
admit to their wrongdoing during the course of the study, most participants doubled down, and
continued the charade of correctly solving the anagrams on their own. However, when asked to
“Please be honest,” about the removal of external stimuli during the course of the study, several
of those liars reneged and admitted to using a search engine to look something up.
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A logistic regression explored the potential that participants may have used the search
engine check question as an avenue of dissonance reduction post-study. As mentioned above,
cheaters were significantly more likely than expected to admit using a search engine during the
course of the study. Whether participants cheated (versus not), lied (versus not), the position of
the confession opportunity, and positive and negative affect measures were entered as predictors
for responses to the question asking if participants had used a search engine during the course of
the study. The model was statistically significant, χ2 (166) = 71.07 p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 =
0.48 (See Table 6.3). While positive affect did not significantly predict admissions to using a
search engine, negative affect did, β = -1.43, SE = 0.13, 95% CI [-1.03, -0.52], p < .001. On
average, participants who admitted to using a search engine reported experiencing much higher
post-task negative affect (M = 4.62, SD = 1.52) than participants who said they did not use a
search engine (M = 2.34, SD = 1.54, 95% CI [1.77, 2.79]; t (171) = 8.85, p < .001, d = 1.48).
Additionally, participants who lied during the confession opportunity were significantly more
likely to admit to using a search engine compared to participants who told the truth about their
performance, β = -1.43, SE = 0.13, 95% CI [-1.03, -0.52], OR = 3.26, p < .001.
These results bolster support that cheaters and liars experienced ethical dissonance as a
result of unethical behavior. Furthermore, both lying on the anagram task and using a search
engine were framed as violations of the study’s rules. So, while participants experiencing ethical
dissonance did not use the confession opportunity as a method of ethical dissonance reduction,
there is some weak support they may have used the search engine check question as a surrogate
confession opportunity and avenue of dissonance reduction.
Results: Exploratory Analyses
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As was the case in Study 2, the Hare Self-Report Psychopathy scale (SRP-III; Paulhus et
al., 2009) and Goldberg’s (1993) Big-Five personality assessment were included to obscure the
measures of the key dependent variables above. The exploratory analyses below examine the
relationships between these two measures and key dependent variables. Notable findings are
reported below.
Hare Self-Report Psychopathy (SRP-III)
The four subscales of the SRP-III showed good internal consistency: interpersonal
manipulation (IPM, α = 0.89 [0.87, 0.91]), callous affect (CA, α = 0.86 [0.84, 0.89]), erratic
lifestyle (ELS, α = 0.86 [0.84, 0.89]), and criminal tendencies (CT, α = 0.93 [0.92, 0.94]).
Excluding two participants who did not respond to the SRP-III questions, total psychopathy
scores for participants in this study ranged from 68 to 262 (M = 161.44, SD = 49.94). The sample
as a whole tended to respond around the midpoint of the maximum possible score of 80 for each
of the four SRP-III subscales: IPM (M = 42.29, SD = 12.01), CA (M = 42.06, SD = 12.14), ELS
(M = 42.29, SD = 12.72), and CT (M = 32.95, SD = 15.41). These results are a bit higher than the
psychopathy scores in Study 2 as well as those reported in previous examinations of community
samples (e.g., Gordts et al., 2017; Watt & Brooks, 2011). Psychopathy scores were distributed no
differently than expected among the four conditions, χ2 (6, 177) = 9.26, p = .159, V = .16.
Super cheaters trended toward scoring significantly higher on the SRP-III (M = 175.17,
SD = 47.51) than non-cheaters (M = 155.96, SD = 50.50, 95% CI [-40.59, 2.15]; t (137) = -2.13 p
= .088, d = -0.39) but not from cheaters (M = 157.28, SD = 50.31, 95% CI [-44.04, 8.24]; t (81)
= -1.62, p = .240, d = -0.37). However, the main effect did not achieve statistical significance, F
(2, 167) = 2.42, p = .092, η2 = .028. Psychopathy scores also influenced self-esteem scores in a 2
(Self-Esteem: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Psychopathy: Low, Medium, High) mixed model
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ANOVA, where there was a significant main effect of psychopathy, F (2, 174) = 14.17, p < .001,
η2 = .088. Participants low in psychopathy reported significantly higher self-esteem than
participants high in psychopathy (Mdiff = -1.22, SE = 0.23, 95% CI [-1.78, -0.65]; t (137) = -5.23,
p < .001, d = -0.39) and marginally more so than participants in the middle of the distribution
(Mdiff = 0.55, SE = 0.28, 95% CI [-0.14, 1.23]; t (85) = 1.94, p = .054, d = 0.15). Similarly,
participants high in psychopathy reported significantly lower self-esteem than participants in the
middle of the distribution (Mdiff = -0.67, SE = 0.25, 95% CI [-1.28, -0.05]; t =(126) -2.63, p =
.019, d = -0.20).
Turning to the affect measures, there were two significant main effects in a 2 (Positive
Affect: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Psychopathy: Low, Medium, High) mixed model ANOVA.
First, the within-subjects effect of time was significant, F (1, 174) = 12.04, p < .001, η2 = .004,
with pre-task reports of positive affect being higher than post-task measures (Mdiff = 0.21, SE =
0.06, 95% CI [0.90, 0.33]; t (176) = 3.47, p < .001, d = 0.26). The main effect of psychopathy
was also statistically significant, F (2, 174) = 4.30, p = .015, η2 = .044. Participants in the middle
of the distribution reported significantly lower positive affect than those low in psychopathy
(Mdiff = 0.93, SE = 0.33, 95% CI [0.14, 1.73]; t (85) = 2.85, p = .015, d = 0.21) and high in
psychopathy (Mdiff = 0.69, SE = 0.29, 95% CI [-0.02, 1.40]; t (126) = 2.34, p = .041, d = 0.18).
Similarly, there were significant main effects for both time and psychopathy in a 2
(Negative Affect: Pre-task, Post-task) x 3 (Psychopathy: Low, Medium, High) mixed model
ANOVA. The main effect of time mirrored that for the overall results, F (1, 174) = 6.12, p =
.014, η2 = .001. Participants reported significantly more negative affect on post-task measures
compared to pre-task measures (Mdiff = -0.13, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.24 -0.03]; t (176) = -2.47, p
= .014, d = -0.19). Regarding the main effect for psychopathy, F (2, 174) = 54.71, p < .001, η2 =
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.374, participants with high psychopathy scores reported significantly higher negative affect than
both those in the middle of the distribution (Mdiff = 2.28, SE = 0.28, 95% CI [1.59, 2.96]; t (126)
= 8.05, p < .001, d = 0.61) and those with low psychopathy scores (Mdiff = 2.32, SE = 0.26, 95%
CI [1.69, 2.95]; t (137) = 8.93, p < .001, d = 0.67).
Two-way ANOVAs examined the effect of psychopathy (low, medium, high) and timing
(pre-task, post-task) for the between-subjects affect measures. The main effects for the affect
measures mentioned here mirrored those reported above, namely experiencing more anger,
fatigue, and shame post-task compared to pre-task measures. Additionally, several main effects
of psychopathy emerged. Those with high psychopathy scores reported experiencing
significantly more anger than those with both medium (Mdiff = 2.49, SE = 0.29, 95% CI [1.79,
3.19]; t (126) = 8.39, p < .001, d = 1.62) and low psychopathy scores (Mdiff = 2.32, SE = 0.27,
95% CI [1.68, 2.96]; t (137) = 8.60, p < .001, d = 1.41). Likewise, participants high in
psychopathy reported higher levels of fatigue than those with both medium (Mdiff = 1.76, SE =
0.33, 95% CI [0.99, 2.53]; t (126) = 5.40, p < .001, d = 1.07) and low psychopathy scores (Mdiff =
1.96, SE = 0.30, 95% CI [1.26, 2.66]; t (137) = 6.61, p = < .001, d = 1.12). The trend continued
for reports of shame with those scoring high in psychopathy reporting significantly higher levels
than those with both medium (Mdiff = 2.71, SE = 0.31, 95% CI [1.98, 3.45]; t (126) = 8.74, p <
.001, d = 1.68) and low psychopathy scores (Mdiff = 1.73, SE = 0.28, 95% CI [1.73, 3.05]; t (137)
= 8.59, p < .001, d = 1.38). None of the interaction effects between psychopathy and timing were
statistically significant.
Psychopathy scores were significantly positively correlated with both moral
disengagement about cheating, r = 0.77, 95% CI [0.70, 0.83], p < .001, and moral disengagement
about lying, r = 0.78, 95% CI [0.72, 0.83], p < .001. There was a significant difference among
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low, medium, and high SRP-III scores and the degree to which participants morally disengaged
from cheating, F (2, 165) = 42.78, p < .001, η2 = .33, and lying, F (2, 165) = 45.06, p < .001, η2 =
.34. However, unlike in Study 2, there was no significant interaction between psychopathy and
type of cheater, F (4, 165) = 0.33, p = .861, η2 = .005, or type of liar, F (4, 165) = 0.71, p < .588,
η2 = .011. The results reported both here and for Study 2 suggest psychopathy may play a role in
moral decision-making tasks and warrants further investigation. However, as the SRP-III was
included as filler to prevent hypothesis guessing, more detailed examination is beyond the scope
of this project.
Big Five Inventory
Goldberg’s (1993) Big-Five personality assessment was also included. Forty-four
questions assessed participants’ Openness (α = 0.82 [0.79, 0.86]), Conscientiousness (α = 0.84
[0.81, 0.88]), Extraversion (α = 0.85 [0.82, 0.89]), Agreeableness (α = 0.74 [0.69, 0.80]), and
Neuroticism (α = 0.86 [0.83, 0.89]) on a five-point scale (1: Strongly disagree; 5: Strongly
agree). Examining differences in the five scales among the three types of cheaters, there were a
few main effects to note for Extraversion, F (2, 167) = 2.74, p = .067, η2 = .032, Agreeableness,
F (2, 167) = 2.71, p = .069, η2 = .031, and Neuroticism, F (2, 167) = 7.03, p = .001, η2 = .078.
Examination of Tukey post hoc comparisons revealed those who cheated once on the anagram
task were marginally significantly more extroverted than non-cheaters (Mdiff = -0.43, SE = 0.18,
95% CI [-0.86, 0.01]; t (126) = -2.33, p = .054, d = -0.46). Super cheaters were marginally less
agreeable than cheaters (Mdiff = 0.34, SE = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.70]; t (81) = 2.17, p = .080, d =
0.55) and significantly more neurotic than both cheaters (Mdiff = -0.72, SE = 0.20, 95% CI [-1.20,
-0.25]; t (81) = -3.59, p = .001, d = -0.90) and non-cheaters (Mdiff = -0.47, SE = 0.17, 95% CI [0.86, -0.08]; t (137) = -2.84, p = .014, d = -0.52).
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Because of the significant correlation between cheating and lying, the same pattern of
results was seen for the ANOVAs of type of liar and Extraversion, F (2, 167) = 2.94, p = .056, η2
= .034, Agreeableness, F (2, 167) = 5.46, p = .005, η2 = .061, and Neuroticism, F (2, 167) = 5.97,
p = .003, η2 = .067. There was also a significant main effect of type of liar on Conscientiousness,
F (2, 167) = 3.11, p = .047, η2 = .036. Those who lied twice were marginally less conscientious
than both those who lied once (Mdiff = 0.35, SE = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.74]; t (81) = 2.09, p =
.095, d = 0.50) and truth-tellers (Mdiff = 0.29, SE = 0.13, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.61]; t (137) = 2.20, p =
.075, d = 0.39.
Linear regressions examined the predictive nature of the BFI subscales for moral
disengagement and changes in self-esteem, positive affect, and negative affect. When entered
into linear regressions as covariates for changes in self-esteem, the model was not significant, F
(5, 165) = 0.114, p = .989, R2 = .003. Likewise, the model was not significant for changes in
negative affect, F (5, 165) = 1.24, p = .293, R2 = .036. The model approached significance for
changes in positive affect, F (5, 165) = 1.99, p = .083, R2 = .028, with Extraversion (β = -0.17, t
= -2.03, p = .044 [-0.28, -0.00]) and Openness (β = 0.19, t = 2.40, p = .018 [0.04, 0.38]) as
significant predictors.
As was the case in Study 2, the BFI subscales were predictors of moral disengagement
about cheating, F (5, 165) = 28.26, p < .001, R2 = .463. Agreeableness was inversely related to
moral disengagement about cheating, β = -0.19, t = -2.22, p = .028 [-0.81, -0.05], as was
Conscientiousness, β = -0.34, t = -4.00, p < .001 [-1.05, -0.36]. Extraversion was directly related
to moral disengagement about cheating, β = 0.34, t = 5.34, p < .001 [0.37, 0.81], as was
Neuroticism, β = 0.18, t = 2.11, p = .037 [0.20, 0.61]. This pattern of results makes sense given
the differences above on these subscales for the types of cheaters and the findings above that
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super cheaters morally disengaged more than non-cheaters. Understandably, the same pattern of
results occurred for moral disengagement about lying, F (5, 165) = 30.34, p < .001, R2 = .481
(See Table 6.4).
Unlike Study 2, it appears that Big Five personality traits did differ among the types of
cheaters and liars in Study 3. As was the case with psychopathy, these measures were included as
filler questions, so detailed examination of these effects is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However, these results suggest that people may have inherent personality differences that
predispose their behavior in guilt manipulations without random assignment to condition.
Discussion
The primary purpose of Study 3 was twofold: replicate the findings from Study 2 and
extend the use of the impossible online anagram task as a guilt manipulation for forensic
psychological research. Because the results from Study 2 and pilot testing of Study 3 met the a
priori threshold of 50% cheating in the Cheating conditions, the paradigm could have been tested
without the inclusion of the Computer-Scored condition. However, because of the novelty of the
paradigm, the latter condition was included for replication purposes and to further investigate the
viability of a fill-in-the-blank manipulation as a non-cheating control condition where ground
truth is known. In full support of Hypothesis 1, there were differences in rates of cheating for
both dichotomous classification (cheaters vs. non-cheaters) as well as scale classification (noncheaters, cheaters, super cheaters). Furthermore, the rates of cheating within the Cheating
conditions (53.55%) and Computer-Scored condition (31.25%) warrant further investigation,
particularly in regards to the Computer-Scored condition, where cheating approached the a priori
threshold for further refinement of a non-cheating condition (25%; See General Discussion).

114

Part of the replication-plus-extension was the inclusion of morality inductions in two of
the cheating condition. In the Passive Reminder condition, participants read a statement about
how proceeding with the study affirmed that the answers reported were their own work, and
providing false information was a violation of the study’s rules. Participants in the Active
Commitment condition read the same but were also required to type the statement. Study 3 also
included an opportunity for participants to relieve potential ethical dissonance by confessing to
cheating on the anagram task. Unfortunately, the morality inductions did not significantly
influence confession behavior. In fact, most participants did not change the number of anagrams
reported correctly unscrambled from the initial report to the confession opportunity, resulting in
a large, positive correlation between cheating on the task and lying during the confession.
Because of this lack of change in reporting, there was a lack of support for the prediction that
morality inductions would increase truthful disclosure, as they had previously in laboratory
studies (Joseph et al., 2021; Hypothesis 5).
Like Study 2, measures of self-concept maintenance (Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al.,
2008), ethical dissonance (Barkan et al., 2012), and moral disengagement (Shu et al., 2011) were
included to evaluate changes as a function of moral transgressions. In Study 3, participants were
faced with two opportunities to misbehave: during the anagram task, and during the confession.
Furthermore, the positioning of the confession opportunity varied among participants. For some,
it occurred immediately after the anagram task; for others, it occurred at the end of the study. As
such, both within-subjects and between-subjects analyses examined changes of these different
measures as a function of both cheating on the anagram task and lying during the confession.
Generally speaking, the findings from Study 3 replicate those from Study 2 regarding
changes in self-concept as a result of cheating on the anagram task. Namely, there were none. In
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both studies, measures of self-concept were nearly identical from pre-task to post-task measures,
and they did not differ as a result of the morality reminders or behavior during the confession
opportunity in Study 3. Despite research from laboratory studies suggesting self-concept should
change as a result of immoral behavior (Hypothesis 2; Mazar et al., 2008), that was not the case
in these studies. One possibility may be the measure used. The self-esteem scales used in these
studies contained only three items measuring participants’ opinions of how good they felt, the
way they looked, and feeling like a person of worth (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Perhaps a
different measure of state self-esteem would provide a more sensitive measure.
Alternatively, the paradigm itself may not have been sufficient to trigger changes in selfconcept. After all, when provided an opportunity to increase benefits with low threat to selfconcept, most people will cheat (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). The stakes of getting caught cheating
on the task were quite low, and much lower than the addition of interpersonal interactions
inherent in laboratory data collection. At the worst, participants would have their HIT rejected
and lose out on their bonus. Perhaps using an different online population, like Prolific, would
increase the stakes. Prolific participants have a Prolific Score which qualifies them for
participation in studies and is directly influenced by rejection. In fact, if a Prolific participant is
rejected too many times, their account is flagged and they will no longer be able to complete any
studies.
The third hypothesis predicting that participants who cheated would experience more
ethical dissonance than participants who abstained was partially supported. On average, positive
affect decreased and negative affect increased from pre-task to post-task within-subjects
measures, which appears to support Hypothesis 3. However, the decrease in positive affect was
driven predominately by non-cheaters who reported significantly less positive affect than those
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who cheated on the anagram task. Cheaters, on the other hand, actually reported slightly higher
post-task measures of positive affect, perhaps experiencing a form of duper’s delight at getting
away with their lie (Ekman, 1985). While this pattern of results directly contradicts the portion of
Hypothesis 3 predicting cheaters would experience decreased positive affect, it does lend some
support to the paradigm’s effectiveness at influencing affect measures.
Turning to negative affect, post-task measures of negative affect were significantly higher
than pre-task measures. Generally speaking, neither morality inductions nor cheating on the
anagram task resulted in increased negative affect, failing to support Hypothesis 3. In fact, the
opposite was true; the only ones who reported an increase in negative affect were non-cheaters
who missed out on an opportunity to increase their bonus, until the position of the confession
opportunity was included in the model. When the confession opportunity immediately followed
the anagram task, cheaters, particularly those in the Passive Reminder condition, reported
significantly higher experiences of negative affect. In other words, serial (un)ethical decisionmaking exerted stronger influence on negative affect measures than when there was a delay
between the decisions. This pattern of results replicated for the other non-positive affect
measures of anger, shame, and fatigue, thus partially supporting Hypothesis 3.
In a similar vein, Hypothesis 6 predicted participants who received some form of
morality reminder (Passive Reminder, Active Commitment) would experience greater ethical
dissonance than participants who did not (Computer-Scored, Cheating). When collapsed across
morality induction being present versus absent, Hypothesis 6 was supported. Participants who
received a morality reminder after the anagram task reported less positive affect and more
negative affect than participants who did not. Despite the support, these significant effects were
driven by participants in the Active Commitment condition for positive affect and by the Passive
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Reminder condition for negative affect, anger, shame, and fatigue. As such, the support for
Hypothesis 6 is conditional, and the role and placement of morality inductions should be further
investigated (See Limitations).
Two hypotheses predicted participants who cheated on the anagram task (Hypothesis 4)
or lied during the confession opportunity (Hypothesis 9) would morally disengage from these
behaviors (Barkan et al., 2012) as a form of ethical dissonance reduction. Both hypotheses were
partially supported. While those who cheated or lied to the fullest extent morally disengaged
from their actions significantly more than non-cheaters and truth-tellers, respectively, those who
cheated or lied a little did not significantly differ from either non-cheaters or truth-tellers. These
results replicate those for moral disengagement about cheating found in Study 2 as well as the
literature at large (e.g., Shu et al., 2011).
The seventh hypothesis predicted participants who confessed would experience ethical
dissonance reduction. In other words, participants who were experiencing ethical dissonance
from cheating on the anagram task would rather change their report—thus alleviating the ethical
dissonance—as opposed to doubling down during the confession opportunity—thereby further
increasing their ethical dissonance by committing a second moral transgression. Mediation
models exploring this possibility suggested this was not the case. Despite the fact that
participants who cheated and lied to the fullest extent experienced the greatest increases in
negative affect, anger, shame, and fatigue, they did not use the confession opportunity to reduce
this ethical dissonance. Instead, these participants may have used the search engine check
question at the end of the study as a surrogate confession opportunity and avenue of dissonance
reduction. More than four times the proportion of participants reported using a search engine in
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Study 3 than in Study 2, and these responses were observed to a greater extent than expected
within those who cheated and lied the most.
Moving to the exploratory analyses, measures of psychopathy and Big Five personality
traits were included both as filler questions but also to provide insight into differences between
those who commit and those who abstain from cheating when there is no random assignment to
guilt condition. As was the case in Study 2, psychopathy scores and moral disengagement were
positively correlated. However, in Study 3, there were significant differences in psychopathy
scores for super cheaters compared to cheaters and non-cheaters, which likely explains this
correlation. Participants high in psychopathy were more likely to be super cheaters (and lie
twice); super cheaters and those who lied twice were more likely to morally disengage from their
unethical behavior. Psychopathy was also related to several within-subjects affect changes, but,
like with moral disengagement, these were tied with cheating or lying. Regarding the Big Five
personality traits, there were some differences among the type of cheater classifications and
some of the subscales, unlike Study 2. In particular, cheaters and liars tended to be more
extroverted and neurotic than non-cheaters, while non-cheaters were more agreeable.
The results from the exploratory analyses of the included personality measures suggest
that there may be fundamental differences between participants who cheat and those who abstain
in paradigms where participants self-select their guilt status (i.e., no random assignment to guilt
condition). As such, any studies utilizing these designs (e.g., die toss, coin flip, anagrams, etc.)
should consider these differences as part of their analysis plans as well as interpretation of
findings. However, according to a literature search, the studies reported in this dissertation are
the first to include such measures within the psycholegal realm.
Limitations
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For no apparent reason, the exclusion rate for Study 3 was nearly twice that of Study 2,
despite using the same inclusion criteria and containing identical instructional manipulation and
comprehension checks. As a result, even though the target sample size was inflated in
anticipation of exclusions, the analyses for Study 3 are severely underpowered. Additionally, the
a priori power analyses did not include some of the more complex, power hungry analyses
ultimately included in this dissertation. As a result, all findings and conclusions are qualified by
this general lack of statistical power. Additionally, several limitations noted in Study 2 were
present in Study 3 due to budgetary and time constraints that precluded refinement of the
paradigm and procedures.
Because Study 3 was a replication-plus-extension, new limitations were introduced with
the new aspects of the design. For instance, the role and placement of morality inductions was
limited to a single placement: after the anagram task. The morality reminders were placed after
the anagram task for two reasons. The first was to exacerbate any ethical dissonance participants
may be experiencing as a result of cheating, which was successful. The second was to investigate
whether this increased ethical dissonance would spur participants to confess to their unethical
behavior; it did not. Future research should further examine whether morality inductions
influence decisions to cheat by placing the inductions before the first opportunity to misbehave.
This research could also examine whether including morality inductions before, after, or both
before and after the first opportunity differentially influences decisions to cheat as well as ethical
dissonance. Perhaps something as simple as changing the framing from double-checking the
initial report to amending the report would be sufficient.
Regarding the impossible anagram task as a whole, there were a few limitations that
applied to both Studies 2 and 3. In general, there was a distinct lack of differences between non-
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cheaters and people who only cheated once. Much of this is likely due to self-concept
maintenance and rationalization, but some may also be due to the positioning of the impossible
anagrams within the task. By positioning the impossible anagrams in the third and eighth slots,
participants could increase their bonus by 250% by cheating on the first anagram and 400% by
cheating on both anagrams. As a result, participants faced a relatively low-cost, high-benefit
decision. The positioning of the first impossible anagram may have over-incentivized some
participants to cheat without activating some of the hypothesized internal drivers of moral
decision-making. Future research should experiment with pushing the first impossible anagram
later in the task (e.g., the fifth or sixth slot), thereby increasing the cost and decreasing the
benefit associated with cheating, to see if clearer differences between cheaters and non-cheaters
emerge. However, because the cheating rate approached the 50% a priori threshold in the
Cheating conditions, that option was not pursued further as part of this dissertation.
Another limitation of this design is the confounded format for the anagram task between
condition. Participants in the Computer-Scored condition were required to type in the solution to
the anagrams, whereas participants in the Cheating condition only needed to check a box.
Despite having to type in the solution, 31-38% of participants in the Computer-Scored condition
correctly solved the first impossible anagram (XEROMA) compared to 0 participants in Study 1.
The most reasonable explanation for this difference between studies is the difference in
presentation format for the anagrams. In Study 1, anagrams were presented individually for 20
seconds each; in Studies 2 and 3, all ten anagrams were presented simultaneously for 200
seconds. In Study 1, easier words were solved faster than the more difficult words, which means
that participants in Studies 2 and 3 likely had more time to utilize online anagram unscramblers
to aid the solution of the first impossible anagram. The confounded presentation format between
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the two conditions aside, one possible way of further decreasing cheating in the ComputerScored condition is to individually present each anagram for 20 seconds, thereby decreasing the
time participants would have to utilize external aids.
A solution to the confounded format between the conditions is to utilize Qualtrics’ File
Upload option, as was originally proposed for this dissertation. The File Upload question type
allows participants to upload an image directly into the survey; in this case, a picture of their
answer sheet. The positioning of the file upload would be manipulated between condition such
that participants would upload their answer sheet before or after seeing the solutions for the No
Cheating and Cheating conditions, respectively. The File Upload option also provides an
opportunity for improvement of the morality induction manipulation. Instead of typing the
commitment to behave honestly, participants would physically write the text and affix their
signature or identification code. The Passive Reminder condition could remain the same as Study
3, where participants simply read the text on-screen. Unfortunately, the File Upload question
type was not available as part of the institution’s Qualtrics license, and budgetary restrictions did
not allow for purchasing the add-on for this dissertation. However, future research of using the
online impossible anagram task would benefit from implementation of this strategy.
Regarding the anagrams themselves, the impossible words were really improbable words.
Despite being obscure words that no one in Study 1 was able to correctly unscramble, the
“impossible” words were still real words. As a result, some, but not all, online anagram
unscramblers recognize the words and provide correct solutions, as seen in the Computer-Scored
conditions of Studies 2 and 3. That said, it is possible that a small minority of participants were
able to correctly unscramble these obscure words, but the use of random assignment would
distribute these wordsmiths among the conditions. Moving forward, future research should use
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fake words that sound obscure (e.g., PHRYNX, THROWDY, HRYVERN) that are literally
impossible versus using obscure but real words and establishing cheating and lying based on
probabilities.
Lastly, due to the digital nature of the anagram task and budgetary restrictions, ground
truth was impossible to establish for both cheating and lying to the same extent as the CAM
(Ruedy & Schwietzer, 2010). As a reminder, the CAM uses carbonless paper, so the imprints
record participants’ performance, and the use of external tools (i.e., online anagram
unscramblers) would be detectable were participants supervised during the task. Future research
using online anagram tasks should consider implementing the use of software to track
participants’ mouse and browser activity to establish if and when online anagram unscramblers
were used to solve the “impossible” anagrams. The use of such software would be preferable to
the current paradigm, where cheating was established based on probabilistic performance from a
different sample.
Conclusion
The main goals of Study 3 were to replicate the findings from Study 2 and investigate the
online impossible anagram task as a guilt manipulation of a larger study design. In both regards,
Study 3 was successful. The findings from Study 3 largely replicate those from Study 2. The
addition of the confession opportunity and the morality inductions provided further opportunity
for investigating ethical dissonance as a result of unethical behavior. Morality inductions and
cheating behavior both moderated changes in ethical dissonance. Furthermore, cheating on the
anagram task exerted more influence on positive and negative affect than subsequently lying
about the initial transgression. Additionally, these studies represent the first to examine
personality differences between cheaters and non-cheaters in the forensic psychological
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literature. Despite the numerous limitations and lack of or partial support for hypotheses, the
studies reported above represent the first steps toward online guilt manipulations for forensic
psychological research involving serial ethical decision-making (i.e., deception, confessions, plea
bargains, etc.).
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL DISCUSSION
This dissertation designed and tested the online impossible anagram task for use as an
online guilt manipulation for forensic psychological research. The first study tested 149
anagrams for solvability to develop a ranked list ranging in difficulty. Ten-word lists comprised
of the easiest and hardest anagrams were pilot-tested using different compositions and
instructions to develop the impossible anagram task used in Studies 2 and 3. Study 2 focused on
testing the impossible anagram task and establishing a baseline for rates of cheating in the two
conditions. Simultaneously, the theoretical drivers of dishonest behavior proposed above were
recorded, and differences in personality and affect measures were found. Study 3 was a
replication-plus-expansion of Study 2 that used the impossible anagram task as a guilt
manipulation to investigate the influence of morality reminders on confession behavior.
As predicted, participants were more likely to cheat when provided an opportunity to
self-report the number of anagrams correctly unscrambled than when required to provide the
solutions to the anagrams. Participants did not suffer a change in self-concept as a result of
cheating on the anagram task, but they did experience increased ethical dissonance. Cheaters and
liars also morally disengaged from their transgressive behavior. When morality inductions were
introduced in Study 3, participants exposed to a morality reminder experienced more ethical
dissonance than those who were not exposed. However, neither increased ethical dissonance nor
morality reminders caused participants to confess to cheating on the anagram task. In fact,
participants were fairly consistent in their initial and second reports. As a result, it was not
possible to fully examine changes in self-concept or dissonance as a function of confessing. That
said, participants who continued to misreport their performance on the anagram task in Study 3
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maintained high levels of ethical dissonance and may have used a standard compliance check as
a surrogate confession and dissonance reduction strategy.
Theoretical Implications
One of the goals of the project was to create a paradigm that activated the same internal
and external drivers of (dis)honest behavior as in-person, laboratory paradigms. The studies
above examined psychological mechanisms of ethical decision-making in an online environment,
including self-concept maintenance, ethical dissonance, and moral disengagement. Self-concept
maintenance theory predicts people will cheat enough to benefit but not enough to necessitate
revision of their self-concept as inherently moral people (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). Although the
hypothesis that participants would experience a change in self-concept as a result of cheating was
not supported, a large proportion of participants in both Study 2 and Study 3 did not cheat to the
fullest extent possible, supporting self-concept maintenance theory. These results suggest that the
online impossible anagram task did activate a cost-benefit analysis in the participants similar to
those seen in traditional laboratory paradigms. Had this not been the case, everyone who did
cheat would have done so to the fullest extent possible.
Furthermore, participants who cheated to the fullest extent possible did experience ethical
dissonance as measured by within-subjects decreases positive affect and increases negative
affect. Recall that ethical dissonance threatens self-perceived goodness beyond ethically neutral
cognitive dissonance and ethically neutral threats to self-concept, especially as a result from
unambiguous unethical behaviors (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Barkan et al., 2012). Most excluded
participants failed instructional comprehension checks regarding the rules of the impossible
anagram task and how the bonus was calculated. Put another way, the only people included in
the study were those who passed two comprehension checks and twice affirmed they understood

126

the rules of the task. As such, it is fair to assume that those who cheated on the task (or
subsequently lied about their performance) did so knowing full well their actions were
unambiguously unethical.
The final measure included for evaluating whether the paradigm activated theoretical
drivers of (dis)honest behavior was moral disengagement (Shu et al., 2011). In Studies 2 and 3,
super cheaters morally disengaged to a greater extent than cheaters and non-cheaters. In Study 3,
participants who lied twice morally disengaged more than those who lie once and those who told
the truth. Again, the online impossible anagram task appears to have activated the same proposed
behavioral drivers as in-person, laboratory paradigms.
Taken together, these results suggest that the online impossible anagram task created for
this dissertation successfully activated the same drivers of ethical decision-making as traditional
laboratory paradigms. Additionally, Study 3 demonstrated the paradigms use as part of a larger
experimental design. Though still in need of improvement, this online cheating paradigm may
provide an avenue for investigation of deception detection, interrogations, confessions, and plea
bargains in online settings. The ability to conduct such studies online could increase
representativeness of samples, facilitate data collection from more difficult-to-recruit
populations, and increase collaborations in the field of forensic psychology.
Future Directions
For the reasons detailed in the Cheating Paradigm section of Chapter 1, the impossible
anagram task was selected as the most suitable option for an online guilt manipulation. While
research using the Russano et al. cheating paradigm achieves 94-96% adherence to the guilt
manipulation for in-person laboratory data collection (e.g., Guyll et al., 2013; Perillo & Kassin,
2011; Russano et al., 2005), previous online anagram tasks only achieved 15.5-59% rates of
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cheating. Given those numbers, two options emerged for this project. The first was to create
conditions where at least 75% cheated in one condition and no more than 25% cheated in the
other. The second was to have a single condition where cheating rates were at or near 50%.
Given the data from the pilot testing and full data collection for Study 2, the latter option was
chosen. As a result, participants self-selected whether or not to cheat on the anagram task and did
so 41-54% of the time in the Cheating conditions. Unfortunately, the inclusion of the Big Five
inventory and psychopathy measures suggests participants who self-select to cheat may have
underlying personality differences than those who choose to abstain. As such, researchers should
aim for random assignment to guilt condition if possible.
Several recommendations for refinement of the impossible anagram task were included
when discussing the limitations of the individual studies above. These included suggestions for
improving upon the anagram task by repositioning the placement of the impossible anagrams
within the task, using Qualtrics’ file upload option to establish ground truth, and replacing
obscure but real words with fake words that sound obscure. Likely the most difficult hurdle will
be minimizing cheating in the No Cheating condition. The a priori threshold for pilot testing of
the online impossible anagram task for this project was 25%, but rates close to that were not seen
until the Computer-Scored condition in Study 3 (31.25%). However, because the rate did
approach the a priori threshold, there is hope for creating conditions to reduce cheating even
further. For instance, single presentation of the anagrams could prevent participants from using
online anagram unscramblers as would using fake words that are literally, not just statistically,
impossible. Ideally, with further refinement, the online impossible anagram task would randomly
assign participants to either cheat or not cheat with at least 90% compliance.
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Even with only 10% data loss in each condition, researchers would need to egregiously
oversample given the exclusion rates seen above for instructional comprehension for the
anagram task (5%-64.5%). Alternatively, these rates are from the MTurk population, and other
data collection platforms may provide better quality participants with less data loss. For instance,
Prolific has more stringent requirements for participants to sign up and, as mentioned above,
Prolific participants must maintain their performance to remain active. Future research should
investigate the online impossible anagram task’s viability in other online population pools.
Conclusion
The online impossible anagram task developed and tested for this dissertation has the
potential to provide psycholegal researchers an avenue for expanding their data collection online.
The analyses above suggest the paradigm activates the same theoretical drivers for ethical
decision-making as traditional laboratory paradigms. Online studies provide a cheaper method
for collecting data from more diverse or specifically targeted samples than a researcher’s own
institution or general geographic location. Furthermore, through open science practices, online
data collection can encourage multi-institutional and multidisciplinary research, encouraging
replication of results and a more robust literature.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 3.1
Proportions of Anagrams Correctly Unscrambled in Study 1
Word

Anagram

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Average
Time

PAPER

PPAER

0.882

0.039

0.806

0.959

7.75 (6.26)

JELLY

YLLEJ

0.869

0.043

0.784

0.954

8.34 (5.42)

PEACOCK

PAECOCK

0.855

0.045

0.767

0.943

9.58 (5.31)

BOOKS

SKOOB

0.851

0.044

0.765

0.936

7.27 (5.45)

GLOVES

GVOLES

0.842

0.048

0.747

0.937

9.02 (6.30)

TOMATO

TAMOTO

0.831

0.047

0.740

0.922

8.24 (5.94)

TICKET

TIKCET

0.831

0.047

0.740

0.922

8.66 (5.72)

JOLLY

YOLLJ

0.828

0.050

0.730

0.925

8.41 (6.19)

ZEBRA a

ZBAER

0.827

0.052

0.724

0.930

11.46 (6.75)

WHEEL

HWEEL

0.804

0.053

0.700

0.908

8.41 (6.53)

TURKEY

TRUKEY

0.800

0.048

0.706

0.894

8.27 (5.93)

TRACK

TRAKC

0.775

0.050

0.677

0.872

9.92 (6.07)

FOLLOW

OFLLWO

0.770

0.054

0.665

0.876

9.76 (6.54)

COVER

RCOVE

0.766

0.053

0.662

0.869

9.79 (6.09)

PENCIL

PINCEL

0.766

0.053

0.662

0.869

11.53 (5.87)

MARVEL

MARLVE

0.758

0.054

0.651

0.865

11.49 (6.17)

CHESS

SSECH

0.750

0.054

0.644

0.856

9.64 (6.19)

FOLDER

FOLDRE

0.738

0.056

0.627

0.848

8.74 (6.38)

ENGINE

EENGIN

0.738

0.056

0.627

0.848

10.69 (5.69)

HOMELY

HOMLEY

0.733

0.057

0.621

0.845

11.68 (6.05)

MONKEY

MONKYE

0.716

0.055

0.608

0.824

9.22 (6.36)
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Word

Anagram

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Average
Time

THOUGHT

TUHGHTO

0.712

0.056

0.603

0.821

9.69 (5.70)

COLOR

ROCOL

0.710

0.058

0.597

0.823

9.31 (6.46)

FEEBLE

FBEELE

0.692

0.057

0.580

0.805

10.27 (6.37)

THANK

AHKNT

0.690

0.061

0.571

0.809

11.90 (6.74)

RULER

RULRE

0.677

0.059

0.561

0.794

10.65 (6.39)

ERASER a

REASER

0.672

0.059

0.557

0.787

11.09 (6.45)

ELEVEN

NELEVE

0.656

0.059

0.540

0.773

12.77 (6.51)

LETTUCE

LETTUEC

0.641

0.060

0.523

0.758

8.74 (5.94)

FADED

FAEDD

0.641

0.060

0.523

0.758

9.94 (6.09)

WHOLE a

EOWHL

0.635

0.061

0.516

0.754

10.67 (6.49)

BUTTER

ETTRUB

0.619

0.061

0.499

0.739

10.71 (5.76)

EIGHT

IEGHT

0.615

0.060

0.497

0.734

9.29 (6.33)

TWELVE

TWEELV

0.614

0.058

0.500

0.728

11.14 (6.29)

SOLID a

DLIOS

0.613

0.062

0.492

0.734

10.89 (6.43)

MORNING

RNIGMON

0.613

0.062

0.492

0.734

12.93 (6.07)

CRAYON

CROYAN

0.585

0.061

0.465

0.704

12.69 (6.37)

DRINK

NKRDI

0.578

0.062

0.457

0.699

12.00 (7.13)

BLUSH

SUBLH

0.567

0.061

0.449

0.686

11.91 (6.34)

COMMON

MOCNMO

0.561

0.061

0.441

0.680

11.73 (5.90)

GIRAFFE

GARFFIE

0.548

0.063

0.425

0.672

10.96 (6.54)

TRAIN

ARINT

0.547

0.062

0.425

0.669

11.44 (6.36)

CHALK

HCAKL

0.541

0.064

0.416

0.666

12.07 (6.35)

TRAVEL

ELARVT

0.538

0.062

0.417

0.660

13.83 (6.09)

FAINT

TIAFN

0.525

0.064

0.399

0.650

11.78 (6.64)

WEARY

WEYRA

0.524

0.063

0.400

0.647

13.51 (6.53)
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Word

Anagram

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Average
Time

BIRTH

TBRHI

0.516

0.063

0.392

0.641

12.41 (6.27)

OFFBEAT

FBAETFO

0.516

0.062

0.393

0.638

15.29 (6.39)

JUGGLE

JEGLGU

0.515

0.062

0.395

0.636

13.32 (6.32)

WIGGLY

IWYGLG

0.507

0.061

0.388

0.627

14.03 (5.78)

SOGGY

GOGYS

0.500

0.062

0.379

0.621

12.35 (6.23)

DECIDE a

CIEDDE

0.492

0.063

0.369

0.616

12.35 (6.51)

BELIEF

ELFIEB

0.492

0.065

0.364

0.619

11.60 (6.96)

GAUDY

DYGAU

0.485

0.062

0.364

0.605

12.91 (6.28)

SETTLE

LSEETT

0.484

0.063

0.359

0.608

13.01 (6.02)

WHINE

EWHNI

0.470

0.061

0.349

0.590

11.04 (6.74)

BROTHER

EORTBHR

0.467

0.064

0.340

0.593

12.91 (6.68)

REBEL

EBLRE

0.466

0.065

0.337

0.594

12.44 (6.86)

PASTE a

TEPSA

0.463

0.061

0.343

0.582

13.00 (6.53)

STAMP

SPATM

0.451

0.070

0.314

0.588

12.79 (6.46)

TOOTH

OTHOT

0.450

0.064

0.324

0.576

12.04 (6.29)

MUDDLED

ULMDDDE

0.446

0.062

0.325

0.567

13.56 (6.15)

FLASH

LHSAF

0.444

0.063

0.322

0.567

12.18 (6.57)

LEGAL

GLLAE

0.444

0.063

0.322

0.567

13.72 (6.31)

GREASY

RAESYG

0.441

0.065

0.314

0.567

14.09 (6.40)

GROUND

ODGNRU

0.433

0.061

0.314

0.551

12.35 (6.23)

VARIOUS a

ASUOVRI

0.419

0.063

0.297

0.542

14.35 (6.69)

FLAME

LMAFE

0.410

0.063

0.286

0.533

11.89 (6.74)

SNATCH a

ACSHNT

0.409

0.061

0.290

0.528

13.45 (6.25)

BASHFUL

BAHLFUS

0.400

0.063

0.276

0.524

12.27 (6.48)

DEPEND

EDEPDN

0.400

0.061

0.281

0.519

12.43 (6.74)
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Word

Anagram

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Average
Time

STATION

OIATNTS

0.393

0.063

0.271

0.516

14.88 (6.37)

COWARD

ROWADC

0.391

0.061

0.271

0.510

14.00 (6.28)

GROUCH

UCRHOG

0.391

0.061

0.271

0.510

14.13 (6.56)

FUZEE

EEFUZ

0.385

0.060

0.266

0.503

13.33 (5.98)

POWDER

DWOPRE

0.385

0.060

0.266

0.503

13.67 (6.24)

UNABLE a

NLUEAB

0.379

0.064

0.254

0.504

14.11 (6.09)

ENTER a

EENRT

0.375

0.061

0.256

0.494

12.77 (6.50)

REQUEST a

EUQRETS

0.369

0.060

0.252

0.487

14.23 (6.53)

ACRID a

DACRI

0.359

0.060

0.242

0.477

14.38 (6.25)

FESTIVE

ITEVSFE

0.355

0.061

0.236

0.474

14.01 (6.55)

SPOOKY

OYSKPO

0.353

0.058

0.239

0.467

13.77 (6.96)

TROUBLE

BETRULO

0.348

0.057

0.235

0.460

14.03 (6.33)

COBWEB

OWCBEB

0.338

0.059

0.223

0.453

11.90 (6.83)

PADDLE

DALDPE

0.338

0.059

0.223

0.453

14.75 (5.45)

OATMEAL

EALMOTA

0.328

0.057

0.216

0.441

13.94 (6.32)

SHIVER

RHSVEI

0.323

0.058

0.209

0.437

14.31 (6.64)

RACIAL

CARALI

0.313

0.058

0.199

0.426

15.71 (5.54)

AFFORD

FARODF

0.308

0.057

0.195

0.420

14.74 (6.37)

UNUSUAL

USAUUNL

0.306

0.059

0.192

0.421

13.08 (6.75)

NOTICE

OECITN

0.299

0.056

0.189

0.408

15.20 (6.14)

CAPABLE

APEBCAL

0.288

0.056

0.179

0.397

14.51 (6.73)

CHIRK

KHIRC

0.286

0.057

0.174

0.397

15.50 (5.94)

WEALTH

HATEWL

0.279

0.057

0.166

0.391

13.56 (6.37)

REASON

NROSEA

0.274

0.057

0.163

0.385

14.16 (6.35)

SWANKY

NSAKYW

0.271

0.058

0.158

0.385

13.03 (7.12)
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Anagram

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Average
Time

HARASS

ASRAHS

0.262

0.055

0.155

0.368

13.58 (6.25)

GATHER

TAHGRE

0.254

0.055

0.146

0.361

14.28 (6.42)

SOFFIT

OSIFFT

0.254

0.053

0.150

0.358

14.55 (6.11)

WHISPER a

EIPHWRS

0.246

0.055

0.138

0.354

12.91 (6.81)

COLLAR a

LLROAC

0.246

0.057

0.134

0.357

13.01 (6.64)

ELDERLY

DELYLER

0.246

0.055

0.138

0.354

14.34 (6.23)

SYLPH

YPSHL

0.237

0.055

0.129

0.346

15.85 (5.61)

ABLAZE

BAZELA

0.234

0.053

0.131

0.338

12.91 (6.75)

SCATTER

ARCTETS

0.233

0.055

0.126

0.340

15.16 (6.25)

ANOMIE

AMOINE

0.222

0.052

0.120

0.325

14.49 (6.65)

BANZAI

AAZBIN

0.219

0.052

0.117

0.320

15.04 (5.88)

MELODIC

EODLEMC

0.213

0.052

0.110

0.316

15.31 (6.36)

SAMOVAR

ARMVASO

0.203

0.050

0.105

0.302

14.92 (6.44)

CERTAIN

ENIARCT

0.203

0.050

0.105

0.302

15.83 (5.63)

CORRECT

CCTORER

0.200

0.050

0.103

0.297

14.17 (6.74)

MOTILE

OTMIEL

0.197

0.051

0.097

0.296

14.85 (6.06)

INDITE a

NEITDI

0.180

0.049

0.084

0.277

15.62 (6.08)

TALARIA

RIAATLA

0.175

0.050

0.077

0.274

15.07 (6.14)

CYMOSE

EOCSYM

0.172

0.047

0.079

0.264

15.65 (5.83)

MAMMOTH TMMHMOA

0.169

0.047

0.078

0.260

14.20 (6.12)

RELEASE

ESRALEE

0.169

0.047

0.078

0.260

14.31 (6.95)

KELOID

ILOEDK

0.169

0.047

0.078

0.260

15.70 (6.25)

NAIAD a

ADNAI

0.164

0.047

0.071

0.257

15.86 (6.03)

TERCET

CETTRE

0.156

0.045

0.067

0.245

15.96 (5.68)

ONEROUS

OUSRNOE

0.154

0.045

0.066

0.242

14.54 (6.51)
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Anagram

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Average
Time

KUVASZ

SUZAKV

0.154

0.045

0.066

0.242

14.89 (6.37)

BORZOI

ORBZOI

0.154

0.045

0.066

0.242

15.18 (6.39)

BHAKTI

IBHAKT

0.152

0.044

0.065

0.238

15.90 (6.33)

FOVEA

VEFOA

0.143

0.044

0.056

0.229

15.13 (6.23)

COTERIE

OECETRI

0.141

0.043

0.055

0.226

14.08 (6.89)

CALABA

ALAABC

0.141

0.043

0.055

0.226

14.44 (6.44)

FLACCID

CDAFCIL

0.141

0.043

0.055

0.226

15.50 (6.53)

STYPTIC

YSTCTIP

0.138

0.043

0.054

0.222

15.77 (6.49)

GOUACHE

GHAUECO

0.133

0.044

0.047

0.219

15.02 (6.38)

PUERILE

RIUELEP

0.127

0.042

0.045

0.209

15.36 (6.32)

GHARRY

HARGRY

0.125

0.041

0.044

0.206

16.15 (6.33)

ELEGANT a

GTEAENL

0.121

0.040

0.042

0.200

15.00 (6.70)

PYXIS

YXIPS

0.119

0.042

0.036

0.201

14.68 (6.37)

QUAGGA

GAUQAG

0.119

0.040

0.042

0.197

15.27 (5.96)

QUAMASH

ASUQHAM

0.119

0.042

0.036

0.201

16.63 (5.42)

TZETZE

TZETEZ

0.116

0.039

0.040

0.191

14.66 (6.82)

QUARTAN

UATRANQ

0.115

0.041

0.035

0.195

14.31 (7.15)

SEQUOIA

EOISQAU

0.108

0.038

0.032

0.183

15.46 (6.74)

PIBROCH

OBHPRIC

0.108

0.038

0.032

0.183

15.46 (6.88)

LLANO

NLALO

0.108

0.038

0.032

0.183

16.45 (5.40)

BYRNIE

BEIYNR

0.104

0.037

0.031

0.178

16.36 (5.51)

ECTOPIA

CPAEITO

0.098

0.038

0.024

0.173

15.26 (6.78)

CARIOCA

AICCOAR

0.094

0.036

0.022

0.165

15.31 (6.49)

PYAEMIA

PYEIAMA

0.082

0.035

0.013

0.151

13.73 (6.77)

EOCENE

CENOEE

0.079

0.034

0.013

0.146

15.96 (6.11)
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THALWEG

LWAGTHE

0.066

0.032

0.003

0.128

14.08 (7.07)

CHADDAR

RCDADHA

0.063

0.030

0.003

0.122

14.85 (6.68)

THYRSUS

USRHYTS

0.063

0.030

0.003

0.122

14.88 (6.73)

TOKAMAK

AMAKTKO

0.063

0.031

0.003

0.124

15.38 (6.39)

OBLOQUY

OLYQBUO

0.063

0.030

0.003

0.122

17.22 (5.70)

FINNIC

IICFNN

0.062

0.030

0.003

0.120

15.63 (6.62)

TYMPANI

AIMYTPN

0.049

0.028

-0.005

0.103

15.27 (6.72)

KNAWEL

AKNEWL

0.048

0.027

-0.005

0.100

16.01 (5.61)

AUSPEX

USEPXA

0.043

0.025

-0.005

0.092

15.76 (5.69)

JUGALE

LUJGAE

0.015

0.015

-0.015

0.045

15.09 (6.41)

XEROMA

AERXMO

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

14.73 (6.82)

HRYVNIA

NIVAHYR

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

15.14 (6.70)

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

15.95 (6.40)

Note. Average time (in seconds) is collapsed across those who succeeded and failed to correctly
unscramble the anagrams. Line breaks in the table indicate anagram difficulty at the 75%, 50%,
25%, and 1% accuracy levels.
a

Some anagrams were found to have more than one possible correct solution (e.g., ADNAI à

NAIAD and DIANA). In cases where that occurred, all possible solutions were coded as correct.
As such, values for these words are inflated and do not represent the proportion of participants
who unscrambled the anagram to the target word.
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Table 5.1
Proportions of Anagrams Correctly Unscrambled in Study 2
Word

Anagram

Seen

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Computer-Scored Condition
PAPER

PPAER

99

0.990

0.010

0.970

1.010

JELLY

YLLEJ

99

0.970

0.017

0.936

1.003

XEROMA

AERXMO

99

0.384

0.049

0.288

0.480

PEACOCK

PAECOCK

99

0.879

0.033

0.814

0.943

BOOKS

SKOOB

99

0.859

0.035

0.790

0.927

GLOVES

GVOLES

99

0.828

0.038

0.754

0.903

TOMATO

TAMOTO

99

0.828

0.038

0.754

0.903

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

99

0.010

0.010

-0.010

0.030

TICKET

TIKCET

99

0.798

0.040

0.719

0.877

JOLLY

YOLLJ

99

0.798

0.040

0.719

0.877

Cheating Condition
PAPER

PPAER

130

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

JELLY

YLLEJ

130

0.985

0.011

0.963

1.006

XEROMA

AERXMO

130

0.423

0.043

0.338

0.508

PEACOCK

PAECOCK

130

0.985

0.011

0.963

1.006

BOOKS

SKOOB

130

0.985

0.011

0.963

1.006

GLOVES

GVOLES

130

0.954

0.018

0.918

0.990

TOMATO

TAMOTO

130

0.969

0.015

0.940

0.999

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

130

0.208

0.036

0.138

0.277

TICKET

TIKCET

130

0.962

0.017

0.928

0.995
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JOLLY

YOLLJ

130

0.938

0.021

0.897

0.980

Note. Proportion correctly solved on items following “impossible” words compared to the Cheat
condition may be due to the fact that several (7%) of participants stopped responding after
encountering the first impossible word and (11%) of participants stopped responding after the
second impossible word.
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Table 5.2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fits Study 2
Models

χ2

df

p

CFI

TLI

AIC

BIC

RMSEA

SRMR

χ2diff

177.99***

Emotional Affect Scale
2 Factor CFA

425.44

43

< .001

0.847

0.805

7568.18

7647.16

0.197 [0.180, 0.214]

0.075

3 Factor CFA

247.45

41

<.001

0.918

0.889

7394.19

7480.04

0.148 [0.131, 0.166]

0.054

Dissonance Thermometer
139

2 Factor CFA

1317.72

251

< .001

0.819

0.819

15326.36

15493.75

0.137 [0.130, 0.145]

0.098

109.55***

3 Factor CFA

1208.18

249

<.001

0.837

0.819

15220.82

15395.04

0.131 [0.124, 0.138]

0.097

174.09***

4 Factor CFA

1034.09

246

<.001

0.886

0.850

15052.73

15237.20

0.119 [0.112, 0.127]

0.088

2 Factor CFA

2730.74

559

<.001

0.768

0.753

22488.79

22731.33

0.131 [0.126, 0.136]

0.090

191.25***

3 Factor CFA

2668.73

557

<.001

0.774

0.759

22430.78

22680.16

0.130 [0.125, 0.135]

0.089

457.37***

5 Factor CFA

2193.37

550

<.001

0.824

0.810

21969.42

22242.71

0.115 [0.110, 0.120]

0.078

Combined

Table 6.1
Proportions of Anagrams Correctly Unscrambled in Study 3
Word

Anagram

Seen

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Computer-Scored Condition
PAPER

PPAER

48

0.938

0.035

0.869

1.006

JELLY

YLLEJ

48

0.833

0.054

0.728

0.939

XEROMA

AERXMO

48

0.313

0.067

0.181

0.444

PEACOCK

PAECOCK

48

0.729

0.064

0.603

0.855

BOOKS

SKOOB

48

0.792

0.059

0.677

0.907

GLOVES

GVOLES

48

0.813

0.056

0.702

0.923

TOMATO

TAMOTO

48

0.833

0.054

0.728

0.939

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

48

0.063

0.035

-0.006

0.131

TICKET

TIKCET

48

0.667

0.068

0.533

0.800

JOLLY

YOLLJ

48

0.729

0.064

0.603

0.855

Cheating Condition
PAPER

PPAER

127

0.992

0.008

0.977

1.007

JELLY

YLLEJ

127

0.961

0.017

0.927

0.994

XEROMA

AERXMO

127

0.496

0.044

0.409

0.583

PEACOCK

PAECOCK

127

0.969

0.015

0.938

0.999

BOOKS

SKOOB

127

0.953

0.019

0.916

0.990

GLOVES

GVOLES

127

0.976

0.013

0.950

1.003

TOMATO

TAMOTO

127

0.937

0.022

0.895

0.979

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

127

0.409

0.044

0.324

0.495

TICKET

TIKCET

127

0.961

0.017

0.927

0.994
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JOLLY

YOLLJ

127

0.953

0.019

0.916

0.990

Note. Proportion correctly solved on items following “impossible” words compared to the Cheat
condition may be due to the fact that several participants (12.5%) stopped responding after
encountering the first impossible word and additional participants (8.33%) stopped responding
after the second impossible word.
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Figure 1
Number of Anagrams in Each Condition by Confession Position
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Table 6.2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fits Study 3
Models

χ2

df

p

CFI

TLI

AIC

BIC

RMSEA

SRMR

χ2diff

55.46***

Emotional Affect Scale
2 Factor CFA

213.21

43

< .001

0.933

0.914

5683.42

5756.21

0.150 [0.131, 0.171]

0.049

3 Factor CFA

157.75

41

<.001

0.954

0.938

5631.96

5711.08

0.128 [0.107, 0.149]

0.046

Dissonance Thermometer

143

2 Factor CFA

1077.89

251

< .001

0.877

0.865

11306.70

11460.64

0.139 [0.130, 0.147]

0.086

135.69***

3 Factor CFA

1060.63

249

<.001

0.879

0.866

11293.44

11453.67

0.138 [0.130, 0.147]

0.086

118.43***

4 Factor CFA

942.20

246

<.001

0.896

0.884

11181.01

11350.66

0.129 [0.120, 0.137]

0.077

2 Factor CFA

2095.36

559

<.001

0.848

0.838

16250.08

16472.30

0.128 [0.122, 0.133]

0.075

256.74***

3 Factor CFA

2045.54

557

<.001

0.852

0.842

16204.26

16432.74

0.126 [0.120, 0.132]

0.074

181.19***

5 Factor CFA

1864.35

550

<.001

0.870

0.859

16037.07

16287.47

0.119 [0.113, 0.125]

0.067

Combined

Figure 2
Interaction between Condition and Cheating for Anger in Study 3
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Figure 3
Interaction between Condition and Cheating for Shame in Study 3
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Figure 4
Interaction between Condition and Cheating for Fatigue in Study 3
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Table 6.3
Search Engine Check Surrogate Confession Study 3
95% Confidence
interval
Lower
Upper
bound
bound

Wald Test
Estimate

Standard
Odds
Standardized⁺
Error
Ratio

z

Wald
df
Statistic

p

147

(Intercept)

3.86

0.76

1.42

47.54

5.09

25.90 1 < .001

2.374

5.349

Positive Affect

-0.03

0.13

-0.05

0.97

-0.21

0.05

1 0.831

-0.290

0.233

Negative Affect

-0.77

0.13

-1.43

0.46

-5.91

34.88 1 < .001

-1.029

-0.516

Confession Position (1)

0.22

0.22

0.22

1.25

0.99

0.98

1 0.321

-0.215

0.656

Cheater (1)

-0.43

0.42

-0.43

0.65

-1.03

1.06

1 0.302

-1.246

0.387

Lied Confession (1)

1.18

0.43

1.18

3.26

2.77

7.67

1 0.006

0.346

2.019

Note. SearchEngineCheck level '0' coded as class 1.
⁺ Standardized estimates represent estimates where the continuous predictors are standardized (X-standardization).

Table 6.4
BFI Subscales Moral Disengagement about Lying Study 3
95% CI
Model

Unstandardized

Standard Error

Standardized

t

p

Lower

Upper

148

H₀

(Intercept)

3.745

0.128

29.184

< .001

3.491

3.998

H₁

(Intercept)

4.758

1.289

3.691

< .001

2.212

7.303

BFI_A

-0.462

0.198

-0.192

-2.333

0.021

-0.853

-0.071

BFI_C

-0.749

0.180

-0.345

-4.172

< .001

-1.104

-0.395

BFI_E

0.593

0.113

0.330

5.262

< .001

0.371

0.816

BFI_N

0.341

0.151

0.190

2.254

0.026

0.042

0.640

BFI_O

0.182

0.144

0.076

1.263

0.208

-0.103

0.467

Appendix A
The following list of words 5-7 letters in length were randomly selected with replacement by
randomlists.com/random-words. The words are presented in the order they were generated. Some
words were shortened to conform to the letter limit (e.g., ThoughtfulàThought;
SequoiasàSequoia), and any duplicates were deleted.
1. Acrid

19. Depend

37. Drink

2. Collar

20. Rescue

38. Wiggly

3. Ground

21. Snatch

39. Whisper

4. Soggy

22. Notice

40. Rebel

5. Groan

23. Spooky

41. North

6. Gaudy

24. Waste

42. Start

7. Harass

25. Cobweb

43. Whine

8. Common

26. Giraffe

44. Greasy

9. Station

27. Belief

45. Paste

10. Unite

28. Oatmeal

46. Elderly

11. Birth

29. Flash

47. Reason

12. Grouch

30. Weary

48. Magenta

13. Solid

31. Signal

49. Bashful

14. Whole

32. Elegant

50. Morning

15. Feeble

33. Follow

51. Thought

16. Wealth

34. Tooth

52. Chalk

17. Grate

35. Coward

53. Certain

18. Enter

36. Juggle

54. Paddle
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55. Color

74. Ablaze

93. Homely

56. Stamp

75. Mammoth

94. Jolly

57. Shiver

76. Gather

95. Gloves

58. Muddled

77. Flame

96. Boast

59. Warlike

78. Point

97. Offbeat

60. Rifle

79. Thank

98. Swanky

61. Sugar

80. Faint

99. Release

62. Chess

81. Butter

100. Travel

63. Onerous

82. Planes

101. Request

64. Scatter

83. Afford

102. Powder

65. Sequoia

84. Unusual

103. Craven

66. Racial

85. Unable

104. Capable

67. Legal

86. Innate

105. Correct

68. Brother

87. Various

106. Decide

69. Cover

88. Festive

107. Zebra

70. Trouble

89. Faded

108. Settle

71. Vigor

90. Coast

109. Wield

72. Melodic

91. Blush

110. Train

73. Marvel

92. Torpid
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Appendix B
The following list of words 5-7 letters in length were retrieved from a list of obscure words
described on the website as “hard, random words pulled from the dictionary, meant for advanced
spellers/vocabulary learners”. www.vocabulary.com/lists/270631
1. Anomie

20. Gharry

39. Pyxis

2. Auspex

21. Ghrelin

40. Quagga

3. Banzai

22. Gouache

41. Quamash

4. Bhakti

23. Hryvnia

42. Quartan

5. Borzoi

24. Indite

43. Samovar

6. Byrnie

25. Ipecac

44. Schwa

7. Calaba

26. Jugale

45. Soffit

8. Carioca

27. Keloid

46. Styptic

9. Chaddar

28. Knawel

47. Sylph

10. Chirk

29. Kuvasz

48. Talaria

11. Coterie

30. Lempira

49. Tercet

12. Cymose

31. Llano

50. Thalweg

13. Ectopia

32. Lygaeid

51. Thyrsus

14. Eocene

33. Motile

52. Tokamak

15. Finnic

34. Naiad

53. Tympani

16. Flaccid

35. Obloquy

54. Tzetze

17. Fovea

36. Pibroch

55. Xeroma

18. Fuzee

37. Puerile

19. Galere

38. Pyaemia
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Appendix C
Proportions of Anagrams Correctly Unscrambled in Study 3
Word

Anagram

Seen

Proportion

SE

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

Cheating Condition
PAPER

PPAER

13

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

JELLY

YLLEJ

13

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

XEROMA

AERXMO

13

0.538

0.138

0.267

0.809

PEACOCK

PAECOCK

13

0.923

0.074

0.778

1.068

BOOKS

SKOOB

13

0.923

0.074

0.778

1.068

GLOVES

GVOLES

13

0.846

0.100

0.650

1.042

TOMATO

TAMOTO

13

0.923

0.074

0.778

1.068

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

13

0.231

0.117

0.002

0.460

TICKET

TIKCET

13

0.846

0.100

0.650

1.042

JOLLY

YOLLJ

13

0.923

0.074

0.778

1.068

No Cheating Condition
PAPER

PPAER

20

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

JELLY

YLLEJ

20

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

XEROMA

AERXMO

20

0.300

0.102

0.099

0.501

PEACOCK

PAECOCK

20

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

BOOKS

SKOOB

20

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

GLOVES

GVOLES

20

0.900

0.067

0.769

1.031

TOMATO

TAMOTO

20

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

20

0.250

0.097

0.060

0.440

TICKET

TIKCET

20

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000
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JOLLY

YOLLJ

20

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

Impossible No Cheating Condition
PAPER

PPAER

14

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

JELLY

YLLEJ

14

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

XEROMA

AERXMO

14

0.357

0.128

0.106

0.608

GHRELIN

IHLGENR

14

0.357

0.128

0.106

0.608

HRYVNIA

NIVAHYR

14

0.214

0.110

-0.001

0.429

JUGALE

LUJGAE

14

0.214

0.110

-0.001

0.429

AUSPEX

USEPXA

14

0.214

0.110

-0.001

0.429

KNAWEL

AKNEWL

14

0.214

0.110

-0.001

0.429

TYMPANI

AIMYTPN

14

0.214

0.110

-0.001

0.429

FINNIC

IICFNN

14

0.214

0.110

-0.001

0.429
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Appendix D
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Appendix E
SRP III – R13
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about you. You can be
honest because your name will be detached from the answers as soon as they are submitted.
1
Disagree
Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4
Agree

5
Agree
Strongly

1. I’m a rebellious person.

1

2

3

4

5

2. I’m more tough-minded than other

1

2

3

4

5

3. I think I could "beat" a lie detector.

1

2

3

4

5

4. I have taken illegal drugs (e.g.,

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

7. Most people are wimps.

1

2

3

4

5

8. I purposely flatter people to get them on

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

11. It tortures me to see an injured animal.

1

2

3

4

5

12. I have assaulted a law enforcement

1

2

3

4

5

people.

marijuana, ecstasy).
5. I have never been involved in
delinquent gang activity.
6. I have never stolen a truck, car or
motorcycle.

my side.
9. I’ve often done something dangerous
just for the thrill of it.
10. I have tricked someone into giving me
money.

official or social worker.

156

1

2

3

4

5

14. I always plan out my weekly activities.

1

2

3

4

5

15. I like to see fist-fights.

1

2

3

4

5

16. I’m not tricky or sly.

1

2

3

4

5

17. I’d be good at a dangerous job because I 1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

22. I never miss appointments.

1

2

3

4

5

23. I avoid horror movies.

1

2

3

4

5

24. I trust other people to be honest.

1

2

3

4

5

25. I hate high speed driving.

1

2

3

4

5

26. I feel so sorry when I see a homeless

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

28. I enjoy doing wild things.

1

2

3

4

5

29. I have broken into a building or vehicle

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

13. I have pretended to be someone else in
order to get something.

make fast decisions.
18. I have never tried to force someone to
have sex.
19. My friends would say that I am a warm
person.
20. I would get a kick out of ‘scamming’
someone.
21. I have never attacked someone with the
idea of injuring them.

person.
27. It's fun to see how far you can push
people before they get upset.

in order to steal something or vandalize.
30. I don’t bother to keep in touch with my
family any more.
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31. I find it difficult to manipulate people.

1

2

3

4

5

32. I rarely follow the rules.

1

2

3

4

5

33. I never cry at movies.

1

2

3

4

5

34. I have never been arrested.

1

2

3

4

5

35. You should take advantage of other

1

2

3

4

5

36. I don’t enjoy gambling for real money.

1

2

3

4

5

37. People sometimes say that I’m cold-

1

2

3

4

5

38. People can usually tell if I am lying.

1

2

3

4

5

39. I like to have sex with people I barely

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

41. Sometimes you have to pretend you like 1

2

3

4

5

people before they do it to you.

hearted.

know.
40. I love violent sports and movies.
people to get something out of them.
42. I am an impulsive person.

1

2

3

4

5

43. I have taken hard drugs (e.g., heroin,

1

2

3

4

5

44. I'm a soft-hearted person.

1

2

3

4

5

45. I can talk people into anything.

1

2

3

4

5

46. I never shoplifted from a store.

1

2

3

4

5

47. I don’t enjoy taking risks.

1

2

3

4

5

48. People are too sensitive when I tell

1

2

3

4

5

49. I was convicted of a serious crime.

1

2

3

4

5

50. Most people tell lies everyday.

1

2

3

4

5

cocaine).

them the truth about themselves.
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1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

53. People cry way too much at funerals.

1

2

3

4

5

54. You can get what you want by telling

1

2

3

4

5

55. I easily get bored.

1

2

3

4

5

56. I never feel guilty over hurting others.

1

2

3

4

5

57. I have threatened people into giving me

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

51. I keep getting in trouble for the same
things over and over.
52. Every now and then I carry a weapon
(knife or gun) for protection.

people what they want to hear.

money, clothes, or makeup.
58. A lot of people are “suckers” and can
easily be fooled.
59. I admit that I often “mouth off” without
thinking.
60. I sometimes dump friends that I don’t
need any more.
61. I would never step on others to get what
I want.
62. I have close friends who served time in
prison.
63. I purposely tried to hit someone with
the vehicle I was driving.
64. I have violated my parole from prison.

SCORING
Interpersonal Manipulation (IPM)
3, 8, 13, 16R, 20, 24R, 27, 31R, 35, 38R, 41, 45, 50, 54, 58, 61R
Callous Affect (CA)
2, 7, 11R, 15, 19R, 23R, 26R, 30, 33, 37, 40, 44R, 48, 53, 56, 60
Erratic Life Style (ELS)
1, 4, 9, 14R, 17, 22R, 25R, 28, 32, 36R, 39, 42, 47R, 51, 55, 59
Anti-Social Behavior (ASB)
5R, 6R, 10, 12, 18R, 21R, 29, 34R, 43, 46R, 49, 52, 57, 62, 63, 64
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